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This Working Paper forms part of a series of five volumes 
dealing with the "Europeanisation" of product safety law. They 
are the result of a study carried out on behalf of the Commission 
of the EC which has so far been published only in German*. The 
publication of this English version has been made possible by a 
grant from Directorate General XL
The five volumes of this series of Working Papers should 
thus be read in context. Volume 1 (Chapter I) aims to show why 
product safety law has given rise to extremely diverse regulation 
patterns and to provide an overview of the most important 
instruments for action.
Volumes 2 and 3 (Chapter II) are concerned with recent 
developments in the relevant legislation of the economically most 
important Community Member States and of the United States. 
Volume 2 (Chapter II, Parts 1 and 2) contains reports on France 
and the United Kingdom, Volume 3 (Chapter II parts 3 and 4) 
deals with the Federal Republic of Germany and the US 
Consumer Product Safety Act 1972, which is of crucial 
importance in the international debate.
Volume 4 (Chapters HI and IV) analyses the development of 
the "traditional" policy of approximation of law and of efforts at a 
"horizontal" European product safety policy. In both policy areas 
it proved impossible to realise the Community's programmatic
* Christian Joerges, Josef Falke, Hans-W. Micklitz, Die Sicherheit von 





























































































goals. As far as policy on achieving the internal market is 
concerned, the Commission itself has pointed out the reasons and 
called for, and implemented, a fundamental revision of traditional 
legal approximation policy. This reorientation of Community 
policy is dealt with in Chapters IV; it describes the most 
important precursors of the new internal market policy, namely 
ECJ case law on Articles 30 and 36 EEC since the Cassis de 
Dijon judgment, and regulatory technique for the Low Voltage 
Directive and then analyses the new approach to technical 
harmonisation and standards, whereby the Community will 
restrict itself in its directives to setting "essential safety 
requirements", leaving it to European and national 
standardisation bodies to convert these safety requirements into 
technical specifications.
Volume 5 (Chapters V and VI) evaluates the effects of the 
Community's new approach to technical harmonisation and 
standards on product safety policy. Chapter V diagnoses a new 
need for action in the area of product safety policy, including in 
particular the internal organisation of the standardisation process, 
and participation by consumer associations in European 
standardisation. Chapter VI continues a comprehensive 
discussion of alternatives open for co-ordinating internal market 
and product safety policy. It argues that a policy of 
"deregulating" Member States' product safety legislation would 
not be feasible, and opts for a "positive" supplementation of the 
new approach by a horizontal Community product safety policy. 
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Exam ples o f  product safety legislation  
Part 3:
Product safety policy  in the Federal Republic o f  Ger­
many
The description of product safety policy in the Federal Re­
public of Germany will concentrate mainly on the Appliances 
Safety Act and its implementation in practice (3.3) and on techni­
cal standardisation of relevance to safety (3.4). A final section 
deals with liability for technical consumer products that cause 
damage (3.5). The account is introduced by notes on home and 
leisure accident research (3.1) and a discussion on some general 
questions on the German system of reference to technical stan­
dards (3.2).
3.1 Research into home and leisure accidents
While industrial accidents in particular have for years been 
fairly completely covered by the occupational accident insurance 
associations, as have road accidents and accidents in schools and 
nurseries1, the Federal Republic lacks comparable statistics for 
the area of home and leisure. The Federal Government did not 
take part2 in the Community pilot experiment relating to a Com-
1 Cf. the Federal Government reports on the state of accident prevention 
and the accident situation in the Federal Republic of Germany 
(Accident Prevention Report) the latest being the Accident Prevention 




























































































munity system of information on accidents involving products 
outside the spheres of occupational activities and road traffic3, 
and was also reluctant about the demonstration project decided 
on in April 1986 with a view to introducing a Community system 
of information on accidents involving consumer products4. It 
based itself primarily on a study concerning home and leisure ac­
cidents, carried out by the Association of Liability Insurers, Ac­
cident Insurers, Automobile Insurers and Legal Costs Insurers 
(HUK-Verband e.V.)5; until then, findings on home and leisure 
accidents were available only for selected groups of people and 
types of accidents6.
The HUK study treats as a home or leisure accident, an oc­
currence in which a person doing something involved with either 
road traffic, an occupation or school suffers an injury requiring 
medical treatment or leading to impairment for at least several 
days. An initial survey asked 89,393 representatively sampled 
households7 whether one or several household members had suf­
fered a home or leisure accident in the last 12 months. The fig­
ures collected are not stated, though the projection based on them 
is. This estimates home and leisure accidents with personal in­
juries requiring medical treatment or at least leading to rather 
long-time impairment at some 3 million for the Federal Republic; 
15% of those injured will require hospital treatment. The number
2 On the ground that project was too costly and that it was intending to 
promote surveys carried out at regular intervals. See answer to written 
question No. 2194/84, OJ C 203, 12 August 1985, 3.
3 Cf. Council Decision 81/623/EEC of 23 July 1981, OJ L 229, 13 Au­
gust 1981, 1 etseq.
4 O JL  109,26 April 1986, 23 etseq.
5 Pfundt, 1985. Cf. Mertens, BArbBl. 5/1986, 321 et seq.; idem, 1986, 
246 et seq. On the methodology of accident analysis, see also Pfundt, 
1986.
6 The findings are briefly summarised in Pfundt, 1985, 205-11. Cf. also 
Compes, 1986; Kern, 1986; Henter/Milarch/Hermanns, 1978; specifi­




























































































of trivial home and leisure accidents is estimated at over 100 
million per year8. It is further stated that in 1982 approximately 
11,000 fatal accidents occurred in road traffic, some 2,500 at 
work or school, and some 12,000 at home or in leisure time. 
More than 75% of the last group of victims are over 649.
In methodological evaluation of the study, the ex­
tremely high forgetfulness curve should be noted. For 
the period within a month of the survey, 5.3 times as 
many accidents are mentioned as in the period within 
12 months of the survey; for accidents with in-patient 
treatment, there was still a forgetfulness factor of 2.1 
for the same period10. This rales out comparison of the 
HUK study with accident survey systems that collect 
Figures directly from accident stations immediately af­
ter the accident, and also arouses doubt as to the relia­
bility of the detailed accounts of the circumstances of 
accidents. Doubts about the study's methodological 
grip arise also from the fact that not a single accident 
resulting in death was covered and that the proportion 
of accidents involving children was only 15%, whereas 
for instance in the Netherlands study it was 30%n .
A second phase of survey asked for further details on the 
course and consequences of accidents, in telephone interviews on 
a total of 3,064 accidents12. The breakdown by individual cate­
gory of accident is as follows13:
7 Not including foreigners and people living in institutions.
8 Pfundt, 1985, 9.
9 Op. cit., 10-14.
10 Op. cit., 4.
11 Report of 1984 Data Home Accident Surveillance System, Amsterdam 
1985, 18.
12 By way of comparison, the Dutch accident survey system in 1984 cov­
ered some 70,000 cases.




























































































Accidents in sport and games 
Accidents in locomotion 
Accidents in manipulation 







Manipulation accidents are 12% with a machine and 32% 
with a tool. These two categories together make up 8% of all ac­
cidents surveyed; because of the relatively slight consequences of 
the accidents and the resulting higher forgetfulness rate, the pro­
portion is probably to be estimated higher in reality14.
The case studies did not from the outset provide any cate­
gory for covering design-related causes of accidents, but made 
only the following behaviour-based assignments15:
— Infringement of elementary safety rules 2%
— Failure to observe a fairly obvious safety mle 15%
— Everyday situation that "went wrong" 72%
— Accident to child because of clumsiness, with
adult unable to intervene 10%
As a whole, the HUK study summarises to the effect that 
technical inadequacies in newly purchased machines, tools or ap­
pliances seem to play no part in the causation of home and leisure 
accidents. The Appliances Safety Act was supposed to have en­
sured that hardly any inadequate, dangerous to handle machines 
were still being sold. 99% of home and leisure accidents are seen 
as being the consequences of more or less serious mistaken ac­
tions16.
In his politically ambitious account and assessment of the 
study, Mertens comes to the conclusion that accidents with appli­
ances and machines as yet undamaged by wear and tear that have 
been used properly and safely, accounted for much less than
14 Op. cit., 40-44.
15 Calculated from Pfundt 1985, 163-165, 184. On the methodological 




























































































0.5% of all home and leisure accidents17. This supposedly obvi­
ous conclusion, that the major part of appliance and machine ac­
cidents are due to improper or unsafe use or to damage through 
wear and tear, can derive support only from the "case studies"18 
on the handling accidents, which are, however, full of very ten­
dentious assessments. Mertens also presupposes that wear and 
tear and mistaken actions are negligible when it comes to setting 
technical standards. The Stiftung Warentest comes to a quite dif­
ferent estimate. It believes that many accidents today classed as 
user-caused could very quickly come to be seen as appliance 
caused if the necessary creativity were applied to thinking how 
foreseeable misuse could be avoided by suitable technical ar­
rangements19.
We do not wish here to go any further into the fact that in 
1984, 24% of appliances tested by trade inspection offices in any 
case proved defective20 nor into the serious, widespread short­
comings in systematic market control by the North Rhine-West- 
phalia Central Office for safety technique that have come to 
light21. One observation of Mertens that remains convincing is 
that data collection on accidents must be made much more de­
tailed if it is to be of use for technical standardisation. What he 
deduces from this, however, is not the need for intensive directed 
studies, for instance on handling accidents with appliances and 
tools, but instead the basic principle of "hazard analysis that has 
stood the test of decades" which makes it possible to prevent ac­
cidents beforehand by applying technical safety principles to re-
16 Loc. cit., 190.
17 Mertens, BArbBl. 5/1986, 34.
18 Pfundt, 1985,96-188.
19 Loose, 1986, 366.
20 For details here see the survey in Chapter II, 3.3.5.
21 For details see the 1984 Annual Report of the Trade Supervisory Of­




























































































moving danger spots and sources of risk. According to Mertens, 
the Community should "concentrate more on intensifying 
supranational work on technical safety regulations and stan­
dards"22, instead of focusing its accident prevention work on ap­
pliance and machine accidents that have already occurred.
3.2 The reference technique in general
A characteristic of German product safety law, as of Ger­
man safety law in general, is the "inteiplay between governmen­
tal legal standards and private technical standards drawn up by 
technical and scientific associations, in a complex multilayered 
system of standards"23. The object of technical safety law is on 
the one hand, to protect life, health, property and the environment 
against damage from technical products and installations, and on 
the other, to provide legal guarantees in connection with eco­
nomic activities bound up with certain technical risks. To this 
end, statutes and legal ordinances lay down binding safety objec­
tives, vaguely defined using such formulae as "generally recog­
nised rules of the art", "state of the art" or "state of science and 
technology". These indefinite legal concepts are amplified by ref­
erences to technical rules or standards drawn up by public-law
22 Mertens, BArbBl. 5/1986, 34-35.
23 Marburger, 1979, 111. A typical example is the resolution of the 
Common Committee for Technology of 2 December 1966 (published 
in VDI Information No. 14, April 1967), which says: "technical knowl­
edge and its application are subject to rapidly, steadily advancing de­
velopment. . . .  The usual procedure of governmental law-making, 
aimed at codifying an area as exhaustively as possible, is therefore not 
suitable for keeping up with accelerating technical development 
through legal rules. . . . Governmental law-making should therefore 
confine itself in the technical area to setting the necessary requirements 
and criteria for the general good, leaving it to the organised, represen­
tative knowledge of experts from theory and practice to determine how 
precisely these requirements and criteria can be met in technical rules 





























































































committees of experts or by private standardisation associations. 
Manufacturers or users of potentially dangerous technical prod­
ucts or installations are not legally bound by the technical rales or 
standards, but may choose other solutions if at least the same 
level of safety is achieved (deviation clause). This is intended to 
take account of the rapid development of modem technology and 
avoid hampering progress and producing rapid outdaring.
The choice among the expressions "generally recognised 
rales of the art", "state of the art" and "state of science and tech­
nology" determines the lag in adapting legal requirements to 
technical or scientific advance24. The legally indefinite expres­
sion "generally recognised rales of the art" focuses on the pre­
vailing view among technical practitioners, on what is generally 
regarded as tried and tested in professional practice. This crite­
rion always lies behind further technical advance. The formula 
"state of the art" shifts the legal criterion for what is permitted or 
commanded to the front line of technical development; the deci­
sive point is not what is generally recognised or established in 
practice, but what is technically necessary, appropriate and possi­
ble, even if commercial practice is not yet in line with it. If a 
requirement mentions the "state of science and technology", those 
precautionary measures regarded as necessary according to the 
latest scientific findings must be used. If this cannot yet be 
achieved technically, permission may not be issued, since the 
limit to the requirement is not set by what is currently technically 
achievable. Detailed technical rales have been displaced from the 
context of governmental law-making to the allegedly more flexi­
ble level of non-governmental regulation, so as to permit quicker 
adaptation to technical progress but above all to allow for repre­
sentative collaboration by "interested circles" in industry and the
24 Fundamental to the reference trial is the so-called Kalkar decision of 
the German Constitutional Court of 8 August 1978, BVerfGE 49, 80 




























































































economy, science, technical monitoring organisations and other 
interested and expert groups in society. P. Marburger speaks of 
the structural principles of flexibility and co-operation25. R. Wolf 
calls the standardisation logic of technical regulation a "self-reg­
ulatory mechanism in the shadow of regulative policy"26. Before 
dealing with the specific form of private technical standardisation 
and its controlled adoption by government in the area of safety of 
technical consumer goods in detail, we shall briefly summarise 
the German debate on the legal admissibility of reference to tech­
nical rules27, since the legal admissibility of the new approach to 
technical harmonisation and standards raises similar questions.
There is no dispute as to the admissibility of rigid refer­
ence28 in which a law or regulation refers to a quite specific ver­
sion of a technical rule. Here the legislator can verify the content 
of the technical standard, and the content of the standard referred 
to cannot be altered without assent by the legislator. Rigid refer­
ence to technical standards is nothing other than a drafting abbre­
viation in the text of the statute, It does not transfer any leg­
islative powers to non-legitimated non-governmental bodies, and 
it complies with the constitutional principle of certainty of law. 
Due to the amplitude of the reference, the content of the technical
Marburger, 1979, 145-176; Rittstieg, 1982, 21-43; Wolf, 1986, 277- 
295.
25 Marburger, 1979, 117-20.
26 Wolf, 1986, 153-59. The effect of unburdening the State was already 
stressed by Gasde, 1972.
27 See Marburger, 1979, 379-407; idem, Gleitende Verweisung, 1982; 
idem, Rechtliche Bedeutung, 1982, 129-135; Schwierz, 1986, 63-99; 
Ossenbühl, 1967; Karpen, 1970; idem, 1976; Arndt, 1979; Brugger, 
1987, 41-44; Buckenberger, 1982; Schnapauff, 1982; Staats, 1978; 
Strecker, 1979; Vogel, 1979; Emst, 27-41. Finally, see also Ar­
beitsschutzsystem, Bd. 1, 1980, 299-308.
28 On rigid reference, see Marburger, 1979, 387-89; Hunscha, 1982; 



























































































rule referred to is binding not only for the administration but the 
citizen as well.
Since rigid reference bindingly prescribes a particular tech­
nical solution, it is a suitable method for linking legal standards 
with technical mles only where one or several technical standards 
can be referred to, where technical development has already 
reached some sort of end-point and major innovations are un­
likely, or will remain irrelevant as far as the object of legal pro­
tection is concerned. By comparison with statutory regulation of 
individual technical questions, rigid reference means unburden­
ing the legislative bodies and the statutory text of detailed techni­
cal questions, allowing more flexible adaptation to technical ad­
vance, since it is not the text of the statute or regulation that has 
to be reworked, but only a formal correction to the reference that 
is required.
The admissibility of sliding or dynamic reference, where 
reference is made to one or more technical standards in their most 
current form, was long disputed29. P. Marburger names four leg­
islative functions of sliding reference30:
— To free the legislator or regulator of a regulatory task for 
which they usually lack the necessary technical under­
standing31 (unburdening the legislator);
— To keep the text of the statute or ordinance free of compli­
cated and often very voluminous detailed technical provi­
sions (unburdening the law);
29 On sliding or dynamic reference, see Marburger, 1979, 390-407; 
Schwierz, 1986, 57-99; Marburger, Gleitende Verweisung, 1982; 
Buckenberger, 1982; Schnapauff, 1982.
30 Marburger, Gleitende Verweisung, 1982, 29-30; idem, 379-383.
31 More clearly, it may be said that in the area of technology the State has 
a structural information deficit vis-à-vis the industry that does the re­




























































































— To allow rapid adaptation of the content of the law to tech­
nical advance, by shifting the technical details of safety reg­
ulation out of the formal legislative procedure (flexibility);
— To allow involvement of expert circles in law-making (co­
operation).
The involvement of "expert" circles may be a guarantee that 
technically practicable and also adequate safety solutions will be 
adopted if it can be made certain that the competent experts are in 
fact represented on the relevant standards committees. Involve­
ment of those concerned in establishing technical standards ought 
to increase willingness to comply with the standards. This ought 
not, however, to be bought at the price of adopting objectively 
unsuitable regulations because of one-sided representation of in­
terests — and "expert" circles are always also "interested" circles. 
The interests concerned must be represented truly comprehen­
sively, including suppliers, consumers and representatives of the 
public interest32. The procedure of private technical regulation, 
and specifically the way it is actually done and not what it said on 
paper, decides whether sliding reference will lead to adoption of 
apposite regulations in the public interest or decisions in the par­
ticular interest of manufacturers33.
Large constitutional objections have been raised against the 
admissibility of sliding reference to technical rules34. It has been 
seen as disguised transference of law-making power to private 
persons, as infringement of the democracy principle, of the con­
stitutionality principle, specifically of the precept of certainty and 
clarity of law, of the requirement for proper publication of laws 
and of the principle of separation of powers.
32 Cf. Marburger, Gleitende Verweisung, 1982, 30.
33 For details on the procedure for drawing up DIN standards see Chapter 
II, 3.4.3 infra.





























































































These objections are upheld against the admissibility of 
sliding reference in supplementation o f standards, making refer­
ence directly and bindingly to technical standards in their succes­
sively current forms35. With this form of reference, in which the 
technical regulations referred to become binding law in their cur­
rent version for both citizen and administration, the legislator or 
regulator refrains from determining the content of the law, or 
leaving it to private standardisation bodies. What this comes 
down to is a blanket law, a law whose content can be altered at 
the whim of the private regulator.
Sliding reference in specifications o f norms716 occurs always 
in connection with an indefinite term in the legal text, which it 
serves to specify. The law may, for instance, prescribe compli­
ance with the "recognised rules of the art"; as a rider or in con­
nection with this, it may then be stated that particular technical 
standards count as such recognised rules of the art. What is 
legally binding on the manufacturer of a product or the operator 
of an installation is only compliance with the statutory safety 
standard, which thus conclusively determines the duties as to 
conduct. Often special procedures are being developed to control 
response to relevant technical rales. Thus, the Federal Ministry 
for Labour and Social Affairs verifies DIN standards of relevance 
to safety before including them in list A of the General Adminis­
trative Regulation under the Appliances Safety Act37. The new 
approach to technical harmonisation and standards likewise cre­
ates, through administration of the list of standards, a possibility 
of checking the harmonised standards and the declared national
35 On this see Marburger, 1979, 390-395, idem, Gleitende Verweisung, 
1982, 31-34.
36 On this see Marburger, 1979, 395-407; idem, Gleitende Verweisung, 
1982, 34-37. Schwierz, 1986, 61-62 speaks about "dynamic references 
that prescribe a general safety criterion".




























































































equivalent ones for their compliance with the underlying safety 
requirements38.
This additional reference to specific technical rules is in­
tended on the one hand, to give addressees of the norm an indi­
cation of how to comply with the legal safety requirements, and 
on the other, to oblige the competent authorities to accept appli­
ances or installations that meet the technical standards listed. 
Firms are free to choose solutions non complying with the tech­
nical rules provided that at least the same level of safety is at­
tained. If they keep to the listed technical standards, there is a 
refutable presumption that the statutory safety duty has been met. 
Whether a technical regulation referred to in fact meets the 
statutory safety standard is subject to judicial verification. The 
competent administrative authorities remain free to act against a 
product manufactured or installation operated in accordance with 
the standards in cases of a concrete risk. Observance of technical 
standards acts merely as an indicator of compliance with the 
statutory safety obligation.
3.3 The Appliances Safety Act and its application in practice
The German law on technical appliances (the Gerätesicher­
heitsgesetz — Appliances Safety Act (GSG))39 is regarded as a 
model for both the Low Voltage Directive and the new approach 
to technical harmonisation and standards. The GSG, an offshoot 
of labour protection law, has developed into one of the most im-
38 For more on this see Chapter IV, 3.3.
39 Of 24 June 1968 (BGBl. I, 717), last amended on 18 February 1986 
(BGBl. I, 265). In general on the GSG see Schmatz/Nöthlichs, 
Gerätesicherheitsgesetz. Kommentar und Textsammlung, Sonderaus­
gabe aus dem Handbuch "Sicherheitstechnik", hrsg. von 




























































































portant German laws for preventive protection of consumers 
against defective products, and at the same time forms a link 
between governmental product safety policy and safety-related 
technical standardisation. In presenting the GSG, one must there­
fore immediately include technical standardisation of relevance 
to safety.
3.3.1 Lines of development
The 1929 Industrial Safety Bill already included the basic 
idea of guaranteeing safety for workers through quality require­
ments on appliances; the competent authorities themselves were 
to determine the requirements on machines needed to protect 
workers' life and health. In the same year, the ILO adopted a rec­
ommendation on responsibility for protective devices on me­
chanically driven machines. In 1963, it extended its earlier 
recommendation and decided on Convention No. 119 on machine 
protection, with the supplementary recommendation No. 118. 
This was the basis for the Machine Safety Bill 
(Maschinenschutzgesetz)40; which assumed the following guidelines:
— All technical appliances should be covered, whether for use 
in factory, office, home or leisure;
— Safety requirements on appliances should not be detailed in 
regulations, but emerge from safety rules developed by ex­
perts;
mann, Gerätesicherheitsgesetz; Lindemeyer; Diekershoff, 1985; Mar- 
burger, 1979, 71-78.
40 On the historical background to the development see Lukes, 1969, 220 
f.; Eberstein, 1969, 1292 f.; Diekershoff, 1985, 609-611; Jeiter, 1980, 
1-4; Peine, 1986, Einführung, Nos. 5-15. Cf. also the explanatory 





























































































— In principle, manufacturers or importers should be responsi­
ble for the perfect safety of products.
This meant that three decisive steps had been taken: manu­
facturer responsibility was to aim at preventive hazard elimina­
tion through safety-minded development, design and manufacture 
of technical appliances. Until then, only the employer had been 
under an obligation, as part of a labour-law duty of care in accor­
dance with the industrial safety and accident prevention regula­
tions, to make only safe appliances and machines available to the 
employees on his premises. Even more than the businessman, the 
non-commercial final consumer is with advancing technical con­
tent, no longer in the position to verify the technical safety of ap­
pliances. Accordingly, the idea developed in the industrial safety 
context of preventive hazard protection is consistently extended 
to all technical utility goods, including those for home and 
leisure use41. With the rapid development of technology and the 
range of goods offered, the focus is placed not on administrative 
quality requirements but on the generally recognised rules of the 
art, to which special provisions and regulations are a guide. The 
supervisory authorities confine themselves to spot checks and to 
intervention in hazardous situations.
Effective from January 198042, the law on technical work 
materials that had come into force in November 1968 with the 
brief title "Maschinenschutzgesetz" (Machine Safety Act) was 
amended. It was given a new brief title "Gerätesicherheitsgesetz" 
(Appliances Safety Act), more appropriate to its broadened 
scope; it assumed inspection of installations, provided legal guar­
antees for the safety mark "GS = geprüfte Sicherheit" (safety-
41 The title of Lukes' 1969 article is significant.
42 Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes über technische Arbeitsmittel und 




























































































tested) introduced by the Federal Minister of Labour, and its 
scope was, to some extent, extended to dealers43.
3.3.2 Scope
The GSG is addressed to manufacturers and importers in so 
far as they market or display technical work materials by way of 
trade, or independently in the context of a business undertaking 
(§ 1 (1) GSG). Although the Lander44, the consumer associations 
and the Trade Supervisory Offices45 had advocated bringing 
dealers fully under the GSG, they were covered only exception­
ally46 on the grounds that retailers were not in a position to make 
technical safety assessments of products and that there were suf­
ficient possibilities of fighting the danger at source. § 1 (3) GSG 
explicitly states that the employer's responsibility under the in­
dustrial safety and accident prevention regulations remains unaf­
fected. In this connection, particular importance is attached to § 5 
of the Accident Prevention Regulations, "General Provisions" 
(VBG 1), which obliges the businessman to require suppliers to 
furnish only those technical work materials that are in line with 
the Accident Prevention Regulations and the generally accepted 
rules of the art in safety technique and industrial medicine.
The GSG applies to all technical work materials for which 
there are no specific regulations. Accordingly, it does not apply 
to vehicles in so far as they are subject to road traffic regulations,
43 On the latter, see the Joint Declaration by Trade and Industry Federa­
tions on the application of the Appliances Safety Act of 25 April 1978, 
printed in Jeiter, 1980, 7-9.
44 Cf. the explanatory statement by Bayems on the amendment to the 
GtA proposed in July 1977, BR-Drs. 133/77, 3-4.
45 See Wilke, 1980, 67-68.




























































































nor to technical work materials which by nuclear safety provi­
sions are subject to special requirements, or which are used ex­
clusively by the Army, the Technisches Hilfswerk, the border 
guards or the police, nor where other provisions aimed at hazard 
prevention pursuant to § 3 GSG regulate the marketing or display 
of technical work materials (§ 1 (2) GSG). Accordingly, for in­
stance, toys are governed by the Foodstuffs and Consumer Goods 
Act as regards any toxic properties, and by the GSG with respect 
to mechanical risks.
Technical work materials are, according to § 2 (1) GSG, 
ready-for-use equipment such as tools, working equipment, 
working machinery, powered machinery, and lifting and con­
veying devices which can be used for their purpose without the 
addition of other parts. This work equipment is by § 2 (2) GSG 
placed on the same footing as protective equipment, lighting, 
heating, cooling, ventilating or air-conditioning equipment, 
household appliances, sports and do-it-yourself appliances and 
toys47. Appliances intended exclusively for export may be dis­
played on Federal territory even though they do not meet the re­
quirements of the GSG, provided that it is clearly indicated that 
they are intended only for export48.
3.3.3 General safety obligation — § 3 (1) GSG
The core of the GSG is the general safety duty under § 3 (1) 
GSG:
47 This provision once again demonstrates the GSG's origin in industrial 
safety and its extension into the home and leisure area.





























































































"A manufacturer or importer of technical work materi­
als may market or display these only if they are, ac­
cording to the generally recognised rules of tire art and 
the industrial safety and accident prevention provi­
sions, of such a nature that users or third parties are 
when properly using them, protected against dangers of 
all kinds to life or health as far as the nature of that 
proper use permits. Generally accepted rules of the art 
and the industrial safety and accident prevention provi­
sions may be departed from where equal safety is guar­
anteed in another manner".
Users and third parties are thus to be protected against dan­
gers of all kind to life and health. By way of guaranteeing com­
prehensive hazard protection, § 2 (4) of the General Administra­
tive Provisions on the GSG (AVV-GSG)49 explicitly states that 
this concerns not only the classical technical aspects of safety 
such as protection against moving parts or pieces thrown off, sta­
bility or protection against touching current-carrying parts50, but 
also such hazards as those resulting from noise, air pollution, heat 
emission or other effects of use. This means that ergonomic ap­
proaches have to be taken into account and all possible effects of 
working materials on their users are to be considered51.
However comprehensively the object of protection may be 
defined, the other elements of the general safety duty on manu­
facturers and importers are defined restrictively.
49 27 October 1970, Bundesanzeiger No. 205, 3 November 1970, 
amended by AVV, 11 June 1979, Bundesanzeiger No. 108, 13 June 
1979.
50 On this cf. DIN 31000/VDE 1000.





























































































The GSG protects the user only in so far as he uses appli­
ances "properly". § 2 (5) GSG contains a legal definition, naming 
two circumstances from which proper use emerges: (1) a subjec­
tive characteristic, namely the manufacturer's or importer’s indi­
cations (particularly those contained in publicity) on ways of us­
ing the technical work materials; (2) an objective characteristic, 
namely the standard use deducible from the design and construc­
tion of the technical work materials.
The manufacturer's or importer's indications as to applica­
tion may contradict the normal use deducible from design and 
construction. In such cases of conflict, it is always, according to 
the Münster Administrative Appeals Tribunal52, always the nor­
mal use deducible from design and construction that applies. The 
appliance must take account of users' habits. The manufacturer 
cannot escape his responsibility through instmctions for use that 
go against the uses predictable from the appliance's design. The 
objective criterion of normal use is not subordinate to subjective 
criteria of indications from the manufacturer, but in cases of con­
flict overrides them. Otherwise, the manufacturer could avoid 
necessary safety measures through indications of use. Since the 
decision cited has apparently remained isolated, it cannot be as­
sumed that the dispute as to interpretation of proper use has 
ended. Laborious justifications continue to be used to play down 
the equal-value objective criterion of § 2 (5)(2) GSG and give 
priority in case of conflict to the manufacturer's instmctions for 
use53.
52 Judgment of 26 October 1978 by OVG Münster — XIII A 881/76, 
repnnted in Meyer, 1979, 257 et seq.
53 See Schmatz/Nôthlichs, Kennz. 1125, 11: The objective criterion was 
allegedly chosen only to make up for the manufacturer's or importer's 
shortage of data or to supplement inadequate data from the manufac­




























































































The standards underlying safety-related standardisation 
work, DIN 820, part 12 and DIN 31000/VDE 1000, in part go 
beyond § 2 (5) GSG. Thus, DIN 820, part 12 states that:
"Technical safety requirements should be specified in 
such a way that (when the product is properly used) it 
is unlikely that people, animals or things will be en­
dangered. Ergonomic considerations should apply. 
Foreseeable mistakes should be taken into account54."
This provision has wide-ranging importance, since DIN 820, 
in all its parts, is binding for the standardisation work of all spe­
cialised standard committees of the DIN55. At any rate, it pro­
vides consumer representatives on standardisation committees 
with arguments for basing the establishment of safety standards 
not on the manufacturers instmctions but on usual habits, in­
cluding mistaken ones.
DIN 31000/VDE 1000 takes the following conceptual speci­
fication for proper use:
"Proper use within the meaning of this standard is the 
use for which the technical product is suitable accord­
ing to the manufacturer's indications including those in 
publicity. In cases of doubt, it is a use that would be 
taken as usual from the design, constmction and func­
tion of the technical product. Proper use also includes 
compliance with operating and maintenance conditions 
stated and the taking of foreseeable misuse into ac­
count56.
DIN 3100/VDE 1000 starts from the basic idea that using 
technology brings hazards resulting in part from the technical
tions for normal use, the manufacturer's declarations should be given 
priority, since he may dispose of more recent data.
54 DIN 820, part 12, (3.9.1).
55 Cf. § 3 of the agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and 




























































































products themselves, in part from the way people handle techni­
cal products57. Even hazards caused by foreseeable misuse 
should be combated by design measures, primarily those of direct 
safety technology, supported by those of indirect safety tech­
nology. In practical standardisation work, the three-stage method 
for safety design58, among the engineers that more or less mo­
nopolise standardisation work is likely to diminish the impor­
tance of the debate on proper, usual or foreseeably incorrect use.
3.3.3.2 Generally recognised rules of the art and the indus­
trial safety and accident prevention provisions
§ 3 (1), the key provision of the GSG, refers in its definition 
of the safety criterion to the "generally accepted rules of the art" 
and to the industrial safety and accident prevention provisions. 
No lesser criterion could be conceived; the requirements clearly 
lag behind advancing technological development. Accordingly, 
when a technical rule is generally recognised, it is the experts that 
have to apply the rales of safety technology that are authoritative. 
They must primarily be convinced that the rules of the art are in 
line with the safety requirements to be placed on the technical 
work material. This technical safety solution need not be the one 
prevailing in practice, but must have been adequately tested in 
practice and have proved itself under operating conditions59. 
Even where the technical standards referred to follow higher re­
quirements, and are for instance based on the "state of the art", 
this does not tighten the general safety duty under § 3 (1) GSG, 
since it is only compliance with generally accepted rules of the 
art that is made binding legally.
56 DIN 31000/VDE 1000, (3.3).
57 DIN 31000/VDE 1000, (2.1).




























































































Whether DIN standards ought to come up to the "state of the 
art" or merely reflect "generally accepted rules of the art" is not 
entirely clear in DIN's own mind. On the one hand, DIN 820, part 
1, which lays down the basic principles for standardisation work, 
says that standards have to take account of the current state of 
science and technology and of economic circumstances60. In re­
ferring to the state of science and technology, DIN did not wish 
to anticipate the severest criterion in the conceptual triad of the 
Federal Constitutional Court's Kalkar Decision61/®. Along with 
the state of science and technology, economic circumstances are 
also to be "taken into account" at the same time. DIN 820, part 4, 
states that a standard must be reworked if it is no longer in line 
with the state of the art63. The guidelines for standardisation 
committees give the working groups the task of ensuring that 
standards are in line with the findings of science and the state of 
technology64. The principles for applying DIN standards state 
rather soothingly that while the rules for establishing DIN stan­
dards call for the consideration of the state of the art, it is 
nonetheless difficult to meet up with these demands due to the 
steady advance of technology65. Finally, the indications to users 
of DIN standards indicate as an objective that DIN standards 
ought to be introduced as "accepted mles of the art".
59 See the official explanatory statement on § 3 (1) GSG, BT-Drs. V/834, 
7. See also Schmatz/Notmichs, Kennz. 1135, 6-9; Diekershoff, 1985, 
615; Lindemeyer, 176; Peine, 1986, § 3, Nos. 24-29.
60 DIN 820, part 1, (5.7).
61 Decision of Federal Constitutional Court of 8 August 1978, BVerfGE 
49, 80 (135 f.).
62 DIN 820, part 1, dates from February 1974.
63 DIN 820, part 4, (4).
64 Guides for DIN standard committees, August 1982 version, point 10 
(8) (g).




























































































The clear impression one derives is that the formulations (of 
engineers) in the various DIN regulations are completely de­
tached from the conceptual considerations of lawyers on techni­
cal safety law.
The industrial safety and accident prevention regulations66 
are not binding solely in so far as they reflect the generally 
recognised state of safety technology. They are binding not be­
cause of consensus by authoritative experts, but because of the 
autonomous legislative power given by Government to the agen­
cies of legal accident insurance, or from their character as legal 
ordinances. Many industrial safety provisions are based on the 
enabling provisions of §§ 120 e, 139 a GewO (industrial code); 
others on the Chemicals Act, the Nuclear Act, the Explosive Act 
or the Federal Mining Act. Important examples of mandatory in­
dustrial safety provisions include:
— Verordnung über Acetylenanlagen und Calciumcarbidlager, 
27.2.1980 (BGBl. I, 220) (Ordinance on Acetylene Plants 
and Calcium Carbide Stores), with a number of technical 
mies for Acetylene Plants and Calcium Carbide Stores, 
drawn up by the German Acetylene Committee;
— Verordnung über Arbeitsstätten, 20.3.1975 (BGBl. I, 729) 
(Workplaces Ordinance), with around 30 directives on 
workplaces;
— Verordnung über die Aufzugsanlagen, 27.2.1980 (BGBl. I. 
205) (Ordinance on Lift Installations), with a number of 
technical mies for lifts drawn up by the German Committee 
for Lifts;
— Verordnung für Anlagen zur Lagemng, Abfüllung und Be­
förderung brennbarer Flüssigkeiten zu Lande, 27.2.1980 
(BGBl. I, 273 (Ordinance for Installations for Storing, Bot­
tling or Transporting Combustible Fluids by Land), with
66 For details see the list of industrial safety provisions in the Accident 




























































































some 40 technical rules for combustible liquids, drawn up 
by the German Committee for combustible liquids;
— Verordnung über Dampfkesselanlagen, 27.2.1980 (BGBl. I, 
173) (Steam Boilers Ordinance), with some 65 technical 
rules for steam boilers, drawn up by the German Steam 
Boilers Committee;
— Verordnung über Druckbehälter, Druckgasbehälter und 
Füllanlagen, 27.2.1980 (BGBl. I, 184) (Ordinance on Pres­
sure Vessels, Pressurised Gas Containers and Filling Plants), 
with some 35 technical rules for pressure vessels, drawn up 
by the Technical Committee on Pressure Vessels under the 
Central Office for accident prevention and industrial 
medicine of the Association of Mutual Indemnity Associa­
tions, and 90 technical rules on pressurised gases drawn up 
by the German Pressure Vessels Committee;
— Verordnung über Gashochdruckleitungen, 17.12.1974 
(BGBl. I, 3591) (Ordinance on High Pressure Gas Lines), 
with 40 technical rules on high pressure gas lines, drawn up 
by the Committee on High Pressure Gas Lines;
— Verordnung über gefährliche Stoffe, 26.8.1986 (BGBl. I, 
1470) (Ordinance on Hazardous Substances), with more 
than 50 technical mles for hazardous substances, drawn up 
by the former Committee for Hazardous Working Materials 
and by the Committee for Hazardous Materials.
By § 708 (1) RVO, the Berufgenossenschaften (Mutual In­
demnity Associations) are autonomously entitled to enact acci­
dent prevention provisions binding on their members, employers 
and employees. These are worked out by technical committees 
that include experts from the indemnity associations and also rep­
resentatives of the Gewerbeausfsichtsämter (Factory Inspectorate 
Offices), of producers and users of technical work material, of the 
trade unions and of employers, and are adopted by the Assembly 
of Representatives, which has a parity-based composition. Before 
they can enter into force, they require approval by the Federal 




























































































merits is out of the question, since this procedure for issuing rules 
takes 5 or 6 years67.
The accident prevention regulations in general contain de­
tailed indications only on rules of conduct for employees and the 
wearing of protective equipment68. Indications on safety design 
for machines and work equipment are by contrast formulated 
only very generally, in turn often referring to the "generally 
recognised state of the art". Accordingly, the hope of using the 
industrial safety and accident prevention regulations to bring 
safety requirements more in line with the present state of tech­
nology or science69 is illusory. In 1982, the DIN and the Indem­
nity Associations finally concluded an agreement whereby the 
latter would in principle — apart from instruction for actions — 
restrict themselves to formulating general safety objectives which 
the DIN would then specify70. This means that with regard to 
accident prevention, all technical regulatory material will, in the 
medium-term, rely on DIN standards.
67 Andresen, 1976, 130. Cf. the issue dates of the accident prevention 
regulations given in list B accompanying the AVV-GSG.
68 A survey of rules and regulations of the Mutual Indemnity Associa­
tions can be found in Baum, 1986.
69 Thus Diekershoff, 1985, 617.
70 Agreement between DIN and the Federation of Industrial Mutual In­
demnity Associations, the Hauptverband der gewerblichen Beruf­
sgenossenschaften e. V./Bundesverband der Unfallversicherungsträger 
der öffentlichen Hand e. V., DIN-Mitt. 62 (1983), 92-94. This also 
regulates in detail the involvement of legal accident insurance agencies 






























































































The deviation clause71 of § 3 (1) (2) GSG is intended to 
make progress in safety technology possible and also to allow the 
manufacturer to depart from the generally accepted rules of the 
art as long as the safety technology solution he chooses is at least 
equivalent. This provision for departure becomes relevant where 
a technical rule contains not only general objects of protection, 
but detailed technical model rules. In such a case the technical 
safety objective which is to be attained in some other way has 
first to be derived from them72.
The deviation clause is of particular importance for foreign 
manufacturers and importers. In general, they, too, have under 
the GSG, to observe the "recognised rales of the art" on the ter­
ritory of The Federal Republic73. If the foreign rale of art is not 
identical with the domestic one but nevertheless provides the 
same level of safety, the product may not be objected to74. If the 
same safety level is attained, the deviation clause thus allows for­
eign manufacturers to continue large production runs without 
losing the German market for safety reasons75. It thus leads to the 
same outcome as the case law on Articles 30 et seq. EEC. For 
goods from Community countries, it follows from Art. 30 EEC 
that they are freely marketable in all Member States if they have 
been marketed legally in the country of origin, unless the im­
porting country can refer to objects of protection under Art. 36 
EEC or to binding requirements in the sense of the Cassis judge­
ment76. If the same level of safety is maintained, any appeal to
71 In general on the deviation clause in § 3 (1) (2) GSG, see 
Schmatz/Nothlichs, Kennz. 1135, 18-21; Jeiter, 1980, 49-51; Linde- 
meyer, 190-194; Peine, 1986, § 3, Nos. 85-90.
72 See Schmatz/Nothlichs, Kennz. 1135, 19-20; Jeiter, 1980, 50; Peine, 
1986, § 3, No. 90.
73 See Schmatz/Nothlichs, Kennz. 1135, 15-16; Lindemeyer, 175.




























































































Art. 36 EEC in order to protect against dangers to life or health is 
ruled out. The bilateral agreements on mutual recognition of 
German and French standards77 make it easier to use the GSG 
deviation clause, since list C in the general administrative regula­
tions for die GSG gives the French standards that are, until proof 
of the contrary, to be taken as equivalent in safety level to the 
German standards. At the same time, the bilateral agreement is an 
indication that neither using the GSG deviation clause nor fol­
lowing ECJ Case Law on Articles 30 et seq. EEC are enough to 
avoid obstacles to trade between Member States.
The deviation clause applies in favour of manufacturers and 
importers even in respect of accident prevention regulations. 
Here distortions of competition may arise because an employer as 
user of work materials does not have a similar entitlement to de­
viate where the same safety is guaranteed78. As far as capital 
goods are concerned, a remedy could be found here if the various 
mutual indemnity associations declared a willingness to allow for 
corresponding departures in the accident prevention regula­
tions79. The problem will lose practical importance as the acci-
75 See Peine, 1986, § 3, No. 79.
76 See Chapter IV, 1.
77 See Chapter II, 1.10 and 3.3.4, end.
78 See Lindemeyer, 192.
79 The Federation of Industrial Mutual Indemnity Associations has so far 
opposed this; cf. Lindemeyer 192. Whether this position is compatible 
with Arts. 30 et seq. EEC remains questionable even after the ECJ 
judgment of 28 January 1986 in Case 188/84, ECR [1986] 419-wood­
working machines (see also the discussion in Chapter IV, 1.2.3 infra). 
This judgment explicitly confirms Member States' rights to decide on 
the equivalence of different safety conceptions, though not by simply 





























































































dent prevention regulations come to specify only general objects 
of protection but not the technical details for meeting them80.
It is controversial whether a manufacturer or importer who 
appeals to the deviation clause has to show that the same safety 
has been achieved in another way81, or whether the authority 
wishing to intervene must establish that the other technical safety 
solution is not equivalent82. Products are certainly freely mar­
ketable in principle without prior permission, even where the 
manufacturer takes advantage of the deviation clause. However, 
where the authorities intervene in the presence of a specific haz­
ard, there is more to say for the idea of obliging a manufacturer 
or importer who departs from the regulation position to provide 
facts or proof of equal safety.
The obligation to comply with generally accepted state of 
the art and the industrial safety and accident prevention regula­
tions does not apply to manufacturers or importers where the 
technical work materials have, according to written statements by 
the proposed user, been manufactured to order (§3 (2) GSG)83.
3.3.4 Incorporation of standards in the lists
In Annexes A, B and C to the General Administrative Reg­
ulations on the GSG, the Federal Minister for Labour and Social 
Affairs indicates mles of the art, compliance with which leads to
80 On this trend, cf. the DIN agreement with the Mutual Indemnity Asso­
ciations, DIN-Mitt. 62 (1983), 92-94 and Schmatz/Nothlichs, Kennz. 
1135, 17.
81 Thus Schmatz/Nothlichs, Kennz. 1135, 20-21. See also Peine, 1986, § 
3, Nos. 87-88.





























































































a presumption that work material is in line with the legally re­
quired level of safety. Through continual supplementation and 
corrective adjustment (at present, twice yearly), the latest results 
of standardisation work and technical practice in the area of acci­
dent prevention are taken into account. In October 1987 the indi­
vidual lists included a total of 1,708 safety rules84, which break 
down as follows:
List A (domestic technical standards)
DIN standards or VDE definitions 1.277
DVGW standards 3
VDI rules 25
List B (accident prevention regulations, etc.)
Accident prevention regulations (UVV) 85
Implementing instructions on the U W  64
Directives, safety rules and leaflets from the 
mutual indemnity associations 115
Ordinances, administrative regulations, 
technical rules and directives for 
installations monitored under § 24 GewO 21
List C (foreign technical standards)
Standards of the French Standardisation 118
Organisation AFNOR
This breakdown brings out the overwhelming importance of 
DIN standards or VDE definitions, which account for some 3/4 
of the safety mles indicated. Table 1 gives an overview of the 
numerical development of regulations under the GSG. Since 
1970, the number of safety mles included in the lists has more
83 For more on this see Peine, 1986, § 3, Nos. 91-100.
84 See the first supplement to the list in the AVV-GSG, BArbBl. 9/1986, 
63 et seq., which amended and supplemented the new version of the 
lists dating from January 1986 (BArbBl. 1/1986, 22 et seq.), and list A 




























































































than quintupled. The lists are subject to continuing review. For 
instance, the September 1986 update deleted 112 technical rules 
and included 169 new ones.
In November 1984 list C was opened. On the basis of the 
bilateral agreement between France and the Federal Republic85, it 
contains standards from the French Standardisation Organisation 
AFNOR, notified by the Ministry for Foreign Trade and Indus­
trial Development, on which the competent authorities in the 
Länder, the Committee on technical work materials, and inter­
ested circles have been heard.
Table 1: Development of regulation work under the Appli­
ances Safety Act and number of recognised test cen- 
tres(l)
Year Number of listed standards 
A and B C
Number of recognised test centres
1970 287 — -
1971 529 — 2
1973 623 — 21
1975 679 — 49
1977 823 62
1979 925 — 69
1981 983 — 69
1983 1210 — 76
1984 1210 118 76
1986 1565 118 78
(1) Compiled from the 1985 Annual Report of the Federal In­
stitute for Industrial Safety, 23, and the first supplement to 
lists A, B and C of the General Administrative Regulations 
under the Act on Technical Work Materials, September 
1986, Bundesarbeitsblatt 9 (1986, 63-70).
If a manufacturer or importer refers to a standard in list C, 
the Trade Supervisory Office only then — unless safety is evi­
dently guaranteed in another way, pursuant to the deviation 
clause in § 3 (1) (2) GSG — asks for this standard to be submitted




























































































in German. If the work materials prove to comply with the 
French standard, equal safety counts as guaranteed86.
The Federal Minister of Labour is, as a mle, involved in the 
issuing of implementing regulations on the accident prevention 
regulations and in bringing out technical safety rules and leaflets 
of the accident insurance agencies; indeed, accident prevention 
regulations require his approval. In general, accordingly, no ad­
ditional technical testing is necessary for inclusion of these regu­
lations in list B87.
3.3.5 Principles o f safety standardisation
In establishing the technical norms for inclusion in list A, 
the Appliances Safety Division of the Federal Institute for Indus­
trial Safety88 and the DIN Committee on Safety Technology 
work closely together.
The Commission on Safety Technology was set up in 1965 
in connection with the preliminary work on the Act on Technical 
Work Materials, on the initiative of and with financial support 
from the Federal Minister of Labour89. Its tasks are, above all, to 
encourage safety standardisation work in the specialised DIN 
standardisation committees, co-ordinate safety standardisation in 
DIN, select suitable DIN standards for inclusion in the lists and
86 Cf. the BMA Circular of 3 October 1984 to competent Lander authori­
ties, BArbBl. 11/1984, 52.
87 Cf. Schmatz/Nöthlichs, Kennz. 1304, 67.
88 To which preliminary work on publishing the lists was transferred after 
1974; Unfallverhütungsbericht 1976, BT-Drs. VH/4668,71.
89 Until then, the German Standards Committee, the predecessor of DIN, 
had neglected safety standardisation. Cf. the letter from the President 




























































































propose them to the Federal Minister of Labour, and, acting on 
suggestions from the Federal Institute for Industrial Safety and 
the Trade Supervisory Offices, test whether standards with safety 
provisions are still in line with the current state of the art90. It co­
ordinates involvement of safety experts from the Factory Inspec­
torate and the Federal Institute for Industrial Safety in the spe­
cialised standardisation committees, and in 1975 submitted a 
proposal, never discussed in detail, far less applied, to set up an 
accident information system also covering the home and leisure 
sectors91. It includes representatives of Federal Ministries and of 
the Lander labour authorities, of the Federal Institute for Indus­
trial Safety, of the legal accident insurance agencies, of the trade 
unions, of employer associations, of the Federal Association of 
German Industry, of standards workers and of science.
The Federal Institute for Industrial Safety delivers opinions 
on draft standards with safety relevance as part of the regular 
procedure for establishing standards, and tests the standards pro­
posed by the Safety Technology Committee for inclusion in List 
A. In a kind of written soundings-taking procedure, it then gives 
expert circles interested a chance to comment on proposed 
changes or additions, though without going as far as a new round 
of discussion on the standards92. In order to secure the broadest 
possible consensus of all expert circles and to cover all reserva­
tions and all findings, umbrella associations in industry, trade and 
handicrafts, and the unions, standardisation workers, the DIN 
Safety Technology Committee, the Länder labour authorities and
secretaries of the specialised standards committees of 18 February 
1966.
90 For details on the tasks of the Safety Technology Commission see 
Lehmann, 1972; Unfallverhütungsbericht 1973, 161.
91 Cf. Lehmann, 1975.
92 It is not intended that those whose objections against draft standards 





























































































the members of the Committee on technical work materials are 
asked to participate93.
At this stage, immediately before publication of tire lists, the 
number of objections still being raised is very small. This is due, 
above all, to the fact that test criteria are laid down in detail for 
all standardisation work in DIN 31000/VDE 1000, "general 
guidelines for safety design of technical products"94 and DIN 
820, part 12 "standardisation work, standards with technical 
safety provisions, design"95.
DIN 820, part 12, published in May 1977, which brings to­
gether experience to date in the DIN Safety Technology Com­
mittee, the Federal Institute for Industrial Safety and the Federal 
Ministry of Labour, provides the structural criteria that safety 
standards must meet for inclusion in list A of the general admin­
istrative regulations under the GSG: safety requirements must be 
laid down concretely and unambiguously, and compliance must 
be fully and unambiguously testable. Requirements must be 
specified so exactly that test results are reproducible.
More important than these formal structural criteria are the 
substantive requirements that DIN 3 1 0 0 0 /VDE 1000 lays down 
for the safety design of technical products. The eventual standard 
of March 1979 had been preceded as long ago as December 1971 
by a preliminary standard based on preliminary work under the 
auspices of the Federal Ministry of Labour96. It was to act as the 
basis for the specification of safety standards or VDE defini­
tions97 and allow initial assessment of technical products as re-
93 Cf. Mertens, 1974,331.
94 On this see Zimmermann, 1977; idem, 1981.
95 On this see Zimmermann, 1979.




























































































gard safety, in so far as valid, specific and complete standards for 
this are not or not yet available98. Its provisions are to be speci­
fied in standards for individual types of technical product or in 
VDE definitions for individual types of electrical equipment, and 
supplemented by indications as to relevant tests99.
The safety design of technical work materials is seen in the 
first place as a design task for engineers. In safety design the pre­
ferred solution should meet the safety objective in technically ra­
tional fashion as well as being economically the best, and in case 
of doubt, safety requirements take priority over economic consid­
erations100. The following three-stage method applies: technical 
products should be so designed that no hazards are present (direct 
safety technology). If this is not or not fully possible, special 
safety devices that come into play automatically should be used 
(indirect safety technology). Only in third place come indications 
of the conditions under which hazardous use is possible (safety 
through instructions). The technique of safety through instruc­
tions is to be used in combination with direct and indirect safety 
technology even where hazards with products can be prevented 
only by particular actions on the part of the user101. This restric­
tion can amount to excluding foreseeable misuse from design 
safety technology and allocating it to the technique of safety 
through instructions.
To supplement and extend the general guidelines of DIN 
31000/VDE 1000, technical safety provisions for particular areas 
that overlap specialities or safety objectives should be sum-
97 DIN 31000/VDE 1000 (2.3).
98 DIN 31000/VDE 1000 (2.4). Some of the banning orders published are 
based, in the absence of specific product standards, directly on in­
fringement of DIN 31000/VDE KXX).
99 DIN 31000/VDE 1000, (2.5).




























































































marised in basic standards (infrastructure)102. Finally, in order to 
allow the DIN standards to have full product-specific effect, 
groups of products or individual products should be covered in 
standards for special fields or standards for components103.
3.3.6 The safety mark "GS = geprüfte Sicherheit" (safety- 
tested)
The GSG does not have an obligation to test technical work 
materials, but offers manufacturers and importers the possibility 
of securing confirmation from a recognised test centre, after a de­
sign test, that their appliances meet the provisions of § 3 (1) GSG 
or of a legal ordinance adopted pursuant to § 4 or § 8a. If the re­
sult is positive they secure the right to use the safety mark "GS = 
geprüfte Sicherheit", uniform for all types of appliance and ac­
companied by an identification of the test centre (§ 3 (4) 
GSG)104. It was introduced by the Federal Minister for Labour in 
1977, after the Association for a Safety Mark had spent seven 
years failing to agree on one. It is intended to provide the con­
sumer with a simple and easy means for choosing safer products. 
The GS mark serves the marketing interests of manufacturers and 
is also a way of lessening the burden on supervisory authorities, 
who should refrain from testing appliances bearing the mark105, 
unless there are grounds to suspect its illegal use.
101 Notes on DIN 31000/VDE 1000.
102 List A of the AVV-GSG at present contains 26 standards with general 
safety conditions.
103 See the notes to DIN 31000/VDE 1000 and Zimmermann, 1979, 45-46.
104 On the GS mark see Albertz, 1985; Schwarze, 1983; Zimmermann, 
1984; idem, Gerâtesicherheitsgesetz, 142a-144; idem, 1987; Jeiter, 
1980, 54-58; Peine, 1986, § 3, Nos. 112-144; Kalwa, 1987.
105 § 6 (1) AVV-GSG. In 1983, 8% of the defective technical work mate­




























































































The Federal Minister for Labour and Social Affairs, after 
consulting the Committee on Technical Work Materials and with 
agreement from the Upper House of the German Parliament, de­
termines by legal ordinance the testing centres competent for the 
design test. These must be suitable in staff and equipment for the 
task, economically independent and able to offer guarantees of 
reliable testing. The list of test centres also lays down the fields 
for which a test centre is recognised. At present there are 78 
recognised centres106, among them 10 technical control boards, 
the Bavarian Provincial Institution for Trade, the Association of 
German Electrical Engineers, the German Vehicle Testing Asso­
ciation and three mail-order firms107, each with an intensive 
range of competences, plus 27 specialised committees of the In­
demnity Associations, three DIN standards committees, the Fed­
eral Institute for Materials Testing and 32 other test centres with 
very specific areas of competence108. In the context of the bilat­
eral agreement between France and the Federal Republic, the 
Laboratoire Nationale D'Essais was also recognised as a test cen­
tre in December 1985. Recognition is preceded by verification of 
the Federal Institute for Industrial Safety, relating inter alia to 
staffing and equipment and including a demonstration from some 
of the areas of coverage applied for109.
In order to arrive at uniformity of testing practice, test cen­
tres must undertake to participate in the information clearing
Supervisory Offices bore a test mark from a recognised test centre; cf. 
the 1984 annual report of the Federal Institute for Industrial Safety, 
1984,21.
106 For the development over time, see Table 1 supra.
107 These offered the chance of linking the proven work of the incoming 
merchandise checks with safety tests for the GS mark, while at the 
same time achieving rapid spread of the GS mark to a broad range of 
goods.
108 See the list of test centres in the AVV-GSG, in the version of the Octo­




























































































houses for test centres in their field attached to the Committee for 
technical work materials, and comply with agreements arrived at 
there. Apart from individual test contracts, the test centres have 
the following tasks. Should they find that technical work material 
for which they have given authorisation to use the safety mark 
has been supplied defectively, they have to cause the manufac­
turer or importer to provide a remedy. If the faults are not re­
moved, or unsafe appliances continue to be marketed, the Trade 
Supervisory Offices are to be informed. They have to note acci­
dents arising in using appliances tested by them and see to the 
removal of faulty goods still found. They have to transfer their 
experience from testing work into standardisation and regulatory 
work110. If an applicant for a test refers to a French standard 
contained in list C, the test centre has to apply the French stan­
dard where the technical work material is not in line with the rel­
evant German standards and equal safety is not obviously guar­
anteed111.
The GS mark has been widely used for many technical con­
sumer goods. The total number of types of appliance or machine 
with valid GS marks amounted by 31 December 1985 to 
85,00g1 12. Applicants for the GS mark have the chance to ask for 
the criteria related to their appliance so as to be able to take the 
safety requirements in force more reliably into account, even at 
the design stage of technical work materials. Since in the case of 
many technical consumer products there is competition between 
various test centres, one cannot ignore the danger that differing 
test criteria might be applied and that manufacturers and im-
109 For details, and on the test reports, see Zimmermann, Gerâtesicher-
heitsgesetz, 142b-142d.
110 See the criteria, guidelines and inductions for test centres under § 3 (4)
GSG, BArbBl, 11/1984, 50-51.





























































































porters might choose test centres likely to give them more 
favourable test results than others. The only remedy is extension 
of the information network among test centres, and the checks on 
test centres by the Federal Institute for Industrial Safety, active 
since 1984.
In safety checks carried out by the Stiftung Warentest, ap­
pliances bearing the GS mark continually display serious safety 
shortcomings113. The reasons adduced are that particular identifi­
able test centres interpret the regulations in force less strictly than 
would be necessary, that products are altered after securing the 
mark, and that the safety regulations applied are inadequate.
112 Unfallverhütungsbericht 1985, BT-Drs. 10/6690, 5 December 1986, 
33.
113 Loose, 1986, 364-65; see also "Normen sorgen für dicke Luft. War­
entester legen zu Recht manchmal schärfere Maßstäbe an", Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 1 April 1987, 5. The Federal High Court recently explicitly 
decided that the Stiftung Warentest could apply more stringent criteria 
in safety testing than those in the technical standards: BGH, NJW 
1987, 2222 et seq. Cf. Vieweg, 1987 and Budde, 1987. In the standard­
setting procedure, no consensus had been secured as to the necessary 
safety arrangements for electric compost choppers. The Stiftung War­
entest, other consumer representatives and the Federal Institute for In­
dustrial Safety had tried in vain to get their ideas on adequate safety in­
cluded, but had to succumb to the supplier side in the opposition pro­
cedure. The Federal Minister for Labour has since recommended test 
centres that have already issued approval for the GS mark on compost 
choppers meeting the DIN standard to withdraw that approval. The 
Stiftung Warentest, which overlaps in personnel with the standardisa­
tion associations, particularly with DIN, — it is represented on the five- 
member DIN Consumer Council and on some 100 standards commit­
tees and other DIN and VDE working bodies, and the Director of DIN 
is Chairman of the Administrative Board of Stiftung Warentest — only 
rarely goes beyond the requirements of technical standards in its test­
ing practices. There are scarcely any testing programmes not based on 
technical standards, at any rate, as far as safety testing goes. If an ap­
pliance does not meet the safety requirements, it is automatically 
graded "defective". The manufacturers' side understandably supports 
stronger ties to technical standards for the Stiftung Warentest. Ac­
cording to the "guidelines for industrial experts in the Stiftung War­
entest" drawn up by the Federal Association of German Industry, the 
Stiftung Warentest should not grade a feature of a product poorer than 





























































































3.3.7 Monitoring by the Trade Supervisory Offices; banning 
orders
The competent supervisory bodies for monitoring the Appli­
ances Safety Act are the 71 National Trade Supervisory Offices. 
These offices have a very wide range of tasks, with responsibili­
ties for protection against nuisances, social industrial safety and, 
in the area of technical industrial safety, for workplaces, moni­
tored installations, dangerous work substances, explosive materi­
als, radiation protection, organisation of industrial safety in facto­
ries and, of course, for technical work materials114.
An extensive empirical study in 1979 showed that they de­
voted only a fraction of their working time, some 2.2%, to appli­
cation of the Appliances Safety Act115. The trade supervisory of­
fices are not obliged to make systematic checks on all technical 
work materials or all manufacturers or importers. Since 180,000 
types of technical work materials come newly on to the market 
each year116, this would be far beyond their resources. From con­
siderations of effectiveness, the principle applied is that of di­
rected monitoring activities. They have to check technical work 
materials where a competent authority for industrial safety or le­
gal accident insurance agency, officer of policy or other authori­
ties, user of technical work materials or centre dealing with haz­
ards protection under the GSG (Stiftung Warentest, works coun­
cils, test centres) has submitted a report on a defective technical
114 An illustrative picture of their wide range of tasks is presented by the 
annual reports of the Trade Supervisory Offices of the Länder.
115 Arbeitsschutzsystem, Bd. 2, 1980, 515.




























































































work material or on an accident in using a technical work mate­
rial117.
Because of time overloads on trade supervisory officers and 
on the Federal Institute for Industrial Safety, a unique possibility 
has been neglected. This would be the introduction of an accident 
information system which would, though not being representa­
tive, specifically examine cases where defective technical appli­
ances had caused accidents or led to serious hazards. It is hard to 
understand why no resources have yet been found for systematic 
evaluations of defect reports passed on to the Länder, in which 
manufacturers or importers of products whose safety has been 
impugned have their headquarters118.
Since the primary objective of the GSG consists in preven­
tive hazard protection, trade supervisory offices might temporar­
ily become active at fairs and exhibitions of more than local im­
portance119 in order to test work materials on offer there, with an 
economical use of staff120. In 1984, 54% of all inspection in con­
nection with the GSG took place at fairs and exhibitions. An ad­
vantage is that at fairs, where the latest technical work materials 
are displayed in large numbers and many types, a whole product 
range can be covered in each case, without having to trace manu­
facturing plants and importers scattered over the whole national 
territory, and also that testing can often be done before mass pro­
duction begins. A disadvantage is that general testing is possible 
only through visual inspection, so that only defects that strike the 
eye can be covered, but no more detailed tests can be done, which
117 § 5 (2) GSG and § 1 AVV-GSG.
118 Not counting the figures for Baden-Württemberg, in 1984 alone there 
were 1,734 of them with several defects each.
119 Often in so-called Fairs Committees, along with technical supervisory 




























































































would often require the dismantling or even destruction of the 
technical work appliance121.
Ad hoc market checks on particular types of technical work 
materials suggested by accident reports or safety tests as being 
particularly accident-prone are done by the Central Office for 
Safety Technology, Radiation Protection and Nuclear Technol­
ogy of Land North Rhine-Westphalia. In view of the shocking 
accident situation in the private sphere, it concentrates mainly on 
types of appliances intended for use in the home, do-it-yourself, 
play and sport122. The findings secured are, if not yet incorpo­
rated in technical safety standards, then used in standardisation 
work123.
Should the trade supervisory offices discover defects im­
plying danger to life or health of users or third parties given 
proper use, the severest sanction open to it, where other measures 
prove inadequate, is the banning order124, preventing the techni­
cal work material from being marketed or displayed (§ 5 (1) (2) 
GSG). Whether an office has recourse to a banning order is in its 
own discretion, in accordance with its duty. Only in two particu­
larly serious cases does § 5 (2) GSG lay down a duty to test, 
namely where a competent authority for industrial safety or a le­
gal accident insurance agency has notified it that a technical work 
material has a defect in quality that endangers the life or health of
120 Explicitly regulated in the Circular Order from the Minister for Labour, 
Health and Social Affairs of Land North Rhine-Westphalia on the im­
plementation of the GSG of 26 July 1982, Ministerialblatt, 1473.
121 Cf. Wilke, 1980, 52-54.
122 Cf the progress report by Fischer, 1984, and the annual reports of the 
Trade Inspectorate of Land North Rhine-Westphalia 1982, 45-71; 
1983,47-55; 1984,48-59.
123 Cf. the list of DIN Standards Committees and Committees of the Ger­
man Electrical Engineering Commission on which Trade Supervisory 
Offices collaborated: Annual Report of the Industrial Inspectorate of 




























































































users or third parties given proper use, or where during use of the 
technical work material an accident has occurred and there is 
good reason to believe that the accident can be attributed to a de­
fect in the quality of the technical work material. If the law's ob­
jective, preventive accident protection, is not to be frustrated then 
the authority must act, if only to avoid public liability claims, 
since any other decision would mean acquiescing in a severe ac­
cident125.
The order to be issued to the manufacturer or importer, and 
only under very restrictive conditions to an exhibitor or trader126, 
must be accompanied by reasons, and the defects must be speci­
fied in detail. To ensure that banning orders are issued only in 
justified cases, the Trade Supervisory Office must before decid­
ing, unless the danger of delay or the defect in the nature of the 
work materials is obvious, consult one of the agencies of legal 
accident insurance whose members use technical work materials 
of the same type (§ 6 (1) GSG). Should an accident have oc­
curred because of the defect ascertained and other accidents are 
to be feared, immediate execution of the banning order should be 
directed (§ 7 (3) AVV-GSG). A copy of the banning order is to 
be sent to the Committee on Technical Work Materials (§ 6 (2) 
GSG).
Even though they are explicitly mentioned in the GSG as the 
sole means of sanction, banning orders constitute the last resort, 
to be used only in severe cases, where no remedy can be secured 
by more moderate measures. Less invasive measures are, for in­
stance, cautions about defects ascertained and advice about 
eliminating them or an order to remove defects ascertained within
124 On banning orders see Peine, 1986, § 5 Nos. 25-119; Falke, 1987.
125 For details on this see Peine, 1986, § 5, Nos. 31-42.





























































































a certain time and thereafter to sell only defect-free appliances127. 
They can be considered only where the manufacturer or importer 
is prepared to remedy the defects ascertained. Willingness to do 
so is greater before starting actual marketing. Cases have been 
reported where importers have, after ascertainment of severe 
safety defects, seen their negotiating position with the manufac­
turer as strengthened by a banning order. Since banning orders 
are based on Federal law they apply in principle in the whole of 
Federal territory, even if issued by Länder authorities128.
The synopsis below gives the picture of trade supervisory 
offices' test work under the GSG in 1984, not including system­
atic market spot checks carried out. It was already stressed that 
more than half tire inspections take place at fairs and exhibitions. 
57% of the 46,600 technical work materials tested are used pri­
marily in industry, agriculture and administration, and some 29% 
are foreign manufactures. Of appliances tested, a total of 24% 
proved defective, 20% of the domestic products and 34% of for­
eign ones. The systematic market checks, not covered here 
mostly give considerably higher rates of defect129. Unsafe appli­
ances usually have an average of two defects. 42% of defects can 
be remedied by re-equipping, 40% by design measures, and 
15.6% result from faulty instructions for use. However, 2.3% of 
defects are so serious as to require complete redesign.
127 See Schmatz/Nothlichs, Kennz. 1155, 6-8; Jeiter, 1980, 73-74; Peine, 
1986, §5, Nos. 16-24.
128 BVerfGE 11, 1 (6).
129 Thus, BMX children's bicycles had a defect rate of 89%, and a partic­
ular kind of heating stove 90% (cf. Fischer, 1984); in 1976-8 65% of 
technical medical appliances (cf. Wilke, 1980, 63) and 54% of fork-lift 
trucks (see Annual Report of the Industrial Inspectorate of Land North 




























































































Synopsis: Tests by Trade Supervisory Offices under 




- at fairs, exhibitions
13,799=100.0
7,465=54.1
Technical work materials tested 
- total 46,566=100.0
- mainly used in
- industry, agriculture, administration















Number of types of defect
- total
- eliminable by re-equipping
- eliminable by design measures
- unusable — redesign necessary












(1) Compiled from the annual reports of the trade supervisory offices in 
individual Länder for 1984.
Banning orders were issued in only 49 cases. This small 
number is only in part because most defects could be more or less 
easily removed by re-equipping, design measures or changes to 
instructions for use. It is also due, apart from strict application of 




























































































visory offices, who see themselves more as advisers than as su­
pervisory authorities130.
Table 2 shows the numerical trend in test inspections by 
trade supervisory offices and in banning orders from 1969 to 
1984. The number of inspections grew steadily until 1974, 
reaching a plateau of around 14,000 thereafter. The number of 
banning orders grew from 1969 to 1975 to a unique peak figure 
of 377 then fell between 1976 and 1981, apart from the high 
value for 1979, to a figure between 150 and 190, and in 1984, at 
49, was only just above the initial year, 1972. This means a criti­
cal point is being reached if trade supervisory offices still wish, in 
their search for less drastic solutions, to be able to use threats of 
banning orders credibly.
Banning orders against traders are possible only on tighter 
conditions131. Exhibitors at fairs can be banned from displaying 
work materials with safety defects only if the manufacturer or 
importer cannot be traced (§ 5 (1) (2) GSG). Otherwise, banning 
orders to traders presuppose under § 5 (3) GSG that the manu­
facturer or importer has previously been banned from marketing 
the technical product, that the trader knows this banning provi­
sion, for which it is sufficient for the authority so to inform him, 
and that the trader has the possibility of returning the defective 
lot of technical work material132 but refuses to avail himself of 
this right of return. In view of this "protective barrier" of restric-
130 47% of Trade Supervisory officials see themselves more as advisers, 
16% more as supervisors; cf. Arbeitsschutzsystem, Bd. 2, 1980, 587- 
590.
131 Cf. Schmatz/Nothlichs, Kennz. 1155, 15-27; Jeiter, 1980, 74-79; Peine, 
1986, §5, Nos. 108-119.
132 This condition reflects the legislator's expectations that the Joint Decla­
ration of Industry and Trade Federations of 15 April 1978 (reprinted in 
Jeiter, 1980, 7-9) will give the trader a contractual right of return where 
a banning order has been issued against the manufacturer or importer. 




























































































tive conditions on action, it is hardly surprising that the power to 
issue bans to the trade, so urgently called for by the trade super­
visory offices133, plays no part134 in practice. It is scarcely possi­
ble for trade supervisory offices to forbid marketing of defective 
products that are already in the trade135.
Table 2: Numerical trend in test inspections by the trade su­

















(I) Compiled from Meyer, 1979, 38; Diekershoff, 1985, 623 f.; annual re­
ports of trade supervisory offices of individual Lander for 1982 to 
1984.
Banning orders are published in the monthly newsletter on 
the GSG distributed by the Federal Institute for Industrial Safety; 
only 500 copies are distributed for internal use by trade supervi­
sory offices136. Since 1981 the Federal Institute for Industrial 
Safety has been publishing non-appealable banning orders or
August 1979 to Chambers of Industry and Trade (printed in Jeiter, 
1980,76-78).
133 Cf. Wilke, 1980, 67-68.
134 Of 353 bans issued between 1982 and 1984, not a single one concerned 
traders, and in 1981 only 44 out of 240.




























































































those for immediate execution. This is intended to warn owners 
of defective appliances and, where technical work materials are 
still in trade, to bring dangers to the attention of traders and po­
tential purchasers. By September 1986, 53 banning orders had 
been published137. One may however doubt whether publication 
in the Federal Labour Gazette some time after enactment of the 
banning order can bring about the widely effective information 
distribution that is necessary. A broadly conceived concerted in­
formation campaign by trade supervisory offices, the Federal 
Institute for Industrial Safety, the Indemnity Associations and the 
retail trade has so far been waged only in the case of compressed- 
gas springs in revolving chairs which are liable to break138, with 
successful effects since some 40% of the hazardous revolving 
chairs were re-equipped. Since 1984 non-appealable banning or­
ders and those for immediate execution have been communicated 
under the European Commission's system for information ex­
change on product hazards139.
136 This information service prints all current information of significance 
for unitary application of the GSG; it has developed into an informa­
tion clearing house among trade supervisory offices.
137 Cf. BArbBl. 10/1981, 84 et seq.; 12/1981, 113 f.; 1/1983, 85 et seq.; 
11/1984, 62 et seq.; 4/1985,94 et seq.; 9/1985, 82 et seq.; 12/1985, 110 
f.; 9/1986, 97 et seq. These banning orders are regularly preceded by 
the following text: "The primary object of publication is to support re­
call actions or similar measures by the manufacturer or importer, and 
where appropriate, also the trader. Above all, those in possession of 
items already supplied should be warned, and instructed not to use 
them or, in some cases, at least to take special measures." The average 
time between issue of a banning order and its publication in the Federal 
Labour Gazette was by September 1985, 11 months (my calculation).
138 Cf. the Annual Report for 1983 of the Federal Institution for Industrial 
Safety, 19 f.: and the Annual Report for 1983 of the Trade Inspectorate 
of Land North Rhine-Westphalia, 52-55.
139 On the legal remedies open to purchasers of products whose manufac­





























































































3.3.8 Limits o f applicability; removal from  storage
Despite its general approach, in no way specific to particular 
products, the GSG did not prove flexible enough to serve as the 
sole act for converting Community directives in the area of safety 
of technical work materials. This is evident particularly from the 
conversion of the Low Voltage Directive140 into German law. 
Because of the far-ranging correspondence between the content 
and concept of the GSG and the Low Voltage Directive, the Fed­
eral Government took the view that no special legislatory proce­
dure would be required to convert the directive into national law. 
Only once did the Commission disagree and threaten to go before 
the ECJ. At his point the Federal Government met the Commis­
sion's wish through the first ordinance under the Act on Techni­
cal Work Materials141 and the amendment to the general admin­
istrative regulations to the GSG142, thereby converting the Low 
Voltage Directive "formally in every respect". The extent to 
which the first ordinance amended or extended the GSG is evi­
dent from the criticism, raised by the Commission143:
— It was not clear how far the existing state of safety technol­
ogy in the Community within the meaning of the directive 
was identical with the general accepted rules of the art 
within the meaning of the GSG;
— The GSG applied only to protecting people, not to the safety 
of domestic animals and the preservation of material values, 
as the directive laid down;
140 For details on the Low Voltage Directive, see Chapter IV, 2.
141 11 June 1979 (BGB1.1, 629).
142 § 3 (3) and § 6 (4) of the AVV-GSG were amended.
143 Cf. Zimmermann, Gerâtesicherheitsgesetz, 147-48. The table present­
ing the differences between the GSG and the First Ordinance to the 





























































































— The safety objectives listed in Annex I to the Directive in 
order to specify the general clause were not contained in the 
GSG;
— The general clause in the GSG referred to industrial safety 
and accident prevention provisions which possibly con­
tained other requirements than the Directive’s.
Despite the correspondences and similarities between the 
GSG pattern and the new approach to technical harmonisation 
and standards, the GSG will not be enough to convert directives 
that follow the new approach, if only because of the difference in 
objects of protection, the modes of demonstrating conformity and 
above all the stating of relatively detailed basic safety require­
ments instead of referring to the generally accepted state of the 
art. Reference to the generally accepted state of the art cannot 
come into consideration for the Community Directive if only be­
cause the Commission, following Article 100 a (3) in the Single 
European Act, must in its proposals for legal harmonisation mea­
sures under Article 100 a in the areas of health, safety, environ­
ment protection and consumer protection take a very high level of 
protection as a basis144. Adoption of individual directives under 
the new approach ought thus lead to supplementation of the GSG 
by a whole fringe of ordinances for specific groups of products. 
The alternative would be to adopt a parallel act to the GSG, con­
verting all the details of the new approach into national law. But 
even then it would presumably be necessary to convert each of 
the product/specific basic safety requirements, relatively detailed 
by comparison with the German tradition of product safety 
law145, separates into German law in each case — after all it is 
ultimately vague that determine the level of protection146.
144 On this cf. Chapter IV, 4.1.
145 It is clear that the basic safety requirements are not merely described 
conceptually in a comprehensive general clause, but laid down in detail 
specifically for a product. But even after presentation of the first draft 
directives, it remains questionable how detailed the basic safety re­




























































































The second ordinance under the GSG147 converts Directive 
79/663/EEC148, which forbids the marketing and use of decora­
tive items containing dangerous liquids. Like the first ordinance 
under the GSG, it is based on § 4 (1) GSG, which empowers the 
Federal Minister for Labour and Social Affairs in fulfillment of 
obligations under bilateral agreements or binding Community de­
cisions to determine by legal ordinance that technical work mate­
rials may be marketed only where particular requirements are met 
or when, following a design test, they have been generally ac­
cepted, or when they have passed a conformity test. Other Com­
munity directives likewise applying to technical work materials 
within the scope of the GSG have not led to further ordinances 
under the GSG because they concern monitored installations and 
were converted into German law as ordinances pursuant to § 24 
of the German industrial code. These ordinances for monitored 
installations149 are industrial safety regulations within the mean­
ing of § 3 (1)GSG'50.
Annex II, section B.in in the Council Resolution of 7 May 1985 on a 
new approach to technical harmonisation and standards (OJ C 136, 4 
June 1985, 1 et seq.), first introduced in this form in the final version. 
They run: "the essential safety requirements which must be met in the 
case of products which can be put on the market shall be worded pre­
cisely enough in order to create, on transposition into national law, 
legally binding obligations which can be enforced. They should be so 
formulated as to enable the certification bodies straight away to certify 
products as being in conformity, having regard to those requirements in 
the absence of standards. The degree of detail of the wording will de­
pend on the subject matter." These sentences both express the reserva­
tions of many Member States regarding far-reaching delegation of 
safety regulation to standardisation bodies, and can be regarded as a re­
treat from the new approach even before its realisation. Cf. the answer 
to written question No. 119/86, OJ C 19, 26 January 1987,4-5.
146 Cf. also the verbatim inclusion of the essential safety requirements of 
the Low Voltage Directive in § 2 of the First Ordinance under the 
GSG.
147 Of 26 November 1980 (BGB1.1, 2195).
148 Directive 79/663/EEC of 24 July 1979, OJ L 197, 3 August 1979, 37.
149 These are ordinances on steam boiler installations, pressure vessels, 
pressurised gas containers and filling plants, lift installations, electrical 




























































































Following a series of sensational accidents and the disclo­
sure of widespread severe safety defects151, § 8 a GSG created 
the conditions for adopting special requirements for licensing and 
operating medical technical appliances. This was done through 
the Medical Appliances Ordinance152, which introduced special 
obligations on instructions and marks, a licensed design system 
for important types of appliances, the inclusion of all suppliers 
under the regulations and above all obligations on operators to 
carry out functional tests before commencing operation, employ 
only qualified staff, notify defects or malfunctions arising, regu­
larly carry out safety checks and keep data sheets on the appli­
ances. The comparison with technical medical appliances, now 
outside the scope of the GSG, and with the Medical Appliances 
Ordinance brings out the GSG's liberal underlying concept 
particularly clearly. Like the new approach, it rules out safety 
rules for the operation of hazardous installations or appliances.
3.4 Technical standardisation in DIN
Details of technical safety standardisation work and of ref­
erence to technical standards have already been discussed in con­
nection with the GSG. Accordingly, the following account can 
concentrate on the development and extent of standardisation 
work in the Deutsche Institut fiir Normung e.V. (DIN) (3.4.1), the 
so-called standards agreement between the Federal Government
and calcium carbide installations and installations for storing, filling 
and transporting combustible liquids on land.
150 On the above cf. Zimmermann, Geratesicherheitsgesetz, 162-164.
151 Between 1976 and 1978, 65% of medical electrical appliances tested 
showed numbers of severe safety defects, in part hazardous to life; cf. 
Wilke, 1980, 63-64. In 1985 safety checks by the Bavarian Technical 
Control Board even showed a defect rate of 85%; cf. FR for 27 August 
85, 18.
152 Ordinance on the safety of technical medical appliances (Medical Ap­
pliances Ordinance) of 14 January 1985 (BGB1. I, 93). On this cf. 
Nothlichs, 1985; Zimmermann, Geratesicherheitsgesetz, 164-166c; 




























































































and DIN (3.4.2), the procedure for producing standards (3.4.3), 
the adoption of international and European standards in German 
standardisation work (3.4.4), the organisation of consumer par­
ticipation (3.4.5) and conformity marks (3.4.6).
3.4.1 Development o f DIN, volume o f standardisation work 
and financing
Although there are in the Federal Republic over 200 organi­
sations153 concerned with the production and dissemination of 
technical rules, the DIN is highly pre-eminent. Through its con­
stant practice, DIN has established its position as the authoritative 
national standardisation organisation through a multiplicity of co­
operative relationships, embodied in agreements, with Federal 
and Länder authorities, associations and technical and scientific 
bodies, so as to integrate technical regulations produced outside 
DIN into the unitary, almost completely comprehensive, DIN set 
of standards. The most important agreement of this nature — 
apart from the standards agreement with the Federal Government 
— is DIN’s agreement with the Verband Deutscher Elektrotech­
niker (Association of German Electrical Engineers — VDE) of 13 
October 1970154, which led to the foundation of a joint body, the 
Deutsche Elektrotechnische Kommission (German Electrical 
Engineering Commission — DKE) and to the incorporation of the 
extensive body of the VDE regulations into the DIN standard 
system155. The most important agreement of this type in recent 
years is that existing with the Mutual Indemnity Associations156.
153 Marburger, 1979, 195-96.
154 Printed in DIN-Normenheft 10, Grundlagen der Normungsarbeit des 
DIN, 4. Aufl., Berlin/Köln 1982, 219 et seq.
155 F o r  o th e r  ag reem en ts  see Reihlen, Auswirkungen des Normen Ver­
trag es, 1977; Kypke, 1982, 156-158.




























































































There the latter confine themselves to setting general safety ob­
jectives and safety criteria and refer for specification to DIN 
standards. Thereby firm links between the regulatory work of the 
legal accident insurance agencies (gesetzliche Unfallver- 
sicherungstrager), the accident prevention regulations, and DIN 
standards will be secured. This dominance of DIN over the other 
regulatory bodies expressed in these examples of integration 
alone justifies concentrating this account on DIN.
DIN, or more exactly its predecessor, owes its foundation in 
1917 to joint efforts by Government bodies, industry and the As­
sociation of German Engineers (VDI) to concentrate technical 
harmonisation work in order to increase armaments produc­
tion157. The "Standards Committee for General Engineering" 
originally under the VDI, extended its area of operation very 
quickly, leading also to a change of name to "Standards Com­
mittee of German Industry”. In 1926 the Association took the 
name "German Standards Committee", since standardisation had 
in the interim come to extend from industrial production to many 
other areas. In 1975 a new constitution and the name "DIN 
Deutsches Institut fiir Normung e.V." were introduced, the object 
being specified as being, "through joint work by interested circles 
and for the benefit of the public", to produce, publish and pro­
mote the application of "German Standards or other working re­
sults that aid rationalisation, quality guarantees, safety and com­
munication in the fields of economy, technology, science, ad­
ministration and among the public", and to "represent German 
standardisation at home and abroad"158.
157 For more on the history of DIN see Kypke, 1982, 153-155.
158 § 1 (2) and (3) of the DIN statutes of 20 April 1975, printed in DIN- 




























































































By 1986, DIN had some 5,400 firms as members and was 
employing 746 full-time workers159. Standardisation work was 
done through 113 standards committees divided into 3,656 
working groups, by 41,000 honorary collaborators in almost 
5,000 sessions of standards committees. DIN standards numbered 
19,937 in 1986160, 1,363 of them new that year. Almost two 
thirds of newly emerging DIN standards have to do with adapting 
existing standards to advancing knowledge or development161. 
By way of comparison, in international standardisation by ISO 
and IEC, two-thirds of new standards refer to areas not yet cov­
ered162.
Some 30% of 6,039 DIN standards are available in English, 
DIN standards are interpreted for the public at 39 centres in Ger­
many and 108 abroad. In October 1979, with the help of the Fed­
eral Government, the German Information Centre for Technical 
Rules (DITR) was set up within DIN163. The DITR database will 
collect all German technical rules, including rules other than DIN 
standards, accident prevention regulations and the technical legal 
and administrative provisions of the Länder, of the Federal Re­
public and of the European Community. Since 1987, the cata­
logue has for the first time also contained references to corre-
159 These and the following figures are taken from the DIN report for 
1986-7.
160 This means that the number of standards went down by comparison 
with previous years; this is to be explained mainly through the with­
drawal of 1,300 standards for pictorial trademarks in 1986.
161 In 1983-6 5,890 new DIN standards came out, while 2,240 standards 
were withdrawn without replacement; both movements ended with a 
decline in total numbers of 33. This means that in that period 3,683, i.e. 
62.5% of newly issued standards, served to adapt existing standards to 
technical progress. Source: personal calculations from indications in 
DIN annual reports.
162 In 1979-86 5,179 ISO or IEC standards were newly issued, with total 
number of standards rising over the same period by 3,624; figures on 
standards withdrawn without replacement are not available. Source: 




























































































sponding international standards. DITR makes its stored infor­
mation available in user-oriented fashion and can considerably 
facilitate and accelerate the administration and updating of volu­
minous standards, databases and manuals.
Table 3 shows the number of international, European and 
DIN standards in the year 1978 and 1986. Here, what is of inter­
est is not so much the absolute figures for the individual types of 
standard, but the percentage increase in each case between 1978 
and 1986. In view of the great differences in tradition and range, 
the individual sets of standards are hardly comparable, and Ger­
man standards have taken over many international and European 
ones. What emerges very clearly is that international and Euro­
pean standards have in terms of numerical growth increased very 
much faster than DIN standards.
Table 3: Numbers of international, European and German standards in 1978 
and 1986
Numbers of 1978 1986 Increase
ISO/IEC standards 5.099 8.726 71 %
European standards (1) 443 829 81 %
DIN standards 18.006 19.937 11 %
(1) Including CENELEC harmonisation documents and Euro-standards
for iron and steel.
Table 4 gives a picture of the number of standards and pro­
posed standards in DIN in 1986 for the 20 areas with most stan­
dards plus a few other selected areas. The relationship between 
projected standards in hand and the number of existing standards 
is an indicator of the rate of growth in each specialised area. 
There is a clearly below-average rate in aviation, tools and 
clamps, shipbuilding, textiles and textile machines, fire-fighting 
equipment, sport and leisure appliances, personal protective





























































































equipment and safety marking and household goods. Develop­
ment is particularly lively in the areas of information processing 
systems, mechanical engineering, plastics and ergonomics164. 
The singular importance of electrical engineering in technical 
standardisation emerges clearly: it accounts for nearly one-third 
of all standards.
The areas of importance to non-commercial final consumers 
such as foodstuffs and farm products, sport and leisure appli­
ances, heating and ventilation, household goods and bicycles lag 
quantitatively behind such exclusively or largely industrially 
dominated product areas as aviation, mechanical engineering, 
tools and clamps, naval products, mining and shipbuilding. The 
areas of ergonomics and air purification, which explicitly have 
industrial safety or environment protection as their objects, are 
quantitatively of very little importance even if they do show con­
siderable growth in recent years.
The individual standards committees seem to correspond not 
so much to a systematic breakdown of standardisation as to 
branches of industry, in which the manufacturer's can be particu­
larly effectively pursued; C.O. Bauer, a DIN Executive Member 
for years, has spoken of an "identity between industrial associa­
tions and specialised standards committees"165. DIN rejects long­
term centralised planning of standardisation work and keeps to 
the traditional working principle of responding to input from in­
terested business circles and using the organisations or structures 
existing there. All the same, it is admitted that in some areas it is 
not enough to see technical standards as carbon copies of the 
state of the art, that is, of the state reached at a particular point in 
time by technical equipment, products, methods and procedures,
164 Because of the low number of standards, the areas of bicycles and air 
purification are left unmentioned.





























































































which has in the opinion of experts proved itself in practice. In 
the area of information technology and nuclear safety, for in­
stance, standards had to be worked out hand in hand with devel­
opment before the state of the art had emerged. The Advisory 
Committees to the Standards Committees are, in view of the ab­
sence of central planning, asked to take decentralised planning all 
the more seriously, and draw up outline programmes for their 
specialised areas166.
Table 4: Number of DIN standards and projected standards in 1986 for the 
20 areas with most standards and some other selected areas 




1 Electrical Engineering 6.473 1.842 0.28
2 Aviation 2.457 538 0.22
3 Materials Testing and Fuels Standards 1.837 861 0.47
4 Tools and Clamps 904 183 0.20
5 Mechanical Engineering 838 679 0.81
6 Naval Products 768 215 0.28
7 Precision and Optical Engineering 757 277 0.37
8 Building Construction 651 241 0.37
9 Hydraulic Engineering 507 179 0.35
10 Images and Film 464 39 0.08
11 Vehicles 459 160 0.35
12 Plastics 457 285 0.62
13 Mining 416 114 0.27
14 Shipbuilding 404 87 0.22
15 Railway 363 126 0.35
16 Mechanical Connectors 351 91 0.26
17 Textiles and Textile Machinery 351 55 0.16
18 Fire-fighting Equipment 276 57 0.21
19 Packaging 273 75 0.27
20 Foodstuffs and Farm Produce 230 94 0.41
24 Information Processing Systems 214 325 1.52
34 Heating and Air Conditioning 159 73 0.46
36 Sport and Leisure Equipment 151 32 0.21
41 Nuclear Technology 131 71 0.54
56 Personal Protective Equipment
and Safety Marking 64 10 0.16




























































































63 Household Goods 52 9 0.17
71 Ergonomics 34 21 0.62
93 Bicycles 11 11 1.00
102 Air Purification 7 52
43
— TOTAL 19,937 8,6530.43
According to the number of standards in each specialised area. The 
composition of the DIN Executive Board reflects the prevailing influ­
ences on standardisation work. The 50 members can be allocated to 
the following fields of interest16' :
Industry 22
Federal Government 5










Mutual Indemnity Associations 1
Consumers 1
Table 5 gives a picture of the development of DIN's fi­
nances168. DIN finances itself very largely from sales proceeds 
for standards sold by its own publishing house (64.6% in 1986), 
and otherwise in equal proportions from contributions from 
member firms and other financial support from business circles 
and public sources. The latter doubled between 1975 and 1978. 
Government pays the costs in full for the Safety Technology 
Committee and the Consumer Council, the work of which is in 
large part for the public interest. If the volume of the official DIN 
budget is set against the number of newly produced standards, 
one arrives at a hypothetical figure for the average cost of each 
new norm. This figure would, however, represent only 10% of 
the actual total expenditure accounted for by the honorary work­
ers in the form of travel expenses, fees, preparation of meetings
167 As at 1 March 1987; source: DIN Annual Report for 1986-7, 22-23.




























































































and development work as such169. The DIN budget is also unbur­
dened through the existence of the so-called external standards 
committees, financed almost exclusively from the trade associa­
tions that support them170. 50% of DIN's financial outgoings go 
to national standardisation, 30% to worldwide standardisation 
through 1SO/IEC, 15% to European standardisation through 
CEN/CENELEC and 5% to bilateral co-operation with other 
countries171.
Table 5: Development of DIN income by source of finance betwen 1972 
and 1986, and hypothetical costs per standard
1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1986
Budget volume in 
million DM 
of which (%):
25.0 37.5 48.4 62.5 68.4 75.4
- Proceeds from 
publications and 
miscellaneous income
70.0 73.0 61.4 62.0 63.2 64.6
- Contributions and 
sectorial support 
from industry
22.0 18.0 20.2 18.2 8.5 18.1
- Public subsidies 
Number of newly
8.0 9.0 18.4 19.8 18.3 17.3
produced DIN standards 1,592 1,539 1,649 1,4181,363
Hypothetical costs
per new standard (DM) 23,556 31,44937,902 48,23755,329
Source: DIN activities reports and personal calculations.
169 Cf. Reihlen, Kosten der Normung, 1977 and the indications in the DIN 
Report for 1986-7, 3 and 9.
170 For more details on this and other forms of the problematic — since it 
creates dependencies — support for DIN by private industry see 
Brinkmann, 1976, 88-89.



























































































3.4.2 The standards agreement
Because of the overwhelming economic effects of technical 
standardisation, its increasing importance to the public and the 
resulting need for legitimation, thinking began in the late 1960's 
about setting the relationship between Government and DIN on a 
legally established foundation. A DIN-commissioned report 
proposing a contractual agreement between DIN and the Federal 
Government was, particularly because of its great flexibility, fi­
nally accepted172.
In the agreement, concluded on 5 June 1975173, the Federal 
Government recognises DIN as the "competent standards organi­
sation for Federal territory and West Berlin and as the national 
standards organisation in non-governmental international stan­
dards organisations" (§1(1))174. DIN undertook to take the public 
interest into account in its standardisation work. This includes in 
particular the areas of safety technology, health protection, envi­
ronmental protection, consumer protection, and areas where there 
is a special interest for the economy as a whole (e.g. energy con­
servation) or where there is special particular interest for gov­
ernment or for public tendering and procurement (EDP, informa­
tion and documentation, building construction)175. It ensures that 
standards can be adduced in legislation, in public administration 
and in law as descriptions of technical requirements (§ 1(2)). This 
is meant to ensure that DIN standards can be referred to as the 
recognised state of the art. The DIN has further undertaken to
172 Cf. Ernst, 1973.
173 The agreement is printed with notes in DIN-Mitt. 54 (1975), 359-364. 
Cf. the statement issued by DIN under the heading "Partnerschaft", 
DIN-Mitt. 54 (1975), 365 et seq. See also on the standards agreement 
Bôttger, 1979; Pokomy, 1977; idem, 1976; Reihlen, Die Auswirkungen 
des Normenvertrages, 1977.
174 In 1986 DIN supplied secretarial services for 162 out of 1,009 techni­
cal committees of ISO/IEC and 42 out of 99 technical committees of 




























































































give the Federal Government a place on its directing bodies, to 
involve other national bodies as well in standardisation work, to 
give Government applications for standards preferential treatment 
and to advise and inform it in matters relating to standardisation. 
The Federal Government in return supports DIN financially from 
the national budget, observes strict subsidiarity in national 
standardisation (§4(2)), informs DIN on matters of standardisa­
tion at national and supranational levels and involves it in devel­
opments in such matters, uses DIN standards in the national ad­
ministration, and publishes a list of DIN standards, draft stan­
dards and projected standards in the Federal Gazette. Finally, 
DIN declares its willingness "to contribute to international under­
standing in tire area of standardisation" and to do every thing in 
its power to ensure that "obligations entered into by the Federal 
Government through bilateral agreements on liberalisation of 
trade and removal of technical barriers are not interfered with by 
DIN standards (§ 6 (1) — "antiprotectionism clause"). Finally, 
DIN explicitly undertakes to comply with DIN 820, which sets 
out the principles for standardisation work, and with the direc­
tives for the specialised standards committees (§ 3); the assump­
tion of responsibility for public tasks is thus made dependent on 
compliance with precisely specified fundamental internal rules of 
procedure. In supplementation of the standards agreement, DIN 
was entrusted in 1984 with the carrying out of tasks arising from 
conversion of the Community Directive on an information proce­
dure, in the area of standards and technical regulations176.
The standards agreement does not transfer any sovereign 
powers and from the legal point of view regulates the therefore 
unwritten relationships between DIN and the Federal Govern­
ment. It confirms the principle of reference to DIN standards in
175 See notes on § 1 of the standards agreement, DIN-Mitt. 54 (1975), 361.
176 On this see the correspondence between the Federal Minister for Eco­




























































































legislation and administration and contributes to the creation of a 
comprehensive and coherent system of standards177.
3.4.3 Principles o f standardisation and procedures fo r  pro­
ducing standards
The legitimation of DIN standardisation work through the 
standards agreement with the Federal Government presupposed a 
standardisation procedure that would be transparent, public in 
principle and formally provide for participation of all those con­
cerned. The decisive factor for legitimating standardisation work 
would thus be neither substantive evaluation of the findings nor 
actual involvement of interested circles, but only the procedure 
specified in DIN 820178. The conditions for this were created 
through the reformulation of DIN 820, Part 1 and Part 4 of 
February 1974, through the October 1974 directives for standards 
committees and the October 1975 reformulation of the DIN rules 
of procedure.
DIN 820, Part 1, lays down the principles for standardisa­
tion work. Standardisation is seen as "planned harmonisation car­
ried out jointly by interested circles" for the general good, which 
ought not to lead to special economic advantages for individu­
als179. The technical work should be done by honorary workers, 
namely experts from interested circles. Examples listed are users, 
public authorities, mutual indemnity associations, vocational and 
technical colleges, institutes and universities, traders, handicraft, 
industrial manufacturers, testing institutions, technical insurers, 
independent experts, the technical supervision system, con-
177 In DIN terminology this means that the extension of 
"Nebennormenwerken" (sets of subsidiary standards) is prevented.




























































































sumers, scientists. In the composition of the working groups, 
where standardisation work is actually done, the principle to be 
observed is that interested circles should be represented in suit­
able proportions180. On the selection of workers, the directives 
for the working committees go on to specify that account has to 
be taken of the special features of the field of work and the ob­
jective of bringing the latest findings of science and the state of 
the given art into standardisation work181. Such a wide declara­
tive openness to all considerable interested groups prevents, 
however, a real openness in debating existing conflicts of inter­
ests. It is further provided that results of regional or international 
standardisation work be taken over where possible without 
change182. Finally, standards should both, promote the develop­
ment and humanisation of technology and take into account the 
current state of science and technology and economic circum­
stances — requirements that in some cases are entirely contra­
dictory183.
DIN 820, part 4, lays down the course of standardisation 
work in detail and also specifies the openness principle laid down 
in DIN 820, Part 1. The procedure leading up to publication of a 
standard should, if no special delays arise, take some three years.
In principle any one is free to apply to DIN or a competent 
committee for standardisation. De facto, most applications come 
from business or from the committees themselves. If the applica­
tion for standardisation is accepted, the public is informed of the 
standardisation project. In non-public sessions, the committee 
works out a preliminary standard. Following technical standardi-
179 DIN 820, part 1 (2).
180 DIN 820, part 1 (3.4).
181 Guidelines for standards committees, point 10 (5).




























































































sation checks by DIN's internal standards verification centre, the 
draft standard is made available to the public for opinions during 
a period of at least 4 months and at most 2 years. Objections or 
proposals for supplementation or amendment can be put forward 
by anyone. Opinions received are discussed by the competent 
working committee, and those who have submitted them should 
be invited. Should an objection be rejected, a mediation and if 
necessary arbitration procedure within DIN is available. Before 
final publication, the standard is once again subjected to final 
technical standardisation checks overall to guarantee that stan­
dardisation work is uniform and non-contradictory. It is explicitly 
stated that all standards must be checked at least every 5 years; if 
a standard is no longer in line with the state of the art, it must be 
reworked if it is to be maintained184.
Formal voting rules for deciding on standards do not exist. 
Instead, the consensus principle applies:
"The content of a standard should be arrived at by 
mutual agreement in the endeavour to reach a common 
view — where possible avoiding formal voting"185.
The dedication to the consensus principle is an expression of 
the self-image of regulatory work as a technical and scientific 
optimisation procedure rather than an economic-cwm-sociological- 
cum-technical balancing problem. Above all, however, it takes ac­
count of the fact that DIN has no enforcement powers, but is de­
pendent on voluntary compliance by the business areas con­
cerned. As explained in DIN 820, part 1:
183 DIN 820, part 1, (5.7).
184 DIN 820, part 4 (4).




























































































"DIN standards in the German Standardisation System 
are open to use by anyone. They should be introduced 
as «recognised rules of the art»"186.
This means that DIN standards cannot, even where further- 
reaching objectives are stated verbally, go significantly beyond 
the standards observed in practice, at any rate as far as those are 
represented by standardisation bodies. The principles for apply­
ing DIN standards state that "while the rules for establishing DIN 
standards call for the state of the art to be taken into account, this 
demand is extremely hard to achieve in practice, simply because 
of the steady advance of technology", and that "the outcome of 
teamwork cannot be expected to meet the highest aspirations"187.
Marburger gives the following five minimal constitutional 
requirements for standardisation procedures188:
— Relevant expertise must be comprehensively represented on 
the standardisation committees;
— AH interests involved should have balanced representation 
in the procedure for arriving at standards;
— The public must have an opportunity to influence the con­
tent of the standard produced;
— Technical standards must be subject to regular revision;
— The procedure must be laid down in binding fashion.
The greatest difficulties in meeting these legal requirements, 
which are appropriate for European standardisation procedure 
too, lie mainly in securing the balanced involvement of all inter-
186 DIN 820, part 1 (6.1).
187 Section m , 3. and 4.




























































































ests concerned. Gusy189 notes one-sided representation of inter­
ests in various respects:
— Private interests may take precedence over public interests 
which are not concretely enough defined and often not per­
sonally represented on the committees;
— Standardisation against clear market leaders is not possible 
— the factor of honorary standardisation work one-sidedly 
favours industrial suppliers;
— Consumers are under-represented and able to articulate their 
interests only with great difficulties;
— There is an overlapping of interests between industry and 
standardisation that is hard to break down — the expertise of 
the applicants from industry cannot 1« outweighed.
It does not seem possible to overcome, but at most to limit, 
these aspects of one-sidedness as long as the principle is main­
tained of seeing production of standards as a self-governing task 
for industry, and making compliance with technical standards a 
free matter.
3.4.4 Incorporation o f international and European standards 
into the German standards system
A large proportion of DIN standards is based on European 
and international harmonisation work. 25% of all DIN standards 
are directly connected with international and European standards. 
50% of all international and European standards (70% in electri­
cal engineering) are converted into DIN standards, half of them 
without any technical differences190. Frequently the adoption of 
an international standard is not possible because the German state 
of the art is higher than the international consensus on technical





























































































requirements would require191. And international standards 
adopted by the German standards system are still subject to the 
usual obligation for verification after 5 years. This may mean that 
because of progress in technical requirements, an international 
standard taken over as a DIN standard is tightened up in the na­
tional framework, if international decision is delayed.
A number of resolutions by the DIN Executive Board are of 
relevance to international and regional standardisation work. 
They state:
"Where an EN Standard (European Standard) exists to 
which DIN has assented, this standard should be 
adopted unchanged by the German standards system as 
a DIN Standard, with a note to that effect. Where an 
International Standard exists, this should either be 
taken over unchanged by the German standards system 
as a DIN Standard with a note to that effect, or else as a 
DIN Standard produced on its basis after suitable re­
working, as with the former ISO recommendations and 
IEC publications. Unchanged adoption of standards is 
to be preferred."
"These conditions for the possibility of adopting Euro­
pean Standards (EN Standards) or International Stan­
dards by the German standards system unchanged as a 
DIN standard are met only if these have previously 
been subjected to the same opposition proceedings and 
test procedures as DIN Standards"192.
In the international bodies ISO and IEC a national member 
organisation is not obliged to take a standard over into its na­
tional standards system, even if it has assented to the interna­
tional standard193. By contrast, with the regional bodies CEN and
190 Cf. DIN-Jahresbericht 1982/83, 24.





























































































CENELEC there is a binding obligation on a standards organisa­
tion, even if outvoted, to take standards over unchanged into the 
national standards system194. In the area of the Low-Voltage Di­
rective, this briefly led to considerable difficulties195. This expe­
rience and the principle of majority decision with binding effect 
even on outvoted standards organisations make considerable dif­
ficulties likely when reaching agreements as to European stan­
dards, especially when national deviations are, contrary to the 
practice in the field of the Low Voltage Directive196, no longer 
permitted.
There is also a DIN Executive resolution on the relationship 
between regional and international standardisation stating:
"International standardisation should, as a rule, be 
given precedence. Where, however, CEN/CENELEC 
have, in connection with the European Community 
harmonisation programmes, agreed with Member State 
governments, and decided to work on a standardisation 
project to which DIN has assented, it must be given 
precedence by the relevant DIN standards committees.
The state of worldwide standardisation has also to be 
taken into account in the European standardisation 
project. International standardisation work in ISO and
193 The rules on take-over are stated in the basic norm DIN 820, part 15 — 
standardisation work, DIN/ISO standards, DIN-IEC standards, struc­
ture. According to these provisions, in the German "package" a na­
tional preamble and a national appendix are possible, but they must not 
contain any changes to the international standards. See also Krieg, 
1977.
194 These common rules for CEN and CENELEC have applied only since 
1986, after the 1985 CEN General Assembly adopted the principle of 
binding majority resolutions for CEN too. See Mohr, CEN-Generalver- 
sammlung 1985, DIN-Mitt. 65 (1986), 47-48. The rules on take-over 
are laid down in basic standard DIN 820, part 13 — standardisation 
work, DIN-EN standards, structure.
195 Cf. Orth, 1981.




























































































IEC is not, however, to impede progress with work in 
CEN/CENELEC197.
3.4.5 The representation o f consumer interests in DIN
The regulation of consumer representation in standardisation 
work played a considerable part in the negotiations on the agree­
ment between the Federal Government and DIN. The DIN Exec­
utive Resolution of 8 October 1974 decided, in agreement with 
the Federal Minister for Economic Affairs, to set up under DIN a 
publicly financed body to improve the representation of con­
sumer interests in standardisation, namely the Consumer Council 
(Verbraucherrat)198. Two factors made this achievement possible: 
(1) The Consumer Council's work is paid for almost exclusively 
by government so that no additional contributions are required 
from the business world; (2) even more importantly, an organisa­
tional form has been found in the Consumer Council that allows 
the inclusion of consumer viewpoints in the normal course of 
standardisation work199. This means that interest representation 
comes about primarily in decentralised fashion in the individual 
standards committees.
The political and formal ties of the Consumer Council dis­
play three features. The honorary body of the Consumer Council 
acts as the link to the consumer protection scene. Government fi­
nancing means relative autonomy vis-à-vis the manufacturing 
side. The formal status of the Consumer Council as a standing 
committee of the DIN Executive and the disciplinary attachment 
of its full-time workers to DIN, guarantee professional ties to 
DIN and its working committees200. This form of consumer rep-
197 DIN-PrasidiumsbeschluB 5/1979.
198 Cf. Brinkmann, 1976, 101-02. See also Kòhne, 1987.




























































































reservation has appositely been called a "partnership-type in- 
house solution"201.
Details on the Consumer Council's work are regulated in the 
rales of procedure of the DIN Executive202. The Consumer 
Council has the task of advising and supporting DIN steering and 
working committees in matters of interest to the non-commercial 
final consumer, and of incorporating consumer interests into in­
ternational, regional and national standardisation. Consumer in­
terest representation must take place exclusively within the pro­
cedure framework laid down by DIN 820 for standardisation 
work. In carrying out these tasks, the Consumer Council should
— keep standardisation projects and work programmes in the 
standards committees under observation;
— present applications for standardisation projects of relevance 
to consumers on the standards committees;
— ensure personal representation of consumers on the stan­
dards committees;
— keep standardisation work under observation, even in stan­
dards committees on which consumer representatives do not 
regularly sit;
— present opinions on preliminary and draft standards and 
where necessary, formulate objections to draft standards;
— ensure the incorporation of DIN standards into the work of 
consumer institutions, and feedback of experience acquired 
there into standardisation work;
— ensure the instruction and training of consumer representa­
tives working on DIN working committees203.
200 Op. cit„ 194-95.
201 Schatz, 1984, 199.
202 Rules of procedure of the DIN Executive of October 1975, point 4.2.2.




























































































The five members of the Consumer Council204 are ap­
pointed by the President of DIN in consultation with the Con­
sumers' Working Group (AGV, Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Ver­
braucher), and the Federal Minister for Economic Affairs. This 
appointment procedure re-emphasises the fact that this interest 
representation of consumers has been decreed rather than fought 
for.
The most important working body is the Executive Office, 
whose seven collaborators are presently DIN employees. To fa­
cilitate co-ordination and train consumer representatives, the Ex­
ecutive Office has produced an exhaustive "guide to standardisa­
tion for consumer representatives"205. At present there are some 
2,400 standards and draft standards of relevance to consumers206. 
To avoid hopeless fragmentation of forces, a priority programme 
has been developed, which provides for some 100 pieces of stan­
dardisation work to be handled at any one time207. This means 
that each Executive Office staff member not doing secretarial 
work, primarily engineers, is involved in 20 or so work projects. 
These projects include sometimes international standardisation, 
but concern primarily advising the honorary representatives in 
standardisation. The priority programme responds to current 
standardisation projects in DIN and does not set up any alterna­
tive standardisation programme from the consumer side. Apart
204 The Consumer Council is presently represented by: a professor of do­
mestic technology and one representative each of the Stiftung War- 
entest, the Federal Office for Materials Testing, the Consumer Associ­
ation and the Berlin Consumer Centre.
205 Stiftung Verbraucherinstitut/DIN-Verbraucherrat (ed.), Leitfaden fiir 
Verbrauchervertreter bei der Normung, Berlin 1981. An extract con­
cerning structural problems of honorary consumer work in standards 
committees is contained in: Bosserhoff, 1984, 7 et seq. The point is 
considered in detail in Chapter V, 6.1.3.
206 DIN (ed.), Normen und Norm-Entwiirfe fiir den Verbraucher, Verze- 




























































































from pragmatically taking into account staffing and financial ca­
pacities, the criteria are the following standardisation objectives:
— Safety or health;
— Environment protection, energy conservation, other general 
economic interests;
— Interchangeability, compatibility, allocation possibilities;
— Assessability of fitness for use.
In general, standardisation projects are followed from their 
inception. In addition, the Consumer Council reserves the right to 
"break in" in the course of preparation of standards in order to as­
sert consumer interests. Still more importantly, a fixed group of 
selected people, augmented in each case by experts in particular 
areas, receives all draft norms of consumer relevance produced 
for a final opinion, so as to assert consumer interests in the course 
of the normal opposition procedure208.
In addition to members of consumer associations, those who 
act as consumer honorary representatives on individual standardi­
sation projects, include advisers to energy supply utilities, repre­
sentatives of the Stiftung Warentest, test centre workers, trade 
supervisory offices, the Federal Institute for Materials Testing, 
the Federal Institute for Industrial Safety, representatives of mo­
toring and hobby clubs and scientific workers in university insti­
tutes209. In a large number of cases, this means that consumer 
representation is handled by workers of other institutions that do 
not have consumer protection as their primary objective. It is ob­
vious that consumers will always be dependent on others in­
volved who will take their views into account and represent them;
207 On the priority programme see Bosserhoff, 1980, 671; Kypke, 1982, 
199-202. On a prionty programme for consumer involvement in Euro­
pean standardisation see Bosserhoff, 1987, Prioritatenprogramm.
208 On these principles cf. Bosserhoff, 1980, 671-72.




























































































it is hardly possible to assert consumer interests as a specific in­
terest in the course of technical standardisation210.
3.4.6 Conformity marks
To promote standards in the areas of testing, monitoring, 
quality assurance and certification of products, services and pro­
cedures, DIN has, by an executive resolution of 24 September 
1971, set up the Deutsche Gesellschaft fiir Warenkennzeichnung 
GmbH (German Society for Product Marking -DGWK). By §3 of 
its articles of association211 it is deemed competent for setting up, 
administering and monitoring marking systems on the basis of 
DIN standards, international standards and suitably recognised 
other provisions of the nature of standards. The DGWK is, by 
DIN executive resolution 2/1973, additionally competent for the 
nomination of testing and monitoring agencies, insofar as they 
are brought in for neutral, independent determination of confor­
mity with standards and assessments of products on the basis of 
standards. As part of its tasks, DGWK handles co-operation in 
international and regional certification. Technical treatment of 
certification tasks212 is incumbent on the standards committees in 
collaboration with the DGWK.
The activities of the DGWK (a 100% subsidiary of DIN) are 
reflected in the form of the DIN testing and monitoring mark. 
This is conferred on products that have been tested for confor­
mity with the relevant DIN standard and the manufacture of 
which is monitored in requisite fashion. This testing is carried out
210 Cf. also Schatz, 1984, 213-14.
211 DGWK articles of association of 30 November 1971, printed in ex­




























































































by independent test centres such as technical control boards and 
other testing laboratories domestically and abroad or by national 
materials testing institutes, or trade associations, For recognition 
by the DGWK, testing and monitoring centres have to carry out 
their task independently and in the strictest neutrality, and with­
out observance of any economic dependency on the basis of pos­
sible ownership or contractual relationships213. If a test centre 
confirms that a product meets all the requirements specified in 
DIN standards, the DGWK confers the DIN testing and monitor­
ing mark, for a limited period and for a fee214. Depending on the 
content of the standard observed, the DIN test mark acts as a 
commodity mark and/or safety mark, or else confirms a product's 
fitness for use.
Marking with the DIN test mark "DIN-gepriift" (DIN- 
tested), which is based on an independent test of conformity and 
attests compliance with all DIN standards of relevance for a 
product, must be clearly distinguished from the marking of a 
product with a DIN number or the association’s mark DIN, which 
anyone may use215. In order for a DIN number to be used as a 
mark, it is sufficient for the product to meet only the require­
ments of the DIN standards indicated, in the manufacturer's view. 
If the mark DIN is used, the rules for this mark should be ob-
212 For details on this see DIN Executive Resolution of 2 January 1985, 
reported by Volkmann, 1985, 172. In general on certification see 
Volkmann, 1982; idem, 1984; idem, 1986.
213 §4(1) of the guidelines for recognition and nomination of testing and 
monitoring centres of 28 November 1974, reprinted in DIN-Normen- 
heft 10 (loc. cit., note 154), 196-198.
214 Cf. in detail the guidelines for conferment of the DIN testing and mon­
itoring mark of 1 January 1975, reprinted in DIN-Normenheft 10 (loc. 
cit., note 154), 192-194; see also the rules for the DIN testing and 
monitoring mark, reprinted in DIN-Normenheft 10 (loc. cit., note 154), 
191.





























































































served. These state that DIN standards directly affecting the rela­
tive product must be complied with.
3.5 Product liability
The extent to which product liability law provides incentives 
to manufacturers to make safer technical consumer products is a 
question that depends on a variety of uncertain legal and extrale­
gal preconditions. It cannot therefore be answered ipso lure either 
affirmatively or negatively, whether for the law of the FRG or 
any other Community Member State216. In any case, the incom­
parability in principle of the "reality" in product liability law 
between the U.S.A. and Western Europe has to be stressed217. 
This lies not so much in distinctions in substantive law, i.e. the li­
ability for product hazards recognised in most American States 
("strict product liability in tort") versus negligence liability in Eu­
rope, as in specific institutional conditions confined to the U.S. 
These are notably the punitive damages awarded by lay juries, 
the contingency-fee system, i.e., the fact that the losing party 
does not as a rule have to bear the winner's legal costs, the need 
to supplement often inadequate social insurance by compensation 
payments, the extensive pretrial discovery procedure, etc. In 
Community Member States employers' liability insurance is a 
major limiting factor on the social preventive approach, namely 
giving companies an incentive to manufacture safer products 
through the establishment of liability of individual manufacturers. 
On the whole, however, Community Member States will not be 
able to do without product liability suits, if only because of the 
possible negative publicity for relevant rulings of Supreme 
Courts, leading to particular effects on the conduct of manufac-




























































































turers of industrial products. Accordingly, a brief outline of West 
German product liability law would be appropriate here.
From the viewpoint of liability law there are two main 
grounds for claims as far as manufacturer responsibility for dam­
age-causing technical consumer products goes: infringement of 
product safety standards like § 3 GSG or § 2 of the First Imple­
menting Order to the GSG, which act as protective legislative 
provisions within the meaning of § 823 (2) of the German Civil 
Code, and general tortious liability of manufacturers pursuant to 
§ 823 (1) of the German Civil Code. Seller-centred contractual li­
ability need not be considered here, since the overwhelming 
number of product liability cases do not, as far as consumers are 
concerned, involve any direct contractual relationship between 
the manufacturer and those suffering damage.
3.5.1 Infringement o f protective legislative provisions (§823
(2)BGB)
3.5.1.1 § 3 ( 1 )  and 3 GSG
As already stressed218, German product safety law has since 
adoption of the GtA 1968 (since 1980 the "GSG”) had a general 
safety duty, in § 3 (1) GSG. Although oriented primarily towards 
industrial safety, the safety duty of § 3 (1) GSG, because of the 
generalisation of the concept of technical work material by the 
list in § 2 (2) GSG, de facto covers a major part of consumer 
goods marketed in FRG. § 3 (1) GSG is accepted as applying as a 
protective legislative provision within the meaning of § 823 (2) 
BGB. It contains a specific rule of conduct, enacted not only in 
the (public) general interest, but aimed in particular at protecting





























































































purchasers and users of products. Culpable infringements of pro­
tective legislative provisions entail compulsory compensation, 
pursuant to § 823 (2) BGB.
Although from a technical regulatory point of view, § 3 (1) 
GSG was taken as a model for industrial safety and product 
safety provisions in other Community Member States, in partic­
ular Britain, its scope nevertheless lags markedly behind that of, 
say, the English offence of breach of statutory duty219. This is be­
cause of two central features of the legal description of a protec­
tive legal provision in § 823 (2) BGB, taken together with § 3 (1) 
GSG: the concept of "generally accepted rules of the art" in § 3 
(1) GSG and the culpability requirement of § 823 (2) BGB.
The indefinite legal concept of generally accepted rules of 
the art has fairly clear outlines in German technical safety law. In 
the context of the German Constitutional Court’s so-called three- 
stage theory220, the recognised rules of the art set the lowest 
safety level. Though the distinction between the upper two safety 
levels, as state of the art and state of science and technology, is 
not uncontroversial either221, the boundary between recognised 
rules of the art and state of the art is probably not disputed even 
among technical experts. As already stressed222, for the detailed 
specification of the indefinite legal concept of generally accepted 
rules of the art the consensus of technical practitioners in the area 
concerned is taken as a basis. In other words, the decisive point is 
the canon of technical rules proven in practice. This practice need 
not conform to scientifically discussed and experimentally tested
218 Cf. 3.3.3 supra.
219 Cf. Chapter H, 2.7.1 supra.
220 BVerfGE 49, 80 at 135-36.
221 Cf. Nicklisch, 1983, 261, Winckler, Zum Begriff, 1983, 2125; 
Budde/Reihlen, 1984, 248.




























































































new technical solutions. This means also that the judge has no 
leeway in individual cases in shaping the safety requirements. As 
regards the objective situation, all that has to be ascertained is 
whether the technical procedure chosen by the manufacturer was 
in conformity with the recognised practice at the time when the 
product was marketed or displayed. A further restriction of the 
scope of § 3 (1) GSG is the double stress on proper use. Users 
are protected against product hazards only given proper use, and 
only in so far as "the proper use allows". § 2 (5) GSG defines 
proper use to be (1) the use for which the technical work material 
is suited according to indications by the manufacturer or im­
porter, particularly indications given by way of publicity, or (2) 
the usual use following from the design and construction of the 
technical work material. This restriction of the scope of protec­
tion to proper use has to be interpreted in such a way that the 
recognised rules of the art do not involve safety rales or technical 
safety standards in the narrower sense, since as regards safety 
standards, the basic standards DIN 820, Part 12, (3.9.1) and DIN 
31000/VDE 1000 (3.3) go further by also taking foreseeable mis­
use into account.
The relatively low level of safety aimed at in the legal con­
cept of generally recognised rules of the art takes much of the 
virulence away from the issue of sliding reference in specifying 




























































































standards and the safety level of generally accepted rules of the 
art are identical, though in practice there is a "factual pre­
sumption" to that effect. Even with official notification of a tech­
nical standard as a recognised rule of art, for instance, by its in­
corporation in list A under the general administrative regulations 
pursuant to § 11 GSG of 11 June 1979, it is possible to show that 
the given technical standard does not constitute a generally ac­
cepted rule of art within the meaning of § 3 (1) GSG. The sole 
decisive criterion in the last analysis remains probation in prac­
tice and acceptance by practical experts224.
A further precondition for manufacturer’s or importer's lia­
bility under § 823 (2) BGB together with § 3 (1) GSG is that they 
have culpably marketed a product that is technically inadequately 
safe. The literature on liability law as regards infringement of 
protective legal provisions within the meaning of § 823 (2) BGB 
is not unanimous as to what the culpability has to relate to, 
whether to actual injury and/or to breach of duty225. Here, how­
ever, this question may be set aside. According to § 823 (2) taken 
together with §3 (1 )  GSG, maufacturers and importers are negli­
gent if they could have avoided marketing products not comply­
ing with generally accepted rules of the art and therefore inade­
quately safe. In view of the low level of safety specified by the 
legal concept of generally accepted rules of the art, the question 
of culpability tends to lose significance, at any rate in cases of 
manufacturer liability. If proof is brought that the design of a 
product did not correspond to the generally accepted rules of the 
art, this justifies an assumption, no doubt hard to refute, of the 
manufacturer's culpability. On the other hand, importers as a rule 
have no culpability where the non-compliance of an imported 
product with generally accepted rules of the art can be detected
224 Among these rulings are BVerwg, BB 1984, 563 — children's 
sickbeds; BGH, NJW 1980, 1219 — folding bicycles; see also BGH, 




























































































only by extensive testing or if the product has been subjected to a 
design test pursuant to § 3 (4) GSG and given the safety mark 
(GS = geprüfte Sicherheit)226.
It should be stressed that the legal description of liability in 
§ 823 (2) BGB taken together with § 3 (1) GSG, by contrast with, 
say, the offence of breach of statutory duty in English product 
safety law, does not cover traders as among those liable. How­
ever, as was stated, the amendment to the GSG 1979, in so far as 
banning orders from trade supervisory offices are concerned, also 
includes traders among those to whom the norms of the GSG are 
addressed, in §§ (1)(2), under the above-specified conditions227. 
Accordingly, the legislator has not made a corresponding exten­
sion of the general safety duty of § 3 (1) GSG.
In line with the traditional nature of public law on safety 
controls, compensation is confined to injuries to the personal le­
gal goods of life, limb and health.
§ 3 (3) GSG regulates the duty on manufacturers/importers 
to supply particular instructions for use when marketing prod­
ucts, to ward off of hazards to life, limb and health of users and 
third parties. Here, then, is one of the few cases of statutory reg­
ulation of the original duty of instruction. Here the general prin­
ciples of tortious liability in connection with provision of in­
formation apply without restriction228. As a rule, according to the
225 Cf. Brüggemeier, 1986, Nos. 824-25.
226 Among these rulings are BGH, NJW 1980, 1219 — folding bicycles. 
Instructive is LG Koblenz, 4 December 1981, printed in Kull- 
mann/Pfister, Bd. I, point 7870/4.
227 Cf. 3.3.7 (text accompanying note 131-135) supra.
228 A recent basic ruling is BGH, BB 1986, 2368 — aerosols; cf. also OLG 
Koblenz, VersR 1981, 740 — grills. Informative is AG Gelsenkirchen, 
14 June 1973, with dissenting note, Schmidt/Salzer, printed in 





























































































jurisprudence of the Federal High Court, generally known dan­
gers or those within the ambit of ordinary experience need not be 
warned against.
3.5.1.2 § 2 of the First Ordinance under the law on techni­
cal work materials of 11 June 1979
The First Ordinance under §4(1)  GSG serves to convert the 
Low Voltage Directive229 into national law. From the liability- 
law viewpoint, § 2 more or less constitutes a forerunner of the 
new approach to harmonisation and standards. According to § 2 
(1) of the Ordinance, manufacturers and importers may market or 
exhibit in the FRG only such electrical equipment as has been 
manufactured in accordance with the state of safety technology 
evident in the European Community and does not, given regular 
installation, maintenance and proper use, endanger the safety of 
people or domestic animals or the preservation of material values. 
§ 2 (2) reproduces the basic safety requirements given in Annex 1 
to the Low Voltage Directive verbatim § 2 (1) of the First Ordi­
nance is, like § 3 (1) GSG, a protective legal provision within the 
meaning of § 823 (2) of the German Civil Code. There are how­
ever two ways in which § 2 (1) of the First Ordinance goes be­
yond § 3 (1) GSG: by including material property in the area of 
protection, and by focusing on the state of safety technology as 
the decisive safety level. The latter point is of critical importance. 
What counts is no longer generally accepted rules of the art, 
which may well be already outdated by technical development, 
but the state of safety technology in the European Community. 
That this is not merely a terminological difference but a substan­
tive one is the unanimous view in the German literature230. 
Firstly, it refers to the level of safety addressed by the legal con-




























































































cept of state of the art, in principle higher than that in the concept 
of generally accepted rules of the art; and secondly, the state of 
Community safety technology is interpreted as the state of safety 
technology in the country where the highest level has been 
reached231.
This once again brings out the significant difference be­
tween public safety law and civil liability law. The Low Voltage 
Directive, like the First Ordinance under the GtA 1968, makes 
compliance with safety requirements a precondition for the mar­
ketability of technical equipment. But there is a (refutable) pre­
sumption that these conditions have been complied with by the 
manufacturer/importer where he has met particular electrical en­
gineering standards, namely (1) haimonised electrical engineer­
ing CENELEC standards, (2) international CEE/IEC standards or
(3) national electrical engineering standards. In liability law, the 
injured party may demonstrate that the notified electrical engi­
neering standard was no longer up to the current state of safety 
technology at the time the electrical equipment was marketed. 
From the administrative law viewpoint, the Low Voltage Direc­
tive, just like the new approach, provides for objections against 
the underlying electrical engineering standard by a Member State 
using the safeguard clause procedure.
Proof of negligence becomes problematic in these cases. A 
shift in the burden of proof can at any rate not be justified if a 
particular notified electrical engineering standard has been com­
plied with by the manufacturer or importer232. This finding corre­
sponds with the allocation of the burden of proof in the related
230 Among many cf. Kullmann, in: Kullmann/Pfister, Bd. I, point 2455/6.
231 Cf. Zimmermann, Geratesicherheitsgesetz, 149; Schmatz/Nôthlichs, 
Kennz. 1610, 9; Kullmann, in: Kullmann/Pfister, Bd. I, point 2455/6.
232 As far as can be seen, there are not yet any relevant decisions on § 2 




























































































cases of infringement of the product monitoring duty in general 
product liability pursuant to § 823 (1) of the German Civil Code.
3.5.2 Producer liability pursuant to § 823 (1) o f the BGB 
(German Civil Code)
Tortious liability under § 823 (1) BGB is in German civil 
law the comprehensive basis for producer liability for damage 
caused by "defective" goods, whether used commercially or pri­
vately. Only the outlines can be sketched out here233.
Very soon after the BGB came into force, the case law of 
the Reich Supreme Court chose the path of dogmatically under­
pinning manufacturer liability in law of tort. Tortious product lia­
bility developed from the general obligation on property owners 
under 823 (1) BGB to ensure that nobody is avoidably endan­
gered by objects or on land controlled by them. The Re- 
ichsgericht established a general duty of manufacturers of com­
modities to not market products which could, given proper use, 
injure anyone as to the legally protected goods of life, limb, 
health and property234. This line of case law has been continued 
and consolidated by the Federal Court. Today, tortious liability 
under § 823 (1) BGB is characterised by two features:
— A system of differentiated, directly enterprise-related trans­
actional obligations on manufacturers (design, manufacture, 
construction, product monitoring and organisational duties), 
which can only in restricted fashion be delegated so as to 
exempt from liability;
233 On this see Kullmann in: Kullmann/Pfister, Bd. I, point 1520; Mertens, 
1986, § 823, No. 279 ff., Briiggemeier, 1986, Nos. 521 et seq.
234 Among basic rulings are RGZ 87,1 — Brunnensalz; RGZ 163, 21; RG, 




























































































— A system of appropriate mles on the burden of proof.
The two duties on manufacturers traditionally to the fore are 
those of proper design and manufacture of the product. Objects 
manufactured, in particular technical consumer products, must be 
safe in operation, so that in foreseeable use no one is avoidably 
injured. Safety is to be guaranteed by suitable information on and 
planning of the product (direct safety technique within the 
meaning of DIN 310G0/VDE 1000) and additional protective 
measures (indirect safety technique within the meaning of DIN 
31000/VDE 1000). The safety level that applies to design and 
manufacture is the given state of the art within the meaning of the 
Federal Constitutional Court's three-stage theory235.
It should, however, be emphasised that by contrast with § 3 
(1) GSG and § 2 (1) of the First Ordinance under the GSG, the 
aspect of "judging safety" plays a much more central part with § 
823 (1). In defining the extent of the transactional duty on manu­
facturers, beside what is technically feasible, the normative ele­
ment of "legitimate social expectations of safety" enters in. The 
Court determines the specific extent of precaution against hazard 
according to what is possible according to the state of the art at a 
given point in time, what is economically reasonable for the 
manufacturer and what is essential in the interest of protecting 
the integrity of the person. Judicial determination of the requisite 
level of safety thus consists in each individual case of a difficult 
compromise between degree of hazard, likelihood of damage and 
cost of prevention236.
235 BGH, VersR 1952, 357 -  Rungenverschluß; BGH, VersR 1960, 1095 
— Kühlanlage.
236 Informative material on this in BGH, NJW 1984, 801 — Eishockey- 





























































































Should it not be possible, even with proper design and man­
ufacture, to rule out damage given foreseeable use, the manufac­
turer is obliged to attach, or have attached on the appliance, in­
structions on the nature of proper use (instructive safety tech­
nique within the meaning of DIN 31000/VDE 1000). § 3 (3) GSG 
constitutes a special statutory regulation of the original duty of 
instruction on manufacturers and importers.
Since there is no basis in law of tort for liability as to devel­
opment hazards, case law in Germany has developed a product 
monitoring duty. Manufacturers are obliged even after supplying 
a product to take measures to ensure that they are in time and 
comprehensively informed of any possible product hazard237. 
Should any risk become apparent, they are obliged to take cor­
rective action). "The content and extent of a warning, and the 
time to give it, are determined largely by which legal good is in 
danger and depend on the extent of the hazard"238. Among the 
variety of possible legally mandated responses are: public warn­
ing on the conditions that cause danger to arise, which may be 
sufficient or recall of the whole product series to remove the 
source of hazard, which may be necessary239.
The place of the duty of organisation in tortious manufac­
turer liability under § 823 (1) BGB is not entirely clear. It acts in 
part as a subsidiary duty where the other transactional duties on 
manufacturers do not apply; in part it acts as a methodological 
device to provide a basis for direct liability of a businessman or 
business under § 823 (1) BGB for misconduct by employees 
(vicarious liability).
237 BGH, BB 1986, 2368 — Spraydose.
238 BGHZ 80, 186, 191 — Derosal/Apfelschorf I.




























































































Rules on the burden o f proof are. of decisive importance for 
the effectiveness of tortious manufacturer liability as an instru­
ment for both individual compensation for damages and social 
prevention of damage. According to the two fundamental deci­
sions of the Federal Court (Hühnerpest, 1968240 and 
Derosal/Apfelschorf I, 1981241), the following evidentiary situa­
tion is to be taken as a basis. The injured party bringing the action 
has to show that interests protected under law of tort have been 
injured by the product, in the form it left the manufacturer's 
sphere of control. If a design, manufacturing or (original) in­
struction defect is alleged, it is for the manufacturer to show that 
no such misconduct took place within his sphere of control. He 
can show this specifically where design and manufacturing de­
fects are alleged by proving that he has taken the state of the rel­
evant art into account when marketing the product. According to 
a disputed but probably prevalent view, compliance with relevant 
technical standards cannot in this context be taken as a basis for 
prima facie proof. This follows from the differing objectives of 
technical standardisation and of liability law242. In the case of 
technical standards, the manufacturer's side that largely deter­
mines standardisation in staffing and financial terms is pursuing 
its own interests in rationalisation, quality and perhaps also 
safety. In liability proceedings, the point is to determine the level 
of safety required in the interest of guaranteeing the object of 
statutory protection. Accordingly, the state of the art and techni­
cal standards are in principle not the same in coverage. Departure 
from a standard (whether in a positive or a negative direction) is 
irrelevant in liability law, as is conformity with standards. In a 
manufacturer's liability case the manufacturer has therefore to 
bring positive proof of having taken the state of safety technology
240 BGHZ 51 ,91— Hühnerpest.
241 BGHZ 80, 186 — Derosal/Apfelschorf I.
242 Cf. the decisions in note 234; in the literature, among many see Mar- 




























































































of relevance for liability-law purposes into account. Anything 
else applies only in the cases, extremely rare in German law, of 
so-called strict reference. This case is regulated by Art. 7 (d) of 
the Community Product Liability Directive243.
As regards monitoring duties, the general principal applies 
that the objective burden of proof is on injured parties, to show 
that manufacturers are in breach of duty. This evidentiary situa­
tion might as far as consumer goods are concerned, be decisively 
improved through official access to data from the joint Commu­
nity information system on home and leisure accidents.
In the present context of liability for consumer goods, it 
should be mentioned that traders too are subject to transactional 
duties under § 823 (1) BGB. They are of course not liable in the 
same way as manufacturers, but they are under trader-specific 
duties as to conduct under law of tort. These are notably:
— The duty to ensure that no new causes of damage arise in the 
trade sphere. An unobjectionable device ought not, while in 
the trader's control, to be turned into a hazardous product;
— Investigation and information duties (the duty to disclose 
dangers). A potentially hazardous product should be discov­
ered as soon as possible, i.e. before it gets into the hand of 
the consumer. However, a duty on traders to investigate 
factory-new products is assumed only where there are spe­
cial reasons.
Special provisions apply to importers. While the Commu­
nity Product Liability Directive in principle treats those who im­
port commodities into the Community in the same way as manu­
facturers, in the case of tortious liability under § 823 (1) BGB a 
distinction must be drawn. An importer bringing a product from a 
Community Member State into the FRG is to be treated like a 
normal trader. An importer importing a product from a non-




























































































Member State into the FRG is liable in the same way as a trader, 
to the extent that manufacturer liability in the third country is 
guaranteed, especially as far as execution goes. This depends 
critically on bilateral agreements on recognition and execution of 
judgments between the States concerned244. If manufacturer lia­
bility is not guaranteed, the importer is (on a disputed view) li­
able in the same way as a manufacturer.
244 On the so-called Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the enforce­
ment of judgments in civil and commercial matters, to which 9 out of 


























































































































































































The U S Consumer Product Safety A ct 
and its implem entation by the Consumer Product Safety 
Com m ission
Adoption of the 1972 Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA) 
by the 92nd Congress was a success for the consumer movement 
and its legislative impact in the US. The CPSA and its imple­
mentation through the Consumer Product Safety Commission 
(CPSC) of 1973 are, however, important even outside the United 
States. The new legislation and its regulatory machinery has 
served as a model or at least a stimulus in all countries where 
product safety law has been further developed1. Moreover, the 
many amendments to the CPSA and the difficulties in applying it 
have been taken as an illustration of the inadvisability of in­
creased government influence on product safety2.
Political controversies within the United States over the 
CPSA make an analysis aimed at deriving general conclusions 
for product safety law even more difficult. Whether the regula­
tory approach has "proved" itself, what supervisory machinery 
has been "successful" and what has "failed", what regulatory 
strategies ought therefore to be taken over at national and/or Eu­
ropean level — all these points would be much easier to judge if 
implementation of the CPSA had taken a more peaceful course.
1 This influence can clearly be seen in the relevant OECD reports: Data 
Collection Systems 197»; Severity Weighting of Data on Accidents, 
Paris 1979; Safety of Consumer Products, Paris 1980; Recall Proce­
dures, Paris 1981; Product Safety, Paris 1983.




























































































But irregularities and constant amendments seem to be a typical 
feature of product safety policy and product safety law, and de­
scription and interpretation have to go along with them. These 
considerations are taken account of in the description below by 
presenting the CPSA not only in its current version, but in its 
original one as well (4.1), and by always referring to the con­
stantly fluctuating conditions in which the CPSA had to operate 
(4.2-4.5).
4.1 The original version of the CPSA and amendments to it
The CPSA's adoption in 1972 was the conclusion to years of 
preliminary work. The most important preparatory step was the 
setting up of the National Commission on Product Safety3, pro­
posed in 1967 by Senator Warren Magnuson, initiator of many 
consumer policy legislative acts. The fact that Senator Magnuson 
was not aiming directly at enactment of a general product safety 
act but leaving the development of suitable proposals to an inde­
pendent commission did much to help make his initiative suc­
cessful4. The Commission, appointed by President Johnson in 
1968, was able to carry out its preliminary work and hearings 
unmolested by the usual antagonistic pressures. In 1970 the 
Commission presented its voluminous final report5. The report 
not only submitted the findings of broad-based surveys — on 
product hazards, accident information systems, voluntary product 
standards, consumer education, the state of product safety law, 
the relationship between Federal law and State law, product
3 Act of Nov. 20, 1967, Joint Resolution 33, Pub. L. No. 90-146, 81 Stat. 
466 (1976).
4 See the brief and informative description of this strategy in Pertschuk, 
1982, 41 et seq.; detailed descriptions in e.g. the note on the Consumer 




























































































safety policy in other countries — but also contained proposals 
for general product safety legislation, the core of which was to be 
the setting up of a new independent agency6.
4.1.1 The CPS A 19729
Two years after publication of the Commission's final re­
port, the CPSA was passed by both Houses of Congress. On all 
major points, the Act followed the ideas of the preparatory 
Commission. This is all the more remarkable because the law, in 
both overall conception and regulatory machinery, broke new 
ground in many respects:
— This firstly applies to the CPSC itself. There have long been 
independent commissions in the area of so-called economic 
regulation (the Securities and Exchange Commission, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Com­
mission8), but transfer of protection of consumer safety in­
terests to an independent agency was an innovation9. The 
autonomy of the CPSC was shielded against both private
5 National Commission on Product Safety. Final Report Presented to the 
President and Congress, Washington, D.C. 1970.
6 Only one of the six commissioners, H.L. Ray, dissociated himself from 
the Commission's proposals (loc.cit., 120 et seq.). He saw them as 
lacking more precise identification and consideration of incentives that 
could encourage industry itself to raise safety levels, and further rec­
ommended co-operation with private standardisation organisations. 
These suggestions have since been implemented. On the first point, see 
also the self-critical remarks by Commissioner M. Pertschuk, 1982, 
141 et seq., and on the amendment to the provisions on mandatory 
standard setting, 4.1.2.1 infra.
7 Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972).
8 See the descriptions in MUller/Vogelsang, 1979, and Weber, 1986, 174 
et seq.
9 See Scalia/Goodman, 1973. Creation of the CPSC completed the net­
work of newly created agencies in the area of social regulation: the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration had been founded in 
1966, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration in 1970 and 




























































































and governmental interests. The five Commission Members 
are each appointed for seven years; budget appropriations 
need not be approved by the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), but simply by Congress directly10.
— It is also true of the broad range of tasks of the CPSC. The 
CPS A covers all consumer goods, except where other agen­
cies are involved in monitoring safety hazards as part of 
their competence11. Additionally, the CPSC was handed the 
administration of specific existing acts12. The Commission 
thus has a kind of general catch-all competence that always 
applies wherever there are no more specific regulations that 
take priority. But even where such priority regulations affect 
particularly important goods (particularly automobiles and 
pharmaceuticals), the scope remains significant. The juris­
diction of the CPSC is reckoned to apply to 15,000 con­
sumer products13; the often cited estimate by the National 
Commission on Product Safety that some 36 million con­
sumer product accidents occur yearly14 relates to these 
products not covered by special regulations.
— A further innovation was the attempt at making safety reg­
ulation "scientific". Section 5 CPSA provides for systematic 
collection and analysis of accident data, and gives the 
Commission tasks and powers in the area of research15.
— Another breakthrough is the introduction of a wide variety 
of regulatory machinery, ranging from information policy 
measures through standard setting and provisions for bans, 
up to an elaborate recall system16. This gamut of measures 
has greatly encouraged the international debate on product 
safety policy17 and may be regarded as exhaustive: there is
10 See §§ 4, 32 CPSA.
11 See §§ 3 (a) and 31 (a) CPSA.
12 Federal Hazardous Substances Act 1960, Flammable Fabrics Act 1953, 
Poison Prevention Packaging Act 1070, Refrigerator Safety Act 1956 
and Cigarette Safety Act 1984.
13 Figures from Dr. G.C. Nichols, CPSC (International Affairs Division).
14 Op. cit. (note 5), 1.
15 See also Section 27 (a) CPSA.
16 Specifically, see Sections 7 (standards), 8 (product bans), 12 (seizures), 
14 (certification), 15 (recalls).




























































































probably no safety policy measure conceivable which has 
not already been tried out within the framework of the 
CPSA.
The CPSA’s overall conception can be reduced to the two 
not necessarily mutually compatible strategies of making product 
safety policy "scientific" and "democratic": product safety was 
declared a public goal, and entrusted to a relatively independent 
government agency that was to set its priorities, seek effective 
methods and in short pursue a "rational" policy; at the same time, 
however, the new institution was to differ from traditional bu­
reaucracies, to take up safety policy submissions from the general 
public and to promote participation by interest groups.
4.1.2 Amendments
The original consensus expressed in the National Commis­
sion on Product Safety's 1970 Report had made enactment of the 
CPSA possible. This consensus, however, did not last. The con­
troversies over the legal justification for a government product 
safety policy and its appropriate means, largely dormant during 
the preparatory phase of the Act, came to the fore at a later date 
and have never yet been settled.
CPSC adverseries succeeded in bringing about severe bud­
get cuts in the 1980's. The first budget for 1974, still solely based 
on recommendations from the Food and Drag Administration, 
amounted to some 30 million dollars18. When the Commission 
then asked for its own appropriations for 1975 and 1976, it man­
aged to secure increases to some 37 and 42 million dollars re­
spectively from Congress19. Until 1981 the budget kept to this
18 Not considering inflation, this would be equivalent to a 1985 figure of 
some 70 million dollars.




























































































figure in nominal terms, and was then cut in 1982 to 33 million 
dollars20. It is still at this level today21. Staffing is one aspect that 
reflects this development. The Commission began in 1973 with 
579 workers, reached a peak of 914 in 197722, and then gradually 
shrank back to its original number. It should be kept in mind that 
the dollar has lost some 50% of its value by comparison with 
197423 and that therefore a return in nominal terms to the 1974 
budget means halving it de facto24. What suffered most from all 
these cuts were the technical and scientific divisions of CPSC and 
its "field offices", whose tasks lay particularly in the area of fol­
low-up market control. Their numbers were cut from 13 to 525.
4.1.2.1 Mandatory standards and product bans
The most important amendments to the CPSA concerned 
regulations on the issue of product standards. Authoritative pre­
scription of mandatory safety standards was, according to the 
National Commission on Product Safety's recommendations and 
the concepts behind the Act's procedures, to be the most impor­
tant instrument of the new product safety policy26. Standards 
could according to Section 7 (a) (1) and (2) CPSA 1972 refer to
20 See table in Viscusi, 1984, 40.
21 35 million dollars in 1984; 36 million dollars in 1985, approx. 35 mil­
lion dollars in 1986 and 1987 (figures from CPSC Authorization Act 
1985, 99th Congress, 1st Session, Report, 99-60 Calendar No. 138, 7 
and from Statler, 1984, 93.
22 See Viscusi, 1984, 40.
23 See the figures accompanying the Consumer Product Safety Amend­
ment Act of 1983,98th Congress, 1st Session, Report 98-114, 9 et seq.
24 See the CPSC's figures in the Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Health and the Environment of the Committee on Energy and Com­
merce. House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 1st Session on H.R. 
2367, 6/7 April 1983, Serial No. 98-29, Washington, D.C. 1983, 413.
25 See Consumer Product Safety Amendment Act of 1983, op. cit. (note 




























































































performance, composition, contents, design and construction, 
finish or packaging. However, apart from informational require­
ments, the Commission was to confine itself to performance 
standards wherever possible. A procedure was introduced that 
would give consumer associations a say in developing standards: 
the so-called offeror procedure. This made standard setting open 
to tender, and the Commission had the possibility of financially 
supporting its development by the selected offeror (Section 7 (d) 
(2))27.
These provisions have undergone far-reaching changes. In 
1978, the CPSC was given the possibility of refraining from the 
offeror procedure28; in 1981 the procedure was then completely 
abolished29. At the same time Congress fundamentally changed 
its originally critical attitude towards mandatory standards: the 
Commission was henceforth to aim exclusively at performance 
standards and duties of information, but no longer to prescribe 
the "design" of a product (Section 7 (a)). Still more important: 
"the Commission shall rely upon voluntary consumer product 
safety standards . . .  whenever such voluntary standard would 
eliminate or adequately reduce the risk of injury addressed and it 
is likely that there will be substantial compliance with such vol­
untary standards" (cf. also Section 9 (b) (2) (B)).
Additionally, the Commission was mandated to draw up a 
"final regulatory analysis", setting out in detail the costs and ben­
efits of the regulation it had in mind and the alternatives it had 
considered (cf. Section 9 (c) (1) and (4), (f) (2) (A) and (B)). Also
26 See references in Klayman, 1982, 99 et seq.
27 See the detailed description in the note, The Consumer Product Safety 
Commission, 1975, 1121 et seq.; on the petition procedure, see also 
4.3.1 infra.




























































































in 1981, the CPSC's quasi-legislatory independence was consid­
erably cut back. By the newly introduced Section 36, Congress 
can now veto a product safety rule desired by the Commission30.
The amendments to Section 9 CPSA did not affect only the 
issuing of mandatory standards. They also concerned regulations 
on the banning of products. Such bans could be promulgated un­
der Section 8 CPSA 1972, where products presented a dispropor­
tionate risk of injury, and this hazard could not be eliminated by a 
standard. Since Section 8 (2) requires a product ban to be pro­
mulgated "in accordance with Section 9", the possibility of 
"voluntary" standards must now be looked into before a ban is 
ordered , and above all, an exact cost-benefit analysis produced31.
4.1.2.2 Right of petition and public information
Among the regulatory innovations of the CPSA 1972 was 
the power for interested persons and organisations to call on the 
Commission to develop or change a product regulation, and even 
in some cases to compel it through the courts to take action 
(Section 10 CPSA 1972). This possibility of influence was abol­
ished in 1981. All that now apply are the general (more restric­
tive) provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act32. The prac­
tical significance of this revocation seems, however, to be slight
29 Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1203, 95 Stat. 703, 704-13 (1981); details in 
Klayman, 1982, 100 et seq.
30 On the constitutional prerequisites for using the veto right, see the in­
dications in Claybrook, 1984, 69.
31 For more details see 4.3.2 infra.




























































































in the light of a silent transformation through the 70's in function 
of the right of petition33.
Considerable effects were however produced by corrections 
to the CPSC's information policy, first through the courts and 
then confirmed in legislation. The relevant provision of Section 6 
CPSA distinguishes between information concerning business se­
crets (Section 6 (a)) and other information on product hazards 
(Section 6 (b)). The first category of information was already ac­
cording to Section 6 (a) CPSA 1972, to be treated confidentially. 
Other information was, however, pursuant to Section 6 (b) CPSA 
1972, to be passed on. In so far as this made particular manufac­
turers identifiable, they had to be given a chance to state their po­
sition, and the Commission was bound to control the accuracy of 
information as far as possible, and verify the fairness of any pub­
lication. A liberal information policy is in any case in line with 
the general objectives of the CPSA (Section 5 (a) (1)), as with 
those of the Freedom of Information Act 197234, which in princi­
ple obliges the American authorities to comply with a request for 
information where not explicitly prevented by specific laws.
The CPSC thus had to face the difficulty of reconciling 
these rights to information with the restrictions contained in Sec­
tion 6 (b) CPSA. It used the expedient of differentiating between 
a "passive" and an "active" way of passing on information. 
Whereas in the former case the Commission would merely refer 
to data it had received, in the latter it would verify this data prior 
to official promulgation. This practice led to some controversy35, 
and was then definitively overthrown by a Supreme Court deci-
33 See Schwartz, 1982,45 et seq., 55 et seq. and 4.3.1 infra.
34 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 and Supp. II 1978).
35 Cf. on the one hand Pierce Stevens Chemical Corp. v. CPSC, 585 F.2d
1382 (2d Cir. 1978), and on the other hand GTE Sylvania, Inc. v.




























































































sion36. In 1981, Section 6 CPS A was entirely recast. Since then, a 
manufacturer can, pursuant to Section 6 (a) (3), designate any in­
formation concerning him as confidential, and have recourse to 
the courts against its being made public, should the Commission 
find this designation unjustified (Section 6 (a) (6)). Even where 
business secrets are not involved, the Commission is to inform 
manufacturers before passing on any information, secure their 
opinion and verify the accuracy of all indications (Section 6 (b) 
(1)); here, too, the manufacturer can, in case of dispute, call for a 
decision by the courts (Section 6 (b) (4)). The Commission's pos­
sibilities of action through information policy have been severely 
restricted through these new requirements37. A 1983 initiative38 
by Senator H.A. Waxman to reverse these changes was unsuc­
cessful39.
4.1.3 The regulatory "philosophy" o f the CPS A in 1972 and 
the American deregulation movement
The legislative and statutory history of the CPSA has to be 
seen in the context of the rise of the consumer protection move­
ment in the US during the 1960's, and the subsequent "revolt 
against regulation"40, which became official under the Reagan 
adminstration. This debate is so complex and at the same time so 
bound up with American traditions and conditions that it would
exhaustively the Comment on The Consumer Product Safety Act, 
1980, 1180 et seq.
36 CPSC v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980).
37 See submissions by S.D. Domfield from the Society of Professional 
Journalists, jurist A.F. Popper and Commissioner St.M. Statler to the 
1983 Congressional hearings (op. cit., note 24), 80 et seq., 90 et seq., 
368 et seq.
38 Reprinted op. cit., 3 et seq.





























































































be neither possible nor advisable to present it even in outline. 
However, in order to understand and assess the CPSA and its pre­
sent significance, some indications as to the concrete repercus­
sions of those developments on the CPSC's conceptual approach 
are necessary. These were partly encouraged by the general po­
litical "climate", partly mediated through the influence of indi­
vidual politicians and partly brought about through the legislative 
interventions described. Yet a description merely explaining the 
Commission's conceptual approaches is admittedly risking crass 
simplification. By American standards, the CPSC is a very small 
agency, but it is not a monolithic block. Changes to its policies 
do not take place abruptly and uniformly, but in laborious, con- 
flictual processes. With these reservations, three stages in the 
CPSC’s history may be distinguished:
— The initial phase, 1973-8: "[Chairman] Simpson and his 
staff have attempted to design their organisation from the 
beginning so that its goal is clear and its method of standard 
setting minimises arbitrariness. This is what political scien­
tists have always asked heads of new agencies to do. Now 
one has. It will be interesting to see what difference it 
makes". These sentences end one of the first reports on the 
CPSC41. Its generously optimistic verdict was founded 
above all on the endeavour to make product safety policy 
"scientific", and therefore, in particular, upon the efforts of 
the newly established Commission to arrive, on the basis of 
its data surveys, at rational debate and determination of pri­
orities42. These initial hopes were later disappointed43. The 
Commission did not succeed in developing and effectively 
applying a convincing programme. It took four years before 
three product regulations could be adopted (on swimming
40 Pertschuk, 1982.
41 Kelman, 1974, 102.
42 For more details see 4.2 infra.
43 Symptomatic critical assessments can be found by the mid 70's in Cor- 
nell/Noll/Weingast, 1976 and Hoffman, 1976; see also Feldman, 1980, 




























































































pool slides, matchbooks and plate glass)44. Information 
policy instruments and recall possibilities were not fully 
used. Not only industry but consumer associations as well 
gave vent to severe criticisms45. During the 1977 Congres­
sional Hearings, J.E. Moss, himself a major proponent of 
enactment of the CPSA, confirmed the general misgivings 
very clearly46.
— The Commission's public image improved following the 
1978 appointment of Susan King as its new chairman47. The 
Commission then trimmed down its overambitious stan­
dardisation programme, opened up an important new field 
of activity with its "chronic hazards program"48 and made a 
prudent use of its regulatory instruments — mainly by mak­
ing the recall provisions of Section 15 (b) CPSA effective49.
— Primarily due to its successes during the consolidation phase 
following 1978, the CPSC managed to survive the deregu­
lation wave following President Reagan's assumption of of­
fice. Moves by the OMB under D. Stockman to take away 
the Commission's independence and integrate it into the De­
partment of Trade were unsuccessful. However, the Com­
mission had to accept the cuts to its budget described above 
as well as the legislative amendments between 1981 and 
1983 and interventions in personnel policy50. All these cor­
rections were, and still are, marked by a clearer orientation 
of the Commission towards criteria of economic efficiency 
and self-control of its activities through cost-benefit analy­
ses. A memorandum drawn up by P.H. Rubin, Associate
44 For more details see 4.3 infra.
45 See Bollier/Claybrook, 1986, 171 et seq.; for further evidence see the 
hearings cited in note 46.
46 Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 1st Ses­
sion, No. 95-52, Washington, D.C. 1977, 1 et seq.
47 In 1977, during the brief transitional period from S.J. Byington's 
chairmanship, the Commission had already announced a change in its 
policy priorities (see 42 F.R. 53953, 4 October 1977).
48 For the programme and the opinion-forming process within the Com­
mission see Merrill, 1981, 1264 et seq., 1297 et seq.
49 For details see 4.5 infra.




























































































Executive Director of the Division for Economic Analysis51, 
documents this trend. The memorandum points to budget re­
strictions on the Commission, and recommends cost-benefit 
analysis as a way of using scarce resources more effec­
tively52. But its ambitions go further: all regulatory machin­
ery should be verified on cost-benefit-analysis criteria, and 
the assessment of safety hazards implicit in individual con­
sumer decisions should be recognised as the ultimately 
binding rationality criterion of safety policy53.
4.2 The accident information system and the CPSC's policy 
priorities
Any product safety policy, whatever regulatory philosophy 
it may follow, is bound to set priorities. This need becomes all 
the more urgent, the more comprehensive is its scope and the 
greater the room for manoeuvre of the safety policy agency. The 
collection of data on accidents and accident risks is an obvious 
preparatory step towards a rational priority policy54.
The CPSC has various simple and more ambitious informa­
tion sources available. It collects newspaper clippings; it accepts 
consumer complaints through a free telephone service 
("hotline")55; Section 15 (b) CPS A obliges manufacturers and 
traders to notify the Commission of product hazards56; also
51 P.H. Rubin, Cost-Benefit Analysis, 26 February 1986 (internal memo­
randum of the CPSC).
52 Op. cit., 6.
53 Op. cit., 8 et seq., 3 et seq.
54 For the Community, see the Council Decision of 22 April 1986 
"concerning a demonstration project with a view to introducing a 
Community system of information on accidents involving consumer 
products", O.J. No. L 109, 26 April 1986, 23.
55 See 16 CFR 1003.
56 According to the CPSC's 1982 Annual Report (5), in 1981 30,000 
death certificates were still being assessed. The 1984 Annual Report 




























































































noteworthy in this connection is information from the Commis­
sion's "Field Services"; and a co-operation agreement was con­
cluded with the Association of American Trial Lawyers, which 
systematically gathers information on product liability actions57.
However, all these sources are of secondary importance. 
More significant is the systematic evaluation of death certificates, 
along with reports from the "Poison Control Centers" and espe­
cially the data from the "National Electronic Injury Surveillance 
System (NEISS)".
4.2.1 The National Electronic Injury Surveillance System
A system for collecting accident data (the "Hospital Emer­
gency Room Injury Reporting System") had already been devel­
oped in 1969 by National Commission on Product Safety Execu­
tive Director William V. White, and was extended in 1970 by the 
Food and Drug Administration. The Commission was able to 
draw on this preliminary work when it began immediately build­
ing up its own accident information system58.
The characteristic feature of this system is its orientation 
towards current accident data. These data are gathered from se­
lected hospital emergency services; originally numbering 119, 
they were reduced to 74 in 1979 and to 64 after 1984. Especially 
trained personnel in these stations allocate accidents associated 
with the use of products to 19 general categories and some 900
57 For the beginning of the co-operation, see Statler, 1980, 80 et seq.; 
Johnson, 1982, 63 et seq.
58 On this see Kelman, 1974, 92 et seq.; Hoffman, 1976, 397 et seq. and 
the Commission document "The National Electronic Injury Surveil­
lance System: A Description of Its Role in the U.S. Consumer Product 




























































































more specific sub-categories, grade their severity (on a scale of 
originally 8, now 7 grades), the nature of the injury (by allocating 
it to one of 250 categories of injury), and the age and sex of those 
involved. These figures are transferred on a daily basis to the 
CPSC's computers. In a Consumer Product Hazard Index, the 
frequency and severity of hazards associated with a product are 
determined, and additionally evaluated on an Age-Adjusted Fre­
quency-Severity Index.
Today the NEISS still supplies data on some 200,000 acci­
dents per year. However, it allows only retrospective conclusions 
as to the involvement of products in causing accidents and/or the 
co-responsibility of product users. Accordingly, the NEISS data 
have always been treated as only a starting point for in-depth 
studies. Only these follow-up studies can and should determine 
typical accident patterns and, when appropriate, the dangers 
arising from a particular product59.
4.2.2 Criticisms o f the NEISS
The suitability of the NEISS as a source of data for deter­
mining priorities for action was always a controversial issue. 
Objections concern partly technical factors which can be cor­
rected, such as the reliability of the data collection and the differ-
59 For more details see Kelman, 1974, 94 et seq. According to the Com­
mission's 1982 Annual Report (5), in the 1981 financial year 235,000 
accidents were surveyed through the NEISS system. In at least 2,000 
cases follow-up studies were done. The 1983 and 1984 Annual Reports 
did not give any figures; it emerges, however, from the CPSC docu­
ments cited supra (note 58), that these figures continue to apply. Nev­
ertheless, it should be bome in mind that as the statements by Commis­
sioner E. Sloan to the 1981 Senate Hearings confirm, the budget cuts 
decided at that time had considerable effect here, too ( see Hearing be­
fore the Subcommittee for Consumer Protection of the Committee on 
Commerce, Science and Transportation, 1 Dec. 1981, No. 97-87, 




























































































entiation of product categories. Other decisions, such as the con­
centration on accident emergency services60, are difficult to alter. 
It seems even more difficult to respond to objections concerning 
the suitability of the data themselves; e.g., collection of accident 
figures is alleged to be demonstrative of the hazardousness of a 
product only if it can be related to the intensity of its use61; the 
scaling of the intensity of injury according to a hazard index is 
said to be arbitrary62; the precision of accident evaluation is said 
to vary according to the type of product involved, particularly be­
cause of geographical differences in product use, to such an ex­
tent that no conclusions as to priorities for action can be based on 
the NEISS data63.
Some of these objections are unacceptable to the CPSC, for 
partly conceptual, partly pragmatic reasons; others have clearly 
influenced the development and evaluation of the data system. 
Here it must be remembered that the NEISS was oriented towards 
the original conception of the CPSA, and that later legislative 
amendments, budget restrictions and reorientations of the Com­
mission's safety policy inevitably affected the structure of the ac­
cident information system. Thus, the decision in favour of an ac­
cident coverage system and against the time-consuming evalua­
tion of general investigations of accidents was a result of the en­
deavour to secure data on product-related hazards as rapidly as
vestigations, there are detailed product-specific guidelines (CPSC Or­
der 901024, 13 January 1983).
60 See Hoffman, 1976.
61 Cf. already Comell/Noll/Weingast, 1976, 484 and now Viscusi, 1984, 
49 et seq.
62 See Comell/Noll/Weingast, 1976, 483 and the statement by medical 
practitioner J. Greensner at the Re-Authorization Hearing before 
Congress in 1981 (Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and 
the Environment, House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 1st Ses­
sion, H.R. 2271 and 2201, 5 and 13 March 1981, No. 97-4, Washing­
ton, D.C. 1981,21 et seq.).
63 Heiden/Pittaway/O'Conner, 1982; cf. Waksberg's reply, 1983, and the 




























































































possible; the concentration on hospital casualty departments took 
account (among other things) of the recognition that, for instance, 
doctors in private practice could hardly be induced to draw up 
accident reports64. Original ideas about the Commission's possi­
bilities of opposing recognised hazards by producing mandatory 
standards was certainly too optimistic. But the reasons for 
changes in its orientation were manifold. On the one hand, the 
Commission felt that priorities — notably the "chronic hazards 
program"65 — had at times to be determined by a conscious pol­
icy. Furthermore, the Commission, responding to both its own 
experience and to external restrictions, moved towards co-opera­
tion with private standardisation organisations in working out 
standards and shifted part of its activities into the area of follow­
up market control. NEISS, in turn, was forced to adapt to all of 
these changes. On the other hand, while budget restrictions did 
not exclude refinements to assessment methods, they did de facto 
rule out adoption of proposed cost-intensive improvements66. 
Thus, in 1985 the CPSC tried out survey methods aimed at inte­
grating data on accident causes, in particular on product defects 
or mistakes by product users, into the NEISS67. This study was 
aimed primarily at saving costs on the in-depth investigations. 
Likewise, the call for the Commission's safety policy to be ori­
ented towards economic rationality criteria was taken into ac­
count only in connection with the evaluation of accident data68.
64 See Verhalen, 1985. Brief descriptions which also show the NEISS's 
further development are contained in each of the CPSC's annual reports 
(in Part II).
65 See note 48.
66 See Verhalen, 1985, 67 et seq.; J. Greensher, loc. cit. (note 62).
67 See the Commission document "Results of a Pilot Study to Collect 
Causal Data from Victims Treated in Emergency Rooms for Product- 
Related Injuries from April 15, 1985 to April28, 1985 (1985).
68 The 1983 Annual Report (II, 6) for the first time contained detailed es­




























































































4.3 Mandatory standards and bans
The original expectation that hazards arising from consumer 
products might primarily be combated by adopting mandatory 
product standards is particularly striking to a German observer. In 
Germany, the legislative restraint on issuing general clauses in 
safety law and the shifting of regulation and monitoring tasks to 
privately organised institutions had already taken place in the 
19th century69. The ramification of institutions of "private-gov­
erning" is so firmly established and their professional compe­
tence so undisputed that consumer policy initiatives aim only at 
reorganisation of the co-operative relationships between govern­
ment agencies and non-governmental self-regulatory bodies and 
at some pluralisation of standard-setting procedures70. From a 
German viewpoint, the CPSA appears as an extraordinarily am­
bitious project: the private sector's technological and scientific 
capability lead was to be compensated for by the setting-up of an 
independent agency, while at the same time the standard-setting 
process was to be opened up pluralistically and all those involved 
were to be offered comprehensive legal protection.
The regulations embodying the original conception of stan­
dard setting concern firstly, the involvement of the public in de­
termining action priorities through petitions under Section 10 
CPSA 1972 and tendering for standardisation contracts by the of­
feror process under Section 7 (d)-(e) CPSA 1972, and secondly, 
the verification and development of regulations within the Com­
mission pursuant to Section 9 CPSA 1972.
69 See Wolf, 1986,71 et seq., 99 et seq., 114 et seq.





























































































Section 10 (a) CPSA 1972 gave all interested parties, i.e. in­
dividual consumers and consumer organisations, and firms, the 
right to call upon the Commission to enact, amend or withdraw a 
product safety regulation. By Section 10 (d), such petitions have 
to be responded to within 120 days. Section 10 (e) further pro­
vided for enforcement actions in the event of rejection of peti­
tions — though this right was to become available only three 
years after the CPSA's entry into force (Section 10 (e)). The 
draftsmen of the bill hoped that these provisions would both cope 
with the phenomenon of organisational "inertia" and promote the 
Commission's readiness to pay attention to publicly expressed 
safety interests.
In the first three years, the number of petitions as well as the 
Commission's readiness to take all motions seriously into account 
— e.g. regulations on earrings, umbrellas and platform shoes —■ 
was considerable. The petition process proved to be extremely re­
source-intensive, yet petitioners were usually disappointed71. Un­
der the impact of the petitions and of the declared objective of 
Section 10 CPSA, the Commission was in four cases prepared to 
opt for the setting of standards, although the products concerned 
would not, according to the NEISS data, have deserved this at­
tention72. This led to the Commission's first spectacular failure73.
Under the second chairman, S J. Byington, the petition pro­
cedure was tightened up in 1977. By that time the difficulties of
71 For details see Hoffman, 1976, 412; Schwartz, 1982, 47 et seq. and the 
statements by Commissioner R.D. Pittle to the 1977 Congressional 
Hearings (loc. cit., note 46), 248 et seq., 358 et seq.
72 See supra 4.2.1.




























































































working out mandatory product standards had become apparent. 
The petition process had therefore lost its attractiveness, espe­
cially to the consumer side. Only business remained active; it 
used the procedure to secure amendments to and exceptions from 
regulations in force74. The legislative reaction in 1981 was in­
evitable: Section 10 CPSA was deleted. Since it was now the 
general provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act that ap­
plied, abolition of the special right of petition meant only formal 
ratification of a change that had already come about75.
The same fate was in store for the offeror process pursuant 
to Section 7 CPSA 1972. According to the ideas of the National 
Commission on Product Safety, incorporated in the Senate bill, 
the danger that the Commission might be captured by business 
interests in working out regulations was to be averted by granting 
groups (not economically interested themselves) the opportunity 
to develop a product standard. Section 7 (b) (4) CPSA 1972 com­
plied with these ideas by obliging the Commission to make its 
intention to adopt a product standard public and call upon "any 
person" to present suitable proposals. Section 7 (d) (2) further 
provided for the possibility of supporting such work financially.
In four cases, the offeror process led to product regulations 
(swimming-pool slides, matchbooks, plate glass materials, motor 
lawn-mowers). In only one of these cases, namely lawn-mowers, 
was a consumer organisation (the Consumer's Union) active; in 
two other cases (televisions, Christmas-tree lights) in which non- 
industrial organisations (the Underwriters Laboratories and the 
National Consumers’ League respectively) were involved, the 
procedures ended with improved voluntary standards, so that in
74 See Schwartz, 1982, 54.
75 Cf. 4.1.2.2 supra and the observations in Merrill, 1981, 1360, 1363 et 




























































































the Commission's view, adoption of a binding rule became super­
fluous76.
The offeror process proved extraordinarily time-consuming, 
costly and frustrating for all concerned. Commissioner R.D. Pittle 
openly admitted all these shortcomings in the 1977 Congres­
sional hearings77. Nonetheless, he did see ways of making the 
procedure effective: through more precise guidelines from the 
Commission, improved co-operation with the offeror in working 
out standards, and adequate financial support for the work of 
non-commercial organisations. According to the testimony of 
D.A. Swankin, who headed standardisation work on Christmas- 
tree lights for the National Consumers' League, Pittle's ideas 
were in this case largely realised, with great practical success78. 
However, no further testing of these improvements was carried 
out. The provisions on the offeror process were withdrawn in 
198179.
4.3.2 Individual standards and typical regulatory problems
In the years 1973-1984, the CPSC issued only 22 binding 
product regulations. These included 7 based on the CPSA, 3 con­
cerning regulations on informational requirements and some 7 
product bans80. These figures appear rather modest. Whether they 
in fact reveal the Commission's inefficiency and/or the inade­
quacy of the Act itself could be decided only from a comparison
76 See Schwartz, 1982, 61 et seq.
77 Loc. cit. (note 46), 270 et seq., 281 et seq., 285 et seq.
78 Loc. cit., 259 et seq.
79 See 4.1.2.1 supra, at note 29. Standards and bans in force can be found 




























































































with the cost and time incurred by private standardisation organi­
sations, and a qualitative comparison of results. Account would 
further have to be taken of the fact that since standards are part of 
the public (though not purely governmental) system, additional 
potential for conflict arises, which may then be taken up again in 
judicial review of administratively approved standards. A gener­
alised evaluation of CPSA provisions is made still more difficult 
by the fact that every standard was a response to specific regula­
tory problems, and that patterns of conflict also varied. There 
would be no point in repeating the history of every individual 
standardisation process, since any attempt to derive general eval­
uations from this would inevitably fail. That notwithstanding, the 
description below should illustrate some problems in setting 
mandatory standards, on the basis of two well-known cases81.
4.3.2.1 The pool slide debacle and the CPSC's product 
safety philosophy
The legal conditions on which a product rule may be laid 
down and the criteria it has to meet follow from Section 9 (b) and 
(c) CPSA. In their original version, these provisions referred to 
"unreasonable risk of injury" and "reasonable necessity" for a 
standard (Section 9 (c) (2) and (7) CPSA 1972); before issuing a 
product mle, the Commission was additionally to consider its 
likely effect on the utility, cost and availability of the products
80 Figures in Viscusi, 1984, 58 et seq. G.C. Nichols (note 13 supra) men­
tions 36 procedures for mandatory standards and over 100 tor volun­
tary ones.
81 Comprehensive analyses taking the CPSC’s work as a touchstone to 
test divergent regulatory theories are not available. A general survey, 
primarily from a legal viewpoint, is offered by Lamatina, 1981; see 
also Schwartz, 1982, 57 et seq., 73 et seq. A brief assessment oriented 
to criteria of cost-benefit analysis can be found in Viscusi, 1984, 71 et 
seq., 88 et seq. For an illuminating political science analysis, see Feld­




























































































concerned (Section 9 (f) (1) (C) CPSA). On the basis of these 
vague expressions, the Commission first of all sought legitima­
tion for its decisions essentially in hazard analyses, rejecting a le­
gal obligation to quantify risks and costs82. In Aqua Slide 'N Dive 
Corp. v. CPSC83, the leeway claimed by the Commission was 
significantly reduced. The Aqua Slide decision concerned the 
first product standard put through by the Commission, following 
a particularly painful experience. The initiatives for regulating 
swimming-pool slides had been begun by the National Swim­
ming Pool Institute (NSPI, an industry group concerned) and the 
plaintiff itself (by far the biggest producer) using the petition pro­
cedure84. Although according to NEISS survey data, the slides 
were far from being among the riskiest groups of products, the 
Commission decided to embark on a regulatory procedure, in 
view of the severity of accidents that did occasionally occur. It 
was at the same time revealing what its product safety philosophy 
was: accidents were attributable to clumsy or incautious but fore­
seeable types of use. In the offeror process, the NSPI was man­
dated to work out a standard. Only after three years was it finally 
promulgated85. In relation to slide design, the Commission, 
doubting its own competence, refrained from mandatory provi­
sions and merely made recommendations. All that was bindingly 
required was a ladder chain and warning notice: "careless slides 
can cause paralysis", "careless slides can cause injury". The Aqua 
Slide 'N Dive Corp. opposed these requirements, fearing mar-
though confined to the Commission's "chronic hazards program" is in 
Merrill, 1981.
82 See e.g. Merrill, 1981, 1279 et seq., with references.
83 569 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978).
84 The grounds for the petition are illuminating: Aqua Slide wanted to 
avoid a product ban or a compulsory recall under the Federal Haz­
ardous Substances Act (see 569 F.2d 835).




























































































keting disadvantages due especially to the indication of the nature 
of possible, though improbable, injuries86.
The key legal question in judicial review of the standard was 
the interpretation of the provisions just cited of Section 9 CPSA 
1972. The Court accepted that the Commission had to assume an 
"unreasonable risk" even in the case of extremely unlikely but 
severe injuries; but it reproached it for not having shown 
"reasonable necessity" for the regulation adopted. The Commis­
sion had not, it said, ascertained the economic effects of its regu­
lation87, nor tested the effectiveness of chain and warning88. 
Judge Wisdom's concurring opinion treated the relationship be­
tween economic cost and benefit much more decidedly: he 
agreed with the Commission that the warning signs helped to re­
duce risks; but these benefits were out of proportion relative to 
the costs they would incur.89. In other respects, the effects on 
competition had proved considerable, contributing to a monopoly 
position which was, ironically, now held by the plaintiff itself90.
The differences in style between the majority opinion and 
Judge Wisdom's arguments show how problematic it is to infer 
from the Aqua Slide decision that the implementation of the 
CPSA should be guided by economic rationality criteria. In prac-
86 569 F.2d 842.
87 569 F.2d 840.
88 On the effect of warning notices, observations were carried out for two 
days (loc. cit., 841); the ladder chain was tested by a Commission con­
sultant on his neighbour's children; "This is not the stuff of which sub­
stantial evidence is made" (op. cit., 843).
89 569 F.2d 845.
90 Schwartz, 1982, 51, note 130. The Commission's attempt to withdraw 
the regulation in 1981 was opposed by Aqua Slide and not pursued be­




























































































tice, though, the decision did have this effect91, contributing to 
the 1982 amendment to Section 9 CPSA92.
4.3.2.2 Lawn-mowers and the indefiniteness of cost-benefit 
analyses
The regulation of "walk-behind power mowers" was also 
taken up on petition from an industry group (Outdoor Power 
Equipment Institute, OPEI) in 1973. In this case, the initiative 
was aimed at securing official blessing for an already worked out 
voluntary standard93. The Commission, however, took the chance 
to then bring in a consumer organisation that had distinguished 
itself by its activities in this area (the Consumers' Union, CU). 
CU finished its work in July, 1975. The outcome was controver­
sial: the OPEI criticised all the major technical proposals, as well 
as the cost-benefit analysis added by the CU.
This essentially explains the duration and intensity of verifi­
cation of the proposals by the CPSC: the standardisation work 
was practically repeated yet again, with renewed official in­
volvement, and not completed until 15 February 197994. In the 
"findings" justifying the regulations95, the effects of the Aqua 
Slide judgment are clearly recognisable. They contain a review of 
estimated numbers and costs of accidents with lawn-mowers, an 
analysis of the effects of the regulation on product costs and an 
account of the likely effects on accident figures and product costs
91 See also D.D. Bean & Sons Co. v. CPSC, 574 F.2d 643 (1st Cir. 1978) 
on the partial review of the matchbook standards, and for the history 
and economic analysis of this regulation Kafoglis, 1979. Additionally, 
see Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum In­
stitute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
92 4.1.2.1 supra.
93 On this see Schwartz's case study, 1982,77 et seq.




























































































of the most important safety requirements. This regulation has 
stood up to judicial review, with one marginal exception96. What 
is remarkable here is that the Commission's "safety philosophy", 
in showing its readiness for "paternalistic" protection of the con­
sumer against his own foreseeable mistakes, was explicitly con­
firmed, while at the same time cost-benefit analyses acquired 
more importance.
The risks bound up with lawn-mowers are widely known. 
Accordingly, use leading to injury can be treated as misuse, and 
the existing safety level taken as a "proper" outcome of consumer 
demand97. However, the Court of Appeals, when it was called in, 
did not accept this argumentation: "Congress intended for injuries 
resulting from foreseeable misuse of a product to be counted in 
assessing risks . . .  There is no evidence . . .  that (consumers') 
presumed willingness to defeat protective measures is reason­
able"98. This safety philosophy effects the bases for cost-benefit 
analysis. If consumer behaviour were declared to be the criterion 
for justifying regulatory intervention, then economic analysis as 
such would be superfluous; the willingness to take risks may then 
appear "unreasonably" high, only with regard to accident insur­
ance and health protection provisions99. But leaving these diffi­
culties aside, and comparing merely the (estimated) increase in 
product cost with the (estimated) effects of the standard on acci­
dent figures and the (estimated) savings (though here delaying 
the purchase of a new mower and the concomitant use of old, 
hazardous machines would be particularly hard to estimate100); 
the fact remains that broad room for discretion in decision arises.
95 16 CFR 1205. 8.
96 Southland Mower Co. et al. v. CPSC, 690 F.2 d 499 (5th Cir. 1980).
97 Cf. esp. Viscusi, 1984, 94.
98 619 F.2d 513.




























































































The CPSC thus saw itself confronted with divergent cost-benefit 
analyses from the CU and the OPEL It did a study of its own, 
which was revised once more following criticisms by the Stan­
dard Research Institute, called in by the OPEI101. The Court of 
Appeals declared itself satisfied with these efforts102. Since ac­
cording to CPSC estimates, the cost-benefit analysis came out in 
favour of adopting the regulation, its legal significance ultimately 
remained undetermined; and the question remained unanswered 
as to whether measures were no longer "reasonably necessary" 
when their effects on product costs exceeded savings on treating 
accident victims. Admittedly, the CPSC success before the courts 
was wiped out on one important point through a legislative 
amendment to the regulation by Congress103.
4.3.3 Product bans
According to Section 8 CPSA 1972, products giving rise to 
an "unreasonable risk of injury" could be "banned" unless some 
product standard promised appropriate protection. The banning 
procedure came under the provisions of Section 9 CPSA 1972 
applying to standard setting, but not those of Sections 7, 10 
CPSA 1972 on petitioning and the offeror process. The possibil­
ity of putting through regulations on its own account does much 
to explain the Commission's inclination, once the standard-setting 
procedure had proved unexpectedly complex and conflictual, to 
opt for the banning procedure. In fact, in at least two cases where
100 See Lenard, 1979, 69, 71, 73.
101 690 F.2d 523 et seq.
102 619 F.2d 524 et seq.; for a criticism, see Viscusi, 1984, 94 et seq.; 
Johnson, 1982, 28 et seq., explicitly praises the CPSC's analyses and 
recommends it to private standardisation organisations for imitation.




























































































issuing or tightening up a standard might have been conceivable, 
the Commission decided on product bans104.
The most important field of application of Section 8 CPSA, 
however, became the hazards analysed under the "chronic haz­
ards" program, from health-threatening, especially carcinogenic, 
chemicals, a case where recourse to Section 8 CPSA 1972 imme­
diately lends itself105. The expectation that product bans might 
become an important regulatory instrument has however since 
been disappointed, an outcome foreshadowed by both the 
formaldehyde controversy and the 1981 legislative amendments.
The formaldehyde controversy began in 1976 with initial 
reports on health complaints from people living in houses treated 
with urea formaldehyde (UF) foam insulation for energy conser­
vation. A true consumer movement developed against UF dan­
gers, further stimulated by medical studies on the possible car­
cinogenicity of the product106. The CPSC initiated wide-ranging 
additional scientific studies, and initially suggested a regulation
104 Cf. Menill, 1981, 1277, note 74 and Schwartz, 1982, 68 and the exam­
ple of the "ban on unstable refuse bins", 42 F.R. 30300, 13 June 1977, 
amended by 46 F.R. 55925, 13 November 1981, 16 CFR 1301; the 
refuse bins had according to the Commission's findings led to 21 
deaths (20 of them children); the product ban specified the nature of 
the bins concerned in detail (loc. cit., 1301.l.(b) and (e); cf. also the 
ban on particular types of children's bicycles under 16 CFR 1500. 18 
(a) (12), which in turn refers to the requirements for bicycles (43 F.R. 
60034, 22 December 1978, 16 CFR 1512); for an illuminating and 
critical discussion of bicycle regulations cf. Comell/Noll/Weingast, 
1976, 493 et seq.; the standard was essentially confirmed by the deci­
sion in Forester v. CPSC, 559 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
105 On the structure of the program, see Merrill, 1981, 1296 et seq., 1310 
et seq. Among the most prominent "victims" of the Commission was 
the chemical TRIS, which had since 1971, following a standard set by 
the Commerce Department, been used to treat sleepwear to reduce fire 
dangers. In this case the Commission presented its action as an inter­
pretation of Section 2 (q) (1) (A) Federal Hazardous Substances Act 
(on the dramatic background, see Merrill, 1981, 1323 et seq.). For the 
losses resulting from the Commission's action, firms involved received, 
through the 1982 "Tris Act", compensation amounting to 56 million 




























































































to oblige manufacturers to provide information on general (not 
carcinogenic) hazards107. It was not until 1981 that the Commis­
sion threatened to ban urea formaldehyde108. The proposal for a 
regulation, which takes up 23 closely printed pages, first de­
scribes the state of the medical studies and goes on to discuss the 
economic consequences of a ban. The avoidance of 23 cancer 
deaths yearly and other major health risks was said to be in line 
with the requirements emerging from the Aqua Slide and South­
land Mower decisions, and to be in "reasonable proportion" with 
the economic drawbacks of a ban109. On 2 April 1982 the defini­
tive ban was issued110. It was praised for its scientific justifica­
tions, once again spelled out, while the Commission's economic 
analysis was found to be heavily flawed111.
The Court of Appeals, called in by a number of manufactur­
ers concerned112, did not go into calculations of the economic 
benefit of preventing cancer deaths against the cost of banning 
urea formaldehyde. The Court was able to avoid taking a position 
on this regulatory aspect because it already regarded 
"unreasonable risk of injury" as not proven. Measurements of UF 
burdens had not been effected by random sampling, and where 
this had been the case, they were often due to installation errors 
and therefore controllable by a standard. The experimental scien­
tific basis for the assumption of carcinogenic effects was on the 
whole too narrow, and could not justify the Commission's risk
106 See Bollier/Claybrook, 1986, 180 et seq.
107 45 F.R. 39434 (1980); on this see again Merrill, 1981, 1354 et seq. and 
Ashford/Ryan/Caldart, 1983.
108 46 F.R. 11188 (5 February 1981).
109 46 F.R. 11200 et seq.
110 47 F.R. 14366 (2 April 1982).
111 On th$ first aspect see Ashford/Ryan/Caldart, 1981, 360 et seq.; Fox, 





























































































estimates. The Commission's 1983 Annual Report113 has a brief 
note on the outcome of the trial, which is very illuminating for its 
present position: "the Commission voted 3-2 to seek an appeal in 
the Supreme Court, but the US Solicitor General decided not to 
ask the Supreme Court to take the case". But it is not only the 
outcome of the formaldehyde controversy and the resulting re­
quirements to demonstrate product risks that lessened the attrac­
tiveness of product bans become unattractive. Legal amendments 
in connection with the 1981 re-authorisation worked in the same 
direction: product bans could henceforth be issued only under the 
conditions introduced in Section 9 CPSA for the setting of 
mandatory standards.
4.4 Updating of "voluntary" standards
The explicitly critical attitude towards "voluntary" standards 
that characterised the NCPS Report ("chronically inadequate, 
both in scope and permissible levels of risk")114 and was to have 
determined the regulatory approach in the CPSA 1972, had al­
ready changed by the mid-70's; it was finally reversed with the 
legislative amendments of 1981115. To understand this develop­
ment and the CPSC's present support for voluntary standard set­
ting, a few indications as to the structures of private standard set­
ting in the US might be of assistance.
112 Gulf South Insulation et al. v. CPSC, 701 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1983).
113 II, 103; see also, for a criticism of the judicial critique, Ash- 
ford/Ryan/Caldart, 1981, 363 et seq. and Fox, 1985, 88 et seq.
114 Op. cit., (note 5), 62; see Hamilton, 1978, 1371 et seq.




























































































4.4.1 Standardisation organisations and procedures116
There are no less than 580 groups in the US concerned with 
developing standards, but the number of organisations of national 
importance is very small. For some influential agencies, stan­
dardisation activities are part of a general representation of pro­
fessional or economic interests. This is true of the engineering 
societies ("American Society of Civil Engineers"; "American So­
ciety of Mechanical Engineers"; "Institute of Electrical Electron­
ics Engineers"; "Society of Automotive Engineers"); they are 
"non-profit” organisations with individual memberships, though 
their standardisation activities are supported and influenced by 
contributions from industry. By contrast, the trade associations 
represent manufacturers in individual industries. Both the engi­
neering societies and the trade associations not only develop 
standards themselves but additionally participate in the activities 
of the most important standardisation organisations: the Ameri­
can Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) and the National 
Fire Protection Association (NFPA). In view of its particular rep­
utation, special mention should be made of Underwriters Labo­
ratories (UL), an institution promoted by American insurers, 
dealing with, among other things, electrical hazards, fire protec­
tion and the development of test procedures. The activities of all 
these organisations are coordinated — which often means stimu­
lated — by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), 
which also represents the US in international contexts.
The standardisation organisations reacted to public criticism 
of the quality of voluntary standards in the 1970's by reviewing 
their procedural arrangements. Thus, standards brought before 
the ANSI must go through a procedure before being recognised 
as an "American National Standard". The ANSI must ascertain 
whether all those primarily involved have had a chance to express




























































































views and raise objections on whether the standard is "unfair" or 
ignores "the public interest"; additionally, all standardisation pro­
posals are published and, where of direct relevance to consumers, 
passed on to a "Standards Screening and Revision Committee of 
the Consumer Council"117. The ANSI's procedural rules are more 
specific, and stricter, when it comes to organisation of standardi­
sation procedures. For safety standards, inclusion of workers, 
authorities, insurers, consumers, and other groups is supposed to 
guarantee a balanced representation of interests, ("A consensus 
does not necessarily mean unanimous acceptance. Votes are 
weighted rather than counted"118), and guarantee that standards 
will actually be applied. All large standardisation organisations 
have similar procedural guarantees. This is the case in particular 
for the ASTM, which develops detailed "due process" require­
ments, and has, like the NFPA and the UL, set up "consumer 
sounding boards"119.
4.4.2 The CPSC attitude
Running parallel to these reorganisation efforts of private 
standardisation associations, attitudes changed towards "self-reg­
ulatory" measures in general120, as did the CPSC's position on 
voluntary standards in particular. In 1975, the CPSC was already 
developing forms of co-operation with private standardisation or­
ganisations121 and regulating "employee membership and partici-
81 et seq.; Johnson, 1982, 6 et seq.
117 Hamilton, 1978, 1365 et seq.
118 For more on the consensus principle see Hamilton, 1978, 1361 et seq., 
and the critical remarks in Hemenway, 1975, 89 and in Opala, 1969, 
45.
119 See Hamilton, 1978, 1349 et seq., 1384.




























































































pation in voluntary standards organisations"122! In the statement 
concerning the 1978 Regulation on "Commission involvement in 
voluntary standard activities", the Commission explicitly dissoci­
ated itself from the National Commission on Product Safety’s 
critical observations on voluntary standards123; at the 1981 Con­
gressional hearings this attitude was confirmed by then Commis­
sion Chairman Stuart Statler, who pointed out that in 83 cases, 
the Commission had already collaborated on developing or re­
vising voluntary standards124. The Underwriters Laboratory ad­
ditionally stressed that the passing on of accident figures by the 
Commission had already often led to private standardisation ac­
tivities125.
The 1978 Regulation just mentioned distinguishes between 
two forms of official involvement. "Monitoring" of the develop­
ment of voluntary product standards involves observing the pro­
cess and influencing it through directed questions, and providing 
accident figures and the results of in-depth studies. In the case of 
"participation", a Commission worker takes part in sessions of 
the private Standardisation Committee, and technical assistance is 
sometimes provided. The first form of involvement requires ap­
proval from only the Commission Executive Director; the second 
requires approval from the Commissioners themselves126. The 
object of both forms, and the type of support that the Commis­
sion can provide127, is fully in line with the CSPA's general
121 See e.g. the references in Hamilton, 1978, 1404 and the testimony by 
Commission Chairman S.J. Byington in the 1977 Congressional Hear­
ings, loc. cit. (note 46), 363 et seq., 373 et seq.
122 40 F.R. 26025, 20 June 1975 (for the form in force at present, see 46 
F.R. 29930, 4 June 1981, 16 CFR 1031).
123 43 F.R. 19216 (4 May 1978), 16 CFR 1032.1.
124 Op. cit. (note 62), 321 et seq., 338 et seq.
125 Op. cit., 816 et seq., 823.




























































































safety policy objectives. Support is accordingly also bound up 
with particular conditions on the standardisation procedure: it 
should be open to all interested parties and guarantee genuine in­
volvement of consumers and/or small businesses; it must provide 
for revisions of standards; actual compliance is important; certifi­
cation provisions should be worked out and standards themselves 
confined to "performance" regulations128. The Commission al­
ways keeps its option to issue a mandatory product regulation 
open, whether to make a voluntary standard generally mandatory 
or because a voluntary standard is inadequate from a safety pol­
icy viewpoint129.
The 1981 legislative amendments did not formally cancel 
this policy statement, but they did reduce its practical signifi­
cance, for many reasons. By the new version of Section 9 (b) 
CPSA, the Commission must always give preference to voluntary 
standards where they eliminate or "adequately reduce" the haz­
ards concerned and "substantial" compliance is to be expected. 
This already guarantees that the Commission will await efforts 
toward voluntary solutions and cannot without further action ig­
nore their outcome. Additionally, the new version of Section 9 (c) 
and (f) CPSA links announcement, and above all enactment, of 
binding rules with additional requirements. The Commission has 
not only to show that a product hazard will not be adequately re­
duced or that observance of a standard would be inadequate; it 
has further to provide a detailed "regulatory analysis" that must 
contain cost-benefit analyses of its regulatory proposal and of all 
alternatives contemplated. The Commission initially responded in 
1984 to this change in conditions for co-operation with standardi­
sation organisations, through a proposal to supplement the 1978 
regulations on involvement in developing voluntary standards; it
127 See 16 CFR 1032.4.




























































































suggested a new procedure that would require special recognition 
of voluntary standards already being applied130. The declared aim 
of this proposal was to encourage application of safety standards 
and improve consumer orientation towards safety aspects of con­
sumer products. But response to the proposal was discordant, and 
mainly negative. Industry feared distortions of competition and 
restrictions on innovation; standardisation organisations recalled 
the Commission's limited resources for implementing recognition 
procedures; the Consumer Federation of America protested 
against the Commission being converted into a sales promotion 
agency. The Commission decided to withdraw its proposal131. 
But this did not end efforts to further develop standardisation 
policy. A memorandum of 22 April 1985132 incorporating sug­
gestions from Commission departments and from public hearings 
describes and discusses a series of options ranging from voting 
rights in setting voluntary standards via systematic announce­
ments of regulatory procedures pursuant to Section 9 CPSA, up 
to the conclusion of co-operation agreements with standardisation 
organisations. The Commission decided to consider only three of 
these possibilities: to intensify its involvement in standardisation 
work on products particularly important in its view; to make di­
rect contact with individual manufacturers before producing or 
amending standards; to refer to standards in its public informa­
tion133. The practical importance of all these activities is hard for 
the outsider to estimate. However, thanks to its accident informa­
tion system and its own technical competence, the Commission 
should continue to have considerable possibilities of influencing
129 See 16 CFR 1032.6; cf. 1032.1 (c).
130 49 F.R. 25005, 19 June 1984.
131 50 F.R. 19699, 10 May 1985; the hearings and discussions that led to 
this decision are documented in the "Briefing Package on Proposed 
Amendment to Commission Policy Involvement in Voluntary Stan­
dards Activities", 14 December, 1984.




























































































the production and promotion of standards of relevance to 
safety134.
4.4.3 Standards and product liability
The intensification of "voluntary” standardisation in the US 
cannot be explained solely on the basis of the CPSC's original 
powers and its current encouragement of voluntary standards, but 
is to be attributed essentially to the influence of American liabil­
ity law. American case law punishes neglect of a mandatory 
standard, but also non-compliance with a safety level laid down 
in a voluntary standard, as in principle "negligence per se"135. 
This sanction manifestly explains industry's willingness to follow 
voluntary standards136; it likewise explains the interest in having 
standards recognised by ANSI and making the standardisation 
procedure itself "fair"137.
On the other hand, compliance with a standard in no way 
rales out product liability. Section 25 CPSA explicitly confirms 
this principle for mandatory standards: "Compliance with con­
sumer product safety rales . . .  shall not relieve any person from 
liability at common law . . . "  However clear this position, court 
practice nevertheless responds in different ways when manufac­
turers appeal to their compliance with voluntary or with manda-
133 Commission Guidance on Voluntary Standards Activities, Memoran­
dum, 28 April 1986.
134 According to a memorandum from D.L. Noble of 14 May 1986, 15 
participation projects and 31 monitoring projects were pursued in that 
year. The memorandum specifies in each individual case the nature of 
the hazards involved, and documents advantages and drawbacks to 
each individual project.
135 See Weinstein/Twerski/Piehler/Donaher, 1978, 56.
136 See Eads/Reuter, 1983, 40.




























































































tory standards in product liability actions. Standards may, for in­
stance, be adduced to establish the "state of the art" in product 
safety, or to support or confute expert testimony138. All these 
forms of observance of standards, however, depart from the prin­
ciple that the courts autonomously determine the level of product 
safety intact; this principle is not questioned either by efforts at 
legislative channelling of product liability law139.
4.5 Recalls
The recall provisions in the CPSA initially stood in the 
shadow of preventive standard setting, but soon developed into 
an important instrument for the CPSC, taking on additional im­
portance after the 1981 restrictions. In the context of European 
product safety policy, the American example deserves particular 
attention not only because the new approach to technical har­
monisation and standards delegates preventive product safety 
policy very largely to private standardisation organisations, but 
also because the need for European framework legislation on 
follow-up market control seems irrefutable140.
4.5.1 The CPSA legislative framework
Two provisions in the CPSA deal with response to hazards 
arising from already marketed products. By Section 12, the 
Commission may order seizure and/or public warnings, recalls, 
repairs, exchange or replacement of "imminently hazardous con-
138 See Hoffman/Hoffman, 1980/1981, 288 et seq., and specifically on 
automobile standards Holley, 1982, 813 et seq.
139 See Dworkin, 1983, 612 et seq.




























































































sumer products". However, the significance of this provision re­
mained marginal141. The Commission has developed its follow­
up market policy entirely on the basis of Section 15. This prefer­
ence is not surprising: the criteria for intervention in Section 15 
are broadly formulated, the potential for sanctions is rich in alter­
natives and can be treated flexibly.
Section 15 (a) CPS A provides sanctions against all 
"substantial product hazards" arising either from failure to com­
ply with a binding rule or from product defect. Every manufac­
turer, distributor and retailer must by Section 15 (b) immediately 
inform the Commission if they obtain information that reason­
ably supports the conclusion that such hazard is present. On the 
basis of such reports and/or other sources of information (NEISS 
accident figures, consumer complaints, in-depth studies etc.), a 
hearing is held to which all interested circles, including con­
sumers, are invited (see Section 15 (c) and (d)).
Should the Commission determine after such consultation 
that a "substantial product hazard" is proven, two measures are 
possible:
— "Notification" under Section 15 (c), whereby a manufac­
turer, distributor or retailer may be ordered to inform the 
general public, notify all manufacturers, distributors or re­
tailers, or mail notice to every person who has purchased or 
received the product;
— The further-reaching possibilities of Section 15 (d), where it 
seems necessary in the public interest to repair a product, 
make it fit applicable standards, exchange it or replace it. 
Additionally, a "corrective action plan", showing how the 
order is to be implemented, may be required.




























































































4.5.2 Application o f Section 15 CPSA
The administration of this legal framework has been inter­
preted and refined by the Commission in its mles on "substantial 
product hazard reports"142 and in a number of internal (though 
publicly accessible) documents. Some elements of this policy 
have already been emphasised: (1) the general clause of Section 
15 (a) (2) on defects that lead to "substantial product hazards" has 
been clarified by the Commission using exhaustive circumlocu­
tions ("a defect is a fault, flaw, or irregularity that causes weak­
ness, failure, or inadequacy in form or function"), differentiations 
(design, manufacture, instructions), examples ("a knife does not 
contain a defect insofar as the sharpness of its blade is con­
cerned") and assessment criteria (". . .  the Commission and staff 
will consider: the utility of the product involved; the nature of the 
risk of injury which the product presents; the population exposed 
to the product and its risk of injury; the Commission's own expe­
rience and expertise; the case law interpreting Federal and State 
public health and safety statutes; the case law in the area of prod­
uct liability; and other factors .. .")143.
(2) The obligation laid down in Section 15 (b) on manufac­
turers, distributors and retailers to report product hazards is re­
garded by the Commission as an indispensable precondition for 
its recall policy. It exhaustively commented on this obligation in 
1978, defending it against criticism from firms involved144. The 
objections are quite understandable. Fears exist with regard to the 
negative effects of such reports on product liability suits, and also 
with regard to deterioration of image and hence of competitive 
position. The rale dating from 1978 sought to allay these doubts 
by explicitly treating the report itself as not constituting admis-
142 43 F.R. 34998 (7 August 1978), 16 CFR 1115.




























































































sion of a product defect145. In 1981 the legislator came to meet 
the interests of firms involved by making the new version of 
Section 6 (b) (5) CPSA provide that in principle information se­
cured under Section 15 (b) be no longer published146. This leg­
islative amendment, and probably also the Commission's budget 
difficulties147, led in 1980-2 to a notable decline in the number of 
reports received. But the Commission's position was not lastingly 
affected. In 1984 it once more gave detailed justifications for the 
importance of the reporting duty148, and managed to reverse the 
trend of the years 1980-2 again149.
This strictness cannot be explained by the information func­
tion of the reports alone. Procedures under Section 15 CPSA 
were inevitably always largely based on other informational 
sources150. Assuredly, closer observance of the reporting duty 
would facilitate the identification of hazards. But the importance 
of the reporting duty also seems to lie in its compensating for the 
indefiniteness of the general clause in Section 15 (a) (2). The
144 43 F.R. 34988-34998, 7 August 1978 (on the subsequently adopted 
rule, cf. in detail Madden, 1981, 211 et seq.).
145 16 CFR 1115. 12(a).
146 See 4.1.2.2 supra.
147 See Schwartz/Adler, 1984, 434.
148 49 F.R. 13820, 6 April 1984; see also Statler, 1984.
149 Exact figures can be found in the memorandum from the divisions for 
"corrective action" and "administrative litigation" of 13 May 1985 and 
11 May 1986; for previous years see Schwartz/Adler, 1984, 433, note 
221; Statler, 1984, 93. However, the courts have cut down on sanctions 
for breach of the reporting duty. In Advance Machine Co. v. CPSC, 
666 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1981) and in Athlone Industries, Inc. v. CPSC, 
707 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1983) it was found that the Commission had 
to impose the fines provided for in Section 20 CPSA through the courts 
(on the importance of this decision see Zollers, 1985). In Drake v. 
Honeywell, Inc. 797 F.2d 603 (8th Cir. 1986) it was decided that 
breach of the reporting duty did not justify any right of private action.
150 See Schwartz/Adler, 1984, 433 and for the Commission's information 




























































































Commission’s interpretive leeway seems to strengthen its position 
vis-à-vis firms involved when negotiating a recall plan.
(3) As with all product safety policy instruments, priority 
setting is essential in follow-up market control. An instructive 
1981 document151 differentiates three types of injury and likeli­
hood; it relates the severity of injury to the likelihood of occur­
rence, and thereby sets up three types of urgency to which cases 
arising can be allocated. These classifications show that the 
Commission sees follow-up market control as implementation of 
the statute, and orients use of its resources towards the objective 
of preventing hazards; consistent orientation of its policy towards 
cost-benefit-analysis criteria152 would lead to another scale of 
priorities.
(4) The great flexibility that Section 15 (c) and (d) allow the 
Commission in its response to product hazards is exploited both 
in notification and in recalls and the drawing up of a "corrective 
action plan". The intensity of response, its specific shape and its 
monitoring correspond to the type of product and the urgency of 
the hazard153. A noteworthy point is the high rate of mutual 
agreement in the resolution of recalls154. This can be explained 
by industry's interest in avoiding adverse publicity and product 
liability actions, and the Commission’s interest in rapidly elimi­
nating product hazards ("safety delayed is safety denied"). Will-
151 Hazard Priority and Corrective Action Guidelines, 19 January 1981; 
see also the detailed description of the decision-making procedures in 
the Task Force "Report on Recall Effectiveness", 25 August 1980, 
table D and Madden, 1981,234 et seq.
152 See 4.1.3 supra.
153 For details see Madden, 1981, 238 et seq. and Schwartz/Adler, 1984, 
437 et seq. (on recalls), 411 et seq. (on notices), as well as, specifically 
on recalls, the detailed CPSC Order 9010.34 (supra note 150).
154 See Madden, 227 et seq.; Schwartz/Adler, 1984, 434. According to 




























































































ingness to compromise manifestly did not suffer from the 1981 
legislative amendments.
4 .53  The function o f follow-up market control
The history of implementation of follow-up market control 
under Section 15 (b) CPS A is one of success. The figures are in­
deed impressive. Former Commission Chairman S. King reports 
that between 1973 and 1980 some 2,500 recall actions were car­
ried out, concerning some 100 million products155. At the 1983 
Congressional hearings, Chairman N.H. Steorts was able to point 
to 3,174 actions on 293 million products156. Commissioner Stuart 
M. Statler in 1980 called the provisions of Section 15 CPS A one 
of the Commission's most effective instruments, that could be 
used even to solve general product safety problems157 — e.g. for 
an industry-wide recall because of a universally occurring design 
defect158. But there are limits to this kind of remodelling of Sec­
tion 15 CPSA. The primary safety objective of recalls, namely to 
eliminate hazards arising from already marketed products, can 
never be fully achieved. The CPSC's implementation studies 
show this very clearly. Though the success or failure of a recall 
action cannot simply be read off from the percentage of returned 
products159, it is nevertheless indisputable that the effectiveness 
of such actions calls for hard strategic decisions. The type of con-
Congressional Hearings, loc. cit. (note 62), 22, over 90% of procedures 
under Section 15 CPSA were settled by mutual agreement.
155 S. King, loc. cit.
156 Op. cit. (note 24), 302, 310, cf. 320 et seq.; see also Statler, 1984, 92.
157 Statler, 1980,79.
158 Schwartz/Adler, 1984, 439, note 260.
159 As stated again in the Recall Effectiveness Study, Loren Lange, Office 
of Strategic Planning, May 1978; the 1980 Report (note 151 supra) ad­
ditionally points to a number of other relevant factors: the significance 




























































































sumer information must depend on whether manufacturers or re­
tailers have customer lists available; where necessary, suitable 
public media must be used. The intensity of information must 
take account of the hazards of the product concerned, but also of 
the attitudes, inhibitions and efforts of the final consumer. For all 
the doubts about the feasibility of recalls arising from these 
problems, it should nevertheless be borne in mind that recall ac­
tions can be used both to raise standards and to improve safety 
controls within firms. These feedback effects are also to be taken 
into account in assessing the "success" of recall arrangements.
4.6 Evaluation o f the CPSC
Assessments of the CPSC's performance are as controversial 
as product safety policy itself. The analyses presented by con­
sumer organisations arrive at positive results. According to cal­
culations by A.K. Lower/A. Averyt/D. Greenberg160, the falling 
trend in home and leisure accidents has been speeded up 
(twofold) by the Commission's activities; in the years from 1978 
to 1983 alone, the CPSC is said to have prevented 1.25 million 
serious injuries and deaths, and saved some 3.5 billion dollars in 
consumer costs. W.K. Viscusi161 arrives at a contradictory find­
ing: the falling accident figures merely continued (even though 
more strongly), a trend that has not been significantly influenced 
by the CPSC. It is hardly surprising that there are also studies 
with findings fluctuating between the two results cited162.
ing used at all, how many have been privately repaired following a 
warning and how many have been simply thrown away.
160 Lower/Averyt/Greenberg, 1983.





























































































Problems with evaluations like these arise because they have 
to identify and quantify factors, which explain the trend in acci­
dent figures and how they are influenced by the CPSC's activi­
ties. All the studies mentioned use simplifying, if not speculative, 
assumptions for this. More illuminating, though controversial as 
well, are analyses of individual measures and of their aggregated 
impact. The Commission itself undertakes analyses, which esti­
mate effects after a measure has been fully implemented. Thus, 
for instance, the rule on children's cots is supposed to have pre­
vented 50 deaths per year, the ban on TRIS in children’s night­
clothes to have averted 500 possible cancer cases, and the lawn- 
mower regulation to have reduced annual injuries by 60,000163. 
For the CPSC’s co-operation with standardisation organisations 
and for recall actions164, there are similarly impressive figures165. 
Critics of the Commission have questioned these success claims 
in individual studies. The careful analysis of the Mattress 
Flammability Standard 1973166 by P. Linneman167 finds that a 
reliable pronouncement on the standard's effects is impossible. 
He points out, however, that the Commission's regulation stan­
dard had simply adopted a voluntary standard, which had already 
been adhered to by industry to 80% Moreover, the Commission 
seems to have been prevented from adopting a stricter solution to 
the problem (namely promulgation of a standard on self-extin­
guishing cigarettes)168. W.K. Viscusi has checked all mandatory
163 CPSC figures to the 1981 Congressional Hearings, loc. cit. (note 62), 
431; also 419,426.
164 For 1981 cf. loc. cit. (note 163), 427; cf. also the 1983 Congressional 
Hearings, loc. cit. (note 24), 318 et seq.
165 The individual estimates may be added together. Thus, for 1981, the 
Commission arrives at a reduction, in relation to mandatory and vol­
untary standards, by 300 deaths and 125,000 injuries (loc. cit., note 62, 
412); for 1983, 450 deaths and 248,000 injuries are claimed (loc. cit., 
note 24, 309).
166 38 F.R. 15095 (8 June 1973).




























































































standards, in detail and overall, for their effects. His analysis of 
the 1973 Poison Preventive Packaging Regulation169 concentrates 
on figures for child poisoning by aspirin. He disputes the success 
claimed by the Commission for compulsory child-proof contain­
ers; the poisoning rate, he says, fell generally, and the relatively 
better figures for the product covered by the regulation should be 
measured against possible counterproductive side effects of the 
regulation in other areas (such as "lulling" effects in non-regu- 
lated areas170). The phenomena mentioned by Viscusi certainly 
exist; however, it seems speculative to use them as evidence in an 
argument like his. The Commission's positive findings are, at any 
rate, supported by studies of the American Academy of Pedi­
atrics171. In the case of the standard for children's cots172, even 
Viscusi concedes an improvement in accident figures by 10%173; 
a demonstration that this improvement can be attributed to some 
general trend can hardly be provided.
These conflicting analyses cannot and will not be defini­
tively assessed here. The controversies, at any rate, show how 
ambitiously research on effects must be designed if it is not only 
to determine involvement of the regulated products in accidents, 
but also clarify other possible influencing factors taking side ef­
fects of regulation into account. The CPSC can at any rate claim 
that its many critics have so far failed to undertake analyses 
which would conclusively question the benefits of standard-set­
ting. And there can hardly be any doubt that the Commission's
168 Bollier/Claybrook, 1986, 173; the standard has since been supple­
mented, see 16 CFR 1632 (1985).
169 38 F.R. 21247 (7 August 1873), 16 CFR 1700.
170 Viscusi, 1984, 77 et seq.; see also idem 1985, 539 et seq.
171 See figures by Greensher/Mofenson to 1981 Congressional Hearings, 
Ioc. cit. (note 62), 81.
172 38 F.R. 129 (21 November 1973), 16 CFR 1508.




























































































recall activities serve an extremely useful function - although 
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